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ROBERT C. ILLIG* 
Hedge funds and other private equity funds are aggressive monitors of 
corporate America.  Their investment strategies are designed to squeeze agency 
costs and other inefficiencies out of underperforming companies.  Mutual 
funds and public pension funds, by contrast, have remained relentlessly 
passive despite their many resources.  Rather than seek to improve the 
performance of their portfolio companies, they generally prefer to exit any 
investments that turn sour.  Why the difference?  In this Article, Professor Illig 
compares the business environments and regulatory regimes affecting different 
types of institutional investors.  He concludes that the primary reason that 
most institutional investors do not better discipline corporate wrongdoing is 
that their individual fund managers have little incentive to do so.  Were they 
permitted to adopt the incentive compensation structure of a hedge fund, 
however, mutual funds and public pension funds would compete to provide 
the oversight necessary to make corporate managers more accountable.  The 
result would be a deeper market for good corporate governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate America needs better monitoring.  Even in the post-
Sarbanes-Oxley era, managers of public companies remain largely 
insulated from outside influence.  They are protected by a 
combination of takeover defenses and the business judgment rule 
and have little to fear from either hostile raiders or their own 
shareholders.  The pendulum remains stuck in favor of managerial 
discretion.  It will swing back toward greater accountability to 
shareholder interests only if managers are subject to more effective 
oversight. 
In the early 1990s, a group of corporate governance scholars led 
initially by Mark Roe and Bernard Black believed they had at last 
identified corporate law’s white knight.  So-called institutional 
investors—large pools of capital invested by professional fund 
managers—appeared to have amassed the resources necessary to act 
as a check against corporate wrongdoing.1  Remove the barriers that 
make shareholder activism so expensive, they argued, and 
institutional investors would happily provide the oversight that 
seemed to be missing from corporate America.2 
Among institutional investors, mutual funds and public pension 
funds displayed the greatest potential as monitors.  They therefore 
received the bulk of the scholarly attention and took on increased 
importance in America’s overall system of corporate governance.3  
                                                          
 1. See Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950–2000:  Major 
Changes But Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349, 353–57 (2000) (tracing the growth 
of institutional investors from 1950–2000); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) 
Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 449–51 (1991) 
(discussing the growth of institutional investors in the 1980s). 
 2. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 
523 (1990) (arguing that “institutional shareholders are hobbled by a complex web 
of legal rules that make it difficult, expensive, and legally risky to own large 
percentage stakes”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control:  The Institutional 
Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1336 (1991) (arguing that 
public pension funds are closer than any other market player to the ideal corporate 
monitor); Rock, supra note 1, at 449 (arguing that “the institutional investor would 
seem to have both the incentive and the abilities to constrain management”); Mark J. 
Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 11, 31–53 
(1991) (arguing that “American law and politics deliberately diminished the power 
of financial institutions to hold the large equity blocks that would foster serious 
oversight of managers”).  The first modern support for institutional investor 
monitoring appears to have come from Alfred Conard.  See Alfred F. Conard, Beyond 
Managerialism:  Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 117, 175–76 (1988) 
(arguing that “institutional investors . . . offer the best hope of restoring to private 
enterprise the vigor that is inherent in the design of capitalism”). 
 3. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1292–93 (arguing that public pension funds and, 
to a lesser degree, mutual funds are the most likely institutional investors to engage 
in criticism and opposition of corporate management); Rock, supra note 1, at 450 
  
228 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:225 
Moreover, like public companies, they aggregate the capital of retail 
investors and are the subject of extensive federal regulation.  I 
therefore refer to mutual funds and public pension funds collectively 
as “public equity funds.” 
Despite their obvious promise, however, most institutional investors 
have remained stubbornly passive.  As explained in Part I of this 
Article, banks and insurance companies suffer from too many 
conflicts of interest to oppose management prerogatives.  The same is 
true for private pension funds, those that are sponsored by corporate 
employers.  Meanwhile, despite being free from most obvious 
conflicts, public equity funds generally prefer to follow the Wall 
Street Rule—sell when performance begins to lag—rather than 
expend resources to influence corporate policy.4 
Not all institutional investors are passive, however.  As 
demonstrated in Part II, venture capital, leveraged buyout (“LBO”) 
and certain hedge funds5—known collectively as private equity 
funds—are the antithesis of passive investors.  Denoted the “kings of 
capitalism” by The Economist, they generally seek to acquire control 
over a limited number of target companies in order to actively direct 
corporate policy.6  In other words, they compete based on their 
relative ability to squeeze agency costs out of inefficient companies.7  
                                                          
(“The heads of public employee pension funds have become high profile players in 
the corporate governance process.”). 
 4. See K.A.D. Camara, Classifying Institutional Investors, 30 J. CORP. L. 219, 230 
(2005) (observing that mutual funds have no preference between improving the 
value of a portfolio company and selling to invest elsewhere). 
 5. In recent years, hedge funds have increasingly invested in leveraged buyouts 
and other traditional private equity transactions.  See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 33 (2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter SEC HEDGE 
FUND REPORT] (noting that a number of hedge funds “adopt traditional, long-only 
strategies similar to those used by most registered investment companies”); see also 
Alan Murray, Hedge Funds Are New Sheriffs of Boardroom, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2005, at 
A2 (“Any risk-averse company that wants to sit on a big pile of cash waiting for a rainy 
day is likely to find itself under quick attack from [hedge funds] that will come in, 
buy up stock, and agitate for change.”); Emily Thornton & Susan Zegel, Hedge Funds:  
The New Raiders, BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2005, at 32 (“Flush with hundreds of billions 
of dollars in cash from investors and hard-pressed to maintain the double-digit 
returns they promise as competition stiffens, many hedge funds are reinventing 
themselves as private investment firms . . . . [T]hey’re seizing control of 
companies.”).  Thus, to the extent a hedge fund invests in corporate equities with a 
view to acquiring control, it may properly be categorized as a private equity fund.  See 
infra notes 203–207 and accompanying text.  Notable examples of this trend include 
the acquisitions in 2004 and 2005 of American icons Sears and Kmart by ESL 
Investments.  See infra note 207. 
 6. Kings of Capitalism:  A Survey of Private Equity, ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 2004, at 2. 
 7. Industry insiders generally articulate this concept by noting that private 
equity funds compete based upon four factors:  their access to deals, their access to 
leverage, their ability to manage costs, and their ability to pick deals.  Considered 
from the light of corporate governance, however, it seems clear that at least the first 
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In doing so, they have effectively resolved corporate law’s 
fundamental agency problem by reuniting ownership and control.8  
The result has been annual returns that can be as high as twenty to 
forty percent or more.9 
                                                          
and last of these factors, and probably the third as well, are really just aspects of the 
broader competition to minimize agency costs.  In other words, the term “deal” in 
this formulation must really be interpreted as meaning “deal that presents the 
opportunity to identify and minimize agency costs.”  Thus, competition in actuality 
revolves around the fund managers’ ability to access and select (and manage) 
investment opportunities that present excess agency costs. 
For examples of research supporting the industry’s success at minimizing agency 
costs, see George P. Baker & Karen H. Wruck, Organizational Changes and Value 
Creation in Leveraged Buyouts:  The Case of the O.M. Scott & Sons Company, 25 J. FIN. 
ECON. 163, 189 (1989) (arguing that the pressure created by a high debt load and 
the incentives created by management equity ownership following an LBO lead to 
improved firm performance); Michael Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61, 65 (arguing that post-LBO companies have an 
incentive structure that is superior to that of public corporations); Krishna G. 
Palepu, Consequences of Leveraged Buyouts, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 247, 248–56 (1990) 
(summarizing the existing evidence and finding that leveraged buyouts create value 
through significant operating performance improvements); Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, 
Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm 
Performance 31–32 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper 
No. 139/2006, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=948907 (finding that 
activist hedge funds create value for target company shareholders).  See also JOSH 
LERNER, FELDA HARDYMON & ANN LEAMON, VENTURE CAPITAL & PRIVATE EQUITY:  A 
CASEBOOK 1 (3d ed. 2005) (explaining that private equity funds “protect the value of 
their equity stakes by undertaking careful due diligence before making the 
investments and retaining powerful oversight rights afterwards”); Marcel Kahan & 
Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1021, 1062–69 (2007) (discussing the nature of hedge fund monitoring); 
Walter Kiechel III, Private Equity’s Long View, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2007, at 18, 
19 (arguing that private equity managers, “in their treatment of the businesses they 
acquire, are merely putting to use many of the best ideas and analytic techniques that 
have been developed in the corporate strategy revolution”). 
 8. For background on the agency problem that lies at the heart of America’s 
separation of ownership and control, see infra Part I.A. 
 9. See GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL CAPITALISTS:  
KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE 207–09 (1998) 
(reporting returns of twenty-five to forty percent on a portfolio of LBO investments); 
KEY TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING 74 (William M. Mercer, 
Inc. ed. 1996) [hereinafter MERCER REPORT] (finding that “annual returns range 
from 0% to more than 30%, with an average of 10% to 20%, far surpassing that 9% 
to 10% average returns historically realized by common stock investors”); Michael 
Jensen, Active Investors, LBOs, and The Privatization of Bankruptcy, 2 J. APPLIED CORP. 
FIN. 35, 39 (1989) (testifying to Congress that returns on successful LBOs ranged 
from forty percent to fifty-six percent); Greg Ip & Henny Sender, Cash Machine:  In 
Today’s Buyouts, Payday for Firms is Never Far Away, WALL. ST. J., July 25, 2006, at A1 
(reporting that buyout funds had average annual returns of twenty-four percent in 
2004 and 2005, triple the return of the S&P 500).  In 2006, the nation’s highest paid 
hedge fund manager posted a forty-four percent return, net of fees, while the second 
and third posted returns of around thirty percent and twenty-four and one-half 
percent, respectively.  Stephen Taub, Top 25 Moneymakers:  The New Tycoons, ALPHA, 
Apr. 2007, at 39, 42–43. 
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Surprisingly, however, most corporate governance scholars have 
thus far ignored the important role played by private equity funds.10  
In fact, some have gone so far as to warn against attempts to imagine 
a counterfactual world with different legal rules that encourage 
institutional investor monitoring.11  Yet public and private equity 
funds are closely related in that both are simply pools of money that 
professional fund managers use to purchase securities on behalf of 
their investors.  As a result, their different approaches to corporate 
governance create a sort of natural experiment that is unburdened by 
differences in culture or time.12  By contrasting the various 
characteristics and regulatory regimes impacting public and private 
                                                          
 10. For three very worthwhile exceptions, see William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds 
and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1403 (2007) (examining empirical 
evidence regarding hedge fund activism); Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 
7, at 37 (arguing that “hedge funds are better positioned to act as informed monitors 
than most other investors”); and Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 1021 (examining the 
nature of hedge fund activism and its implications for corporate governance and 
regulatory reform).  Coffee and Black also made implicit references to private equity 
funds when they identified the monitoring role played by fund managers in 
leveraged buyouts.  Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring:  The 
Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895, 924–25 (1992) [hereinafter Black, Empirical 
Evidence]; Coffee, supra note 2, at 1315 n.159.  Finally, Black and Henry Hu have 
been critical of the role of hedge funds in decoupling voting rights from economic 
ownership at many large corporations.  See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New 
Vote Buying:  Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 
907 (2006) (analyzing the potential benefits and costs associated with the 
increasingly common practice of vote buying). 
 11. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents:  The Promise of Institutional Investor 
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 830–31 (1992) (“We can’t today answer the 
counterfactual questions:  How much monitoring would the institutions do if legal 
rules were different?  How valuable is institutional oversight?”); see also Donald C. 
Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds:  Derivative 
Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 
1019, 1031–32 (2005) (arguing that the unique features of mutual fund governance 
suggests that “judges and policymakers should not even try to reason by analogy to 
governance in other kinds of corporations”). 
 12. This term was used by Coffee to describe a comparison between U.S. capital 
markets and those of Great Britain, the foreign economy most closely resembling 
that of the United States.  John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor:  A 
Half-Time Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 844 (1994).  However, the dichotomy 
between public and private equity funds is superior and presents a cleaner 
comparison than either a historical or cross-cultural analysis.  While such 
comparisons are undoubtedly helpful and provide valuable insights, they suffer 
obvious impediments resulting from differences in culture, history and language.  See 
Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 
102 YALE L.J. 2021, 2036 (1993) (noting that it is difficult to judge which country’s 
system produces the best economic performance); see also Edward B. Rock, America’s 
Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate Governance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 368 
(1996) (tracing the emerging interest of comparative corporate governance 
scholarship).  For this reason, this Article does not attempt to draw any conclusions 
based on the distinctions between American private equity markets from those of 
Europe or Asia. 
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equity funds, I seek to uncover in Parts III and IV important insights 
about the continued passivity of public equity funds. 
My thesis is that the key difference between public and private 
equity funds lies in the types of compensation that fund managers are 
permitted to charge.13  Private equity fund managers charge a fee 
based on performance, typically retaining for themselves twenty 
percent of any profits they produce through effective corporate 
oversight.14  By contrast, the individuals who administer mutual funds 
and public pension funds are generally limited to charging a flat 
percentage fee based on the assets they manage.15  Thus, whereas 
managers of private equity funds are entitled to share directly in any 
profits that accrue from efficient monitoring, public equity fund 
managers have at best an indirect incentive to monitor.  Indeed, with 
mutual fund fees generally peaking at around one or two percent of 
assets under management, the costs of shareholder activism are 
almost certain to outweigh such limited benefits. 
Put succinctly, private equity funds invest in active corporate 
monitoring because the structure of their compensation provides 
their managers with a direct financial incentive to do so.  As I argue 
in Part V, it is not only the high cost of oversight that discourages 
monitoring, as some scholars have suggested, but the fact that 
monitoring is not profitable for the fund managers in light of such 
costs.  Like their public company brethren, public equity funds are 
fictional legal entities that suffer from their own internal agency 
problems, with the interests of fund managers and their investors 
often differing.16  Permit the fund managers to share in the profits 
from monitoring and you give them a direct financial interest in 
more active oversight.  The result would be to engage public equity 
                                                          
 13. John Coffee made the same point.  See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1362–63 
(arguing that the compensation of public equity fund managers “does little to align 
incentives between the manager and the fund it serves . . . incentive compensation 
based on capital appreciation would work far better”).  However, this Article takes 
Coffee’s argument one step further, by expressly comparing the fee structure of 
public equity funds with that of private equity funds.  It also extends the argument by 
concluding that deregulating fund manager compensation would have the effect of 
fostering a system of institutional investor control, not merely voice.  Cf. Paul G. 
Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 161, 179–80 
(2004) (raising the possibility of trying to “harness the monitoring efforts of 
institutional investors for the benefit of unsophisticated investors” by relaxing the 
restrictions on incentive compensation); Jesse Eisinger, Long & Short:  Pay-for-
Performance Bedevils Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2005, at C1 (arguing that more 
mutual funds should copy hedge funds in adopting performance fees). 
 14. See infra Part II.D. 
 15. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
 16. Rock, supra note 1, at 469–72 (describing the agency problem existing 
between public equity fund money managers and their depositors); see also infra Part 
V.A (examining existing incentives for public equity fund managers). 
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funds, with their vast store of retail dollars, in competition to impose 
greater discipline on corporate managers.  Indeed, the continued 
willingness of sophisticated investors to pay the outsized fees of 
private equity fund managers attests to the power of their 
compensation model. 
In addition to my primary thesis, an important theme of this Article 
is that a system characterized by institutional investor voice—as 
opposed to institutional investor control—would be too subtle to 
succeed.  Voice is the term used by scholars to describe a system 
wherein shareholders are limited to small, fractional stakes but able 
to combine their energies so as to wield greater collective influence 
over management.17  It can be contrasted to the private equity model 
of acquiring direct control over individual corporations in order to 
dictate policy.  However, the relatively minor benefits attainable 
through the exercise of voice may not be sufficient to justify the 
increased expense.  Rather, the impetus to monitor requires a much 
greater incentive:  that which comes from exercising control.  Thus, it 
may not be possible to obtain the benefits sought by proponents of 
increased voice without going one step further and adopting a system 
of institutional investor control.18 
Before continuing to the substance of my argument, it is important 
to note that a significant debate continues with respect to the 
advisability of enlisting institutional investors as corporate monitors.19  
                                                          
 17. See, e.g., Black, supra note 11, at 816 (“Institutional voice means a world in 
which particular institutions can easily own 5–10% stakes in particular companies, 
but can’t easily own much more than 10%; in which institutions can readily talk to 
each other and select a minority of a company’s board of directors, but can’t easily 
exercise day-to-day control or select a majority of the board.”).  Under some 
circumstances, the term “shareholder voice” may also include informal means of 
communication between shareholders and corporate managers occurring outside of 
the formal voting and proxy system but aimed at and supported by the corporate 
franchise.  Black, supra note 2, at 522 n.3.  It is sometimes used synonymously with 
the concept of “investor capitalism.” 
 18. Part of the explanation for the persistence of our current system of corporate 
governance may be attributable to a lingering discomfort among scholars and 
policymakers with the notion of financial institutions exercising control over major 
American corporations.  This, of course, is exactly the point that Mark Roe made 
with respect to the nation as a whole.  See Roe, supra note 2, at 11 (“Opinion polls 
show Americans mistrust large financial institutions with accumulated power and 
have always been wary of Wall Street controlling industry.”); see also Kahan & Rock, 
supra note 7, at 1042–45 (comparing the nature of hedge fund activism favorably to 
the more traditional types of monitoring engaged in by public equity funds). 
 19. To borrow John Coffee’s typically colorful prose: 
One side in this debate tends to see institutional investors essentially as 
Gulliver tied down by a host of Lilliputian regulations. . . . Free Gulliver, they 
argue, and the market will work.  The other side not only believes that the 
market today is working satisfactorily, but that it is threatened by . . . [a] 
nightmar[ish] vision of the future . . . in which invisible coalitions of 
institutional investors can form virtually overnight . . . . 
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A group of reform-minded scholars, among them Black, Roe and 
Lucian Bebchuk, believe that federal proxy regulations should be 
amended to lower the costs associated with institutional investor 
activism.  For them, managers remain unaccountable and the 
increased discipline that would likely come with greater institutional 
shareholdings would be a net positive.20  By contrast, a great many 
scholars, many of them prominent in the law and economics 
movement, believe otherwise.21  There is also a related question as to 
whether activist monitoring strategies would impose undue risk on 
the retirement savings of retail investors.22  Finally, not everyone 
                                                          
Coffee, supra note 12, at 842.  For an assessment of some of the risks associated with 
institutional investor monitoring, see id. at 871–75; Coffee, supra note 2, at 1329–36.  
See also Roe, supra note 2, at 53–67 (“Concentrated financial capital does not mix well 
with a broad-based egalitarian democracy in which interest groups can acquire great 
influence . . . .”). 
 20. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833, 835–36 (2005) (advocating proxy reform in order to encourage the 
exercise of institutional investor voice); Black, supra note 11, at 812–15 (arguing that 
institutional investor oversight of corporate wrongdoing is not only possible but 
desirable); see Roe, supra note 2, at 15 (noting that when General Motors faced 
bankruptcy due to mismanagement in the 1920s, Pierre DuPont—who owned twenty-
five percent of GM—relocated to Detroit and reorganized the company without a 
proxy fight or hostile takeover (citing ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR. & STEPHEN SALISBURY, 
PIERRE S. DU PONT AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN CORPORATION 457–560 (1971))); 
see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 
1489, 1502–17 (1970) (arguing at an early date that five-percent shareholders should 
be entitled to use management’s proxy materials); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier 
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director:  An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 863, 883–92 (1991) (recommending a program of increased 
institutional investor activism). 
 21. For a sample of critiques of proposals to increase shareholder power, see 
generally Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 561 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder 
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for 
Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671 (1995) [hereinafter 
Bainbridge, Politics]; Allen D. Boyer, Activist Shareholders, Corporate Directors, and 
Institutional Investment:  Some Lessons from the Robber Barons, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
977, 1038–39 (1993); K.A.D. Camara, Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in 
Corporate Law, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1425 (2004); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, 
Election Contests In the Company’s Proxy:  An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 
67 (2003); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic:  A Traditionalist Response 
to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759 (2006). 
 22. See Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and Entrepreneurs in American Corporate 
Finance, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997) (arguing that the primary purpose of institutional 
investors is to shield their customers from undue risk).  But see Gregory S. Alexander, 
Pensions and Passivity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 112 (1993) (arguing that the 
regulation of retirement plans combines passivity with paternalism in a manner that 
“denies pension participants the political and moral virtues that historically have 
been associated with the two great models of ownership that have competed since 
the nineteenth century:  liberalism and socialism”). 
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believes that private equity funds have a positive impact on either the 
companies in which they invest or society as a whole.23 
I do not attempt to answer such questions in this Article, nor do I 
attempt to make any type of cross-cultural analysis of foreign 
regulatory systems.  Rather, the purpose of this Article is to provide a 
roadmap for those who would enlist public equity funds as monitors 
of corporate America, thereby bringing retail investment dollars into 
the market for good corporate governance.  Existing research on 
public equity funds provides an inadequate explanation for their 
continued passivity.  Thus, my goal is to advance the scholarly 
thinking on the subject by offering a new methodology of 
comparison and a new exemplar of corporate discipline. 
Private equity funds engage in the kind of aggressive monitoring 
that is absent from the investment strategies of most public equity 
funds.  By building on their example, regulators can fundamentally 
alter the relationship between corporate managers and their 
shareholders.  In particular, they can help promote a competitive 
marketplace for good corporate governance. 
I. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR MONITORING 
Part I of this Article explores the puzzle presented by public equity 
funds:  given their size and resources, why have they remained such 
passive investors?  After presenting some general background on 
corporate governance in Part I.A, Parts I.B and I.C review the existing 
scholarship regarding institutional investor monitoring.  Part I.D 
then considers various efforts that have been undertaken to reform 
the federal proxy system in order to encourage public equity funds to 
engage more actively in oversight activities.  Finally, Part I.E examines 
the current landscape and concludes that, even after substantial legal 
reform and scholarly attention, public equity funds remain as 
stubbornly passive today as when they were first “discovered” by 
scholars in the early 1990s. 
                                                          
 23. As an example, a number of legal scholars have been critical of the structure 
of leveraged buyouts undertaken by LBO funds.  See Patricia L. Bryan, Leveraged 
Buyouts and Tax Policy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1039, 1041–42 (1987) (summarizing 
arguments against LBOs); see also Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A 
Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1366 (1978) (arguing that LBOs 
offer little more than an opportunity for management to benefit at the expense of 
stockholders); Dale Arthur Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts:  Creating 
or Appropriating Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 207, 218–23 (1988) 
(summarizing potential abuses of the use of leverage). 
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A. Background 
It is by now an old and familiar story that America’s system of 
corporate governance is characterized by a separation of ownership 
and control.  As we have known since the 1930s, shareholders, despite 
being the corporation’s residual claimants, possess little to no direct 
power over the officers and directors who control its day-to-day 
affairs.24  The cause is atomization:  unlike their counterparts in 
Europe and Japan, American shareholders tend to own small, 
fractional stakes in any given corporation, preferring instead to 
diversify their investments across a wide number of stocks.25 
The result of our system of dispersed share ownership is a collective 
action problem that leads inexorably to rational shareholder apathy.26  
For any one shareholder, the cost of monitoring corporate 
management almost certainly outweighs the potential benefits.27  This 
                                                          
 24. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (offering the first complete description of the separation of 
ownership and control); see also Bainbridge, Politics, supra note 21, at 674–78 (arguing 
that “shareholders of a public corporation have neither the legal right, the practical 
ability, nor the desire to exercise the kind of control necessary for meaningful 
monitoring of the corporation’s agents”).  This separation has been embedded in 
the corporate statutes of all fifty states in the statutory delegation of power to the 
board of directors.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) (“The business 
and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or 
under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) 
(2005) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the 
board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation 
shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board 
of directors. . . .”). 
 25. See Roe, supra note 2, at 12–16 (recounting the traditional Berle-Means story).  
The American system is often contrasted with those of Germany and Japan.  In 
Germany in 1985, for example, banks effectively exercised control over thirty-four 
percent of the voting power of the top one hundred companies, and over fifty 
percent of the voting power of the top ten.  Coffee, supra note 2, at 1303.  Japanese 
financial institutions have similarly dominated industrial firms through the keiretsu 
system.  Id. at 1294–1302.  See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History:  The 
Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. 
REV. 641, 641 (1999) (noting that “contemporary empirical evidence finds that, even 
at the level of the largest firms, dispersed share ownership is . . . largely limited to the 
United States and Great Britain”). 
 26. For a superb explication of corporate law’s agency problem and collective 
action problem from the law and economics tradition, see Rock, supra note 1, at 453–
63 (summarizing the work of Mancur Olson, Russell Hardin, Albert Hirschman and 
others).  See also Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, 
and Economic Organizations, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 788 (1972) (arguing that it is 
neither desirable nor feasible for individual shareholders to participate in each 
decision in a corporation); Black, supra note 2, at 526 n.10 (cataloguing law and 
economics scholarship that views passivity as inevitable and therefore opposes 
legislative efforts to reform the proxy system). 
 27. Roe gives the example of the shareholder who owns $10 million of the stock 
of a $10 billion company.  Such investor should rationally decline to invest $100,000 
in monitoring activities even if such amount would create $100 million in additional 
value for the company.  Roe, supra note 2, at 14. 
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is because those benefits must be shared pro rata with one’s fellow 
shareholders.  Thus, when an investment turns sour, American 
shareholders rationally prefer to sell their shares rather than attempt 
to influence management to improve its performance.28 
The fundamental problem of corporate law is that this separation 
of ownership and control causes the interests of shareholders and 
managers to diverge, thereby producing agency costs.29  For example, 
shareholders would generally prefer that managers work diligently, 
competently, honestly and efficiently.  Managers, on the other hand, 
often use their discretion over a corporation’s affairs to benefit 
themselves, either through lawful mechanisms such as high salaries 
and lavish benefits, or occasionally through unlawful means such as 
occurred most recently and spectacularly at the likes of Enron and 
WorldCom.30  The result is a loss of value for shareholders and a 
disincentive for the optimal level of investment.31 
Admittedly, the traditional image of countless small investors each 
owning a few isolated shares is outdated.32  Today, over sixty percent 
of all securities in the United States are held by large and 
                                                          
 28. See generally Black, supra note 2, at 526–29 (describing what he terms “The 
Passivity Story”). 
 29. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:  RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 1 (1970) (“Under any economic, social, or 
political system, individuals, business firms, and organizations in general are subject 
to lapses from efficient, rational, law-abiding, virtuous, or otherwise functional 
behavior.  No matter how well a society’s basic institutions are devised, failures of 
some actors to live up to the behavior which is expected of them are bound to 
occur. . . .”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Shareholder Activism and Institutional Investors 7 
(UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 05-20, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=796227 (arguing that “agency costs are the inescapable 
result of placing ultimate decision-making authority in the hands of someone other 
than the residual claimant”). 
 30. Roe, supra note 2, at 12 (“Managers want high salaries, nice offices, and, if 
the firm is large enough, corporate jets.  Occasionally they take corporate 
opportunities for themselves.  Much more perniciously, many managers pursue 
operating policies that diminish social wealth.”).  For a discussion of executive 
compensation issues, see LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:  
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); Mark J. Loewenstein, 
The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2000); Charles 
M. Yablon, Bonus Questions:  Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for Performance, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271 (1999). 
 31. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976) 
(discussing the economic theory behind the divergence of interests between 
principals and agents).  See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 
63–68 (1974) (examining the conflicting goals of those in authority and those not in 
authority within various societal organizations). 
 32. See Black, supra note 2, at 523 (“The passivity story also assumes a company 
with thousands of anonymous shareholders, each owning a tiny fraction of the 
company’s voting stock.  That assumption, never wholly true, is increasingly obsolete.  
Institutional investors have grown large enough so that a limited number of 
institutions own a sizeable percentage of the shares of most public companies.”). 
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sophisticated institutional investors.33  However, so long as 
institutional investors continue to pursue passive investment 
strategies, the fact of their higher ownership percentages will remain 
largely irrelevant for corporate governance purposes.  Their function 
is to provide retail investors with the benefits of a diversified 
portfolio, not to act on their own behalf as independent players in 
the financial markets.34  For most companies, then, ultimate 
beneficial ownership remains widely dispersed. 
Moreover, the underlying agency problem has been exacerbated 
because management has used its power over the corporate purse to 
protect itself from outside discipline.  Not only is management’s 
discretion increasingly shielded by the business judgment rule,35 for 
                                                          
 33. See Institutional Investors Snap Up U.S. Stocks, REUTERS, Jan. 22, 2007, available at 
http://www.signonsandiego.com.news/business/20070122-155-investors-ownership.h 
tml (summarizing 2005 data collected by the Conference Board); see also INVESTMENT 
COMPANY INSTITUTE, INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 10 (47th ed. 2007) [hereinafter 
INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK] (reporting that registered investment companies 
held twenty-five percent of the outstanding stock of all U.S. companies at the end of 
2006, and were also the largest holders of U.S. commercial paper).  U.S. investment 
companies also play an outsized role in foreign capital markets.  See INVESTMENT 
COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra (reporting that, in 2006, “U.S. investment companies 
purchased approximately 55 percent of the $290 billon in foreign stocks and bonds 
that U.S. residents acquired”). 
 34. See Allan F. Conwill, Blight or Blessing?  The Wharton School Study of Mutual 
Funds, 18 BUS. LAW. 663, 667 (1963) (“[A]n investor of moderate means cannot 
achieve the diversification provided by most funds by individual investment in 
selected stocks.  Unless he has substantial funds available, he cannot buy each of the 
one hundred or more securities which are in the portfolio of the typical mutual 
fund.  Thus, the mutual fund provides the modest investor with an easy and 
convenient vehicle for achieving diversification.”); Mahoney, supra note 13, at 180 
(“Mutual funds give investors the benefit of diversification and, if the fund is actively 
managed, professional money management.”); Smith, supra note 22, at 5 (arguing 
that the primary purpose of institutional investors is to shield their customers from 
undue risk via diversification). 
 35. The business judgment rule is a presumption that managers, when making a 
business decision, do so “on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief 
that the action was taken in the best interests of the company.”  Aronson v. Lewis, 
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).  It is generally understood as protecting managerial 
discretion by barring courts and shareholders from second-guessing board decisions 
unless certain exceptions apply.  See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123 
(1986) (noting that “the mere mention of the business judgment rule brings smiles 
of relief to corporate directors”).  The adoption by the Delaware legislature of 
section 102(b)(7), which authorizes corporations to limit or eliminate the personal 
liability of directors for breaches of their fiduciary duty of care, as well as recent 
caselaw regarding the duty of good faith, appear part of a trend to minimize the 
impact of those exceptions.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); Stone 
v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 372–73 (Del. 2006) (holding that defendant directors could 
not be found liable for failing to prevent employee actions that led to $50 million in 
fines because the directors had exercised their oversight responsibility in good faith 
by implementing what the court considered a reasonable reporting system, despite 
the fact that system had ultimately proven to be ineffective); In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006) (holding that the business judgment 
rule protected the actions of directors of The Walt Disney Company in agreeing to 
terminate then-president Michael Ovitz on a no-fault basis, thereby allowing him to 
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example, but managers have shown themselves to be adept at 
manipulating politics36 and the press,37 as well as at co-opting their 
                                                          
leave the company with a lucrative severance package); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 
244, 267 (Del. 2000) (holding that the business judgment rule protected the actions 
of directors of The Walt Disney Company in approving what plaintiffs characterized 
as an extravagant and wasteful employment agreement for Michael Ovitz as the 
company’s president). 
For an interesting take on how existing law regarding the duty of care could be 
interpreted expansively, see Judd F. Sneirson, Doing Well by Doing Good:  Leveraging 
Due Care for Better, More Socially Responsible Corporate Decisionmaking, 3 CORP. GOV. L. 
REV. 438, 468–69 (2007) (arguing that, in order to satisfy the duty of care, a manager 
must inform herself as to the environmental and social impacts of corporate 
decisions). 
 36. Management’s successful lobbying of state politicians during the “takeover 
wars” of the 1980s is well known and resulted in a wide variety of anti-takeover 
legislation.  See, e.g., BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 463 (D. Del. 1988) 
(summarizing the operation and effect of various anti-takeover statutes).  Many of 
these statutes were written and adopted in haste at the request of a local firm that was 
facing the threat of a hostile takeover.  According to Dale Oesterle: 
When rumors circulated about a takeover of Boeing Corporation, for 
example, the Washington legislature met in emergency session and 
approved a bill, signed immediately by the governor, that had been drafted 
by Boeing counsel.  Arizona state officials, at the request of Greyhound 
Corporation, introduced, adopted, and signed into law the Arizona Control 
Share Act in three days.  It took Illinois only two days and Minnesota only 
one to pass their statutes.  The governor of Massachusetts signed the 
Massachusetts statute in the offices of Gillette, a takeover target at the time. 
DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 615 (3d ed. 2005).  More 
recently, management has scored notable successes by quashing a proposal to 
significantly overhaul the proxy process and convincing the SEC to water down new 
rules on reporting executive compensation.  With respect to the SEC’s proposed 
overhaul of the proxy system, see infra Part I.D.  With respect to the rules on 
executive compensation, see Gretchen Morgenson, Weird and Weirder Numbers on Pay 
Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007, (Sunday Business) at 1; John Schwartz, 
Transparency, Lost in the Fog, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at C1. 
There has also been a great deal of lobbying aimed at lessening the impact of 
Sarbanes-Oxley on small businesses.  See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Investors’ Suits Face 
Higher Bar, Justices Decide, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2007, at A1 (reporting that, with the 
end of the Bush Administration looming, “industry groups and allies in academia 
have urged the Administration, Congress and regulators to make it harder for 
investors and consumers to sue companies [and] have also sought to relax some of 
the provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002”).  In fact, until the failure of 
WorldCom, it appeared that management might be successful in staving off any 
effort at reform proposed in the wake of Enron’s collapse.  Ironically, one event that 
may have helped to change the then-dimming prospects for reform was a speech by 
President Bush that was intended to reassure markets but that instead coincided with 
a sharp fall on Wall Street.  See David E. Sanger, How a Clear Strategy Got Muddy Results, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2002, at C1 (noting that the Dow Jones industrial average 
dropped 473 points, or five percent, in the three days following the President’s 
speech); see also Floyd Norris, Real Reform:  What Bush Might Have Said, N.Y. TIMES, July 
12, 2002, at C1 (suggesting that a speech proposing stronger corporate reforms 
would have gotten a better market reception); David E. Sanger & David E. 
Rosenbaum, White House Moves to Limit Corporate Scandals’ Fallout, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 
2002, at A1 (describing political maneuvering by the Bush Administration aimed at 
containing fallout from the accounting scandals and the volatile stock market).  The 
Senate approved its version of Sarbanes-Oxley 97–0 only hours after a second speech 
by President Bush, this one in Birmingham, Alabama, in which he again attempted 
to reassure investors even as the Dow Jones industrial average plunged another 440 
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supposed gatekeepers.38  In the judicial arena, corporate managers 
continue to score impressive victories against class action lawsuits, 
including the recent Supreme Court decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor 
Issues & Rights, Ltd.39  They have apparently “won” the takeover wars, 
effectively insulating themselves from all but the most costly of proxy 
                                                          
points.  David E. Sanger & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Senate Approves a Broad Overhaul of 
Business Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2002, at A1. 
 37. Corporate public relations efforts currently appear aimed at laying the 
groundwork for a further rollback of Sarbanes-Oxley.  They are spreading the notion 
that America’s share of the worldwide initial public offering (“IPO”) market is being 
diminished by its draconian recordkeeping and certification requirements.  See, e.g., 
Stephen Labaton, Is the S.E.C. Changing Course?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, at C1 
(reporting on a speech by SEC Chairman Christopher Cox in which Cox blames 
Sarbanes-Oxley for America’s perceived loss of IPO market share).  In fact, America’s 
share of global stock-market activity has increased, rather than fallen, over the past 
decade, with the U.S. market for equities growing at almost twice the pace of many 
foreign exchanges.  See James Surowiecki, The Financial Page:  Over There, NEW YORKER, 
Feb. 5, 2007, at 29; see also Greg Ip, Maybe U.S. Markets Are Still Supreme, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 27, 2007, at C1 (reporting on a study conducted by investment management 
scholars Andrew Karolyi, Rene Stulz, and Craig Doidge, which concluded that there 
is no evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley has led to foreign companies listing their shares 
in London instead of New York).  For an almost farcical example of management’s 
manipulation of the media, see Stewart’s Prison Life:  Martha Popular with Lunch Crowd, 
NEWSDAY, Nov. 29, 2004, at A12 (painting a domestic picture of prison life for “the 
famous homemaker” by highlighting the fact that she was serving time—and having 
lunch—with an anti-war Catholic nun). 
 38. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS:  THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 55–56 (2006) (summarizing several theories explaining the failure of 
gatekeepers—auditors, attorneys, etc.—to avoid the scandals at Enron and 
WorldCom, including the theory that corporate managers pressured or seduced 
their advisers into abetting their wrongdoing).  Post-Sarbanes-Oxley examples of 
apparently legal manipulation by management include using record-breaking 
corporate profits to redeem shares—and hence push up the value of management 
stock options—rather than make capital or other long-term investments, and 
deliberately underestimating corporate profits so as to minimize the risk of liability 
for a subsequent restatement of financial reports.  See, e.g., Buttonwood:  Companies Are 
Buying Back Their Own Shares at a Record Rate, ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 2007, at 87 (noting 
that “businesses are buying back shares, rather than investing in new plant and 
equipment”); Paul Krugman, Editorial, Another Economic Disconnect, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
30, 2007, at A21 (“Instead of investing in physical capital, many companies are using 
profits to buy back their own stock.  And cynics suggest that the purpose of these 
buybacks is to produce a temporary rise in stock prices that increases the value of 
executives’ stock options, even if it’s against the long-term interests of investors.”); 
Floyd Norris, Why Won’t Companies Invest More?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2007, at C1 
(quoting public remarks by Robert W. Parenteau, the chief U.S. economist and 
strategist for a subsidiary of Allianz, the German bank and insurance company, to the 
effect that American companies are using historically high corporate profits to buy 
back shares, thereby pushing up the value of management stock options). 
 39. 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (ruling 8–1 that shareholders must show “cogent and 
compelling evidence” of intent to defraud in order to sustain a securities class action 
lawsuit); see also Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at A1 (quoting an executive at the National Chamber 
Litigation Center, which represents the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in the Supreme 
Court, as stating that the 2006–2007 Roberts Court was “our best Supreme Court 
term ever”); Stephen Labaton, Investors’ Suits Face Higher Bar, Justices Decide, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 22, 2007, at A1 (discussing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.). 
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contests and generally reducing even successful shareholder 
proposals to a merely advisory role.40  Even the adoption of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 has had only marginal impact on the level 
of managerial accountability.41 
As Mark Roe has demonstrated, however, the American system is 
most likely the product of a political choice, rather than an inevitable 
result of market or other historical forces.42  Americans appear to 
have long distrusted large accumulations of capital, fearing the power 
of wealth more than they feared the power of industrial capacity.43  As 
a result, over the years, American corporate law has slowly 
accumulated a series of rules that discourage shareholders from 
acquiring more than five (or sometimes ten) percent of any given 
corporation.44  The separation of ownership and control has thus 
                                                          
 40. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No:  A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with 
Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 858 (1993) (announcing famously:  
“The takeover wars are over.  Management won.”).  For a recent example of the 
ability of a corporate board to thwart a takeover attempt that is popular with its 
shareholders, see Gretchen Morgenson, A Board That Knows Two Words:  No Sale, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 8, 2007, (Sunday Business) at 1 (reporting on a $400 million offer for 
Midwest Air Group:  “While Midwest’s stockholders are jumping up and down for the 
deal, its directors have staunchly rejected it.  As a result, some Midwest shareholders 
wonder whether the board is performing its duty to the company’s owners or acting 
instead to benefit a management with whom it has long been associated.”). 
 41. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance:  Still Broke, No Fix in Sight, 
31 J. CORP. L. 39, 60 (2005) (arguing that Sarbanes-Oxley set modest goals—
deterring and catching illegal acts—and is still unlikely to meet them); Robert W. 
Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance:  2002 Style, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 49–52 
(2003) (describing the mostly unfavorable reactions of commentators following 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).  For a more critical view of the Act, see 
Robert Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 
114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1602 (2005) (“An extensive empirical literature suggests that 
[the] mandates [imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act] were seriously misconceived, 
because they are not likely to improve audit quality or otherwise enhance firm 
performance and thereby benefit investors as Congress intended.”). 
 42. Roe, supra note 2, at 10.  Roe has also extended his analysis of the political 
roots of corporate governance and applied it to the international stage.  E.g., MARK J. 
ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:  POLITICAL CONTEXT, 
CORPORATE IMPACT (2003); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS:  THE 
POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994). 
 43. See Roe, supra note 2, at 31–53 (arguing that restraints on the power of 
institutional investors arose from a combination of populist distrust of financial 
institutions, interest group politics, and the federalist structure of the American 
constitution); see also Joseph A. Grundfest, Subordination of American Capital, 27 J. FIN. 
ECON. 89, 89–90 (1990) (stating that the theme behind state and federal government 
efforts to limit investors’ influence over the governance of publicly traded 
corporations is that “society cannot trust stockholders and bondholders to promote 
the ‘public interest’”).  But see Coffee, supra note 2, at 1280 (arguing that “the 
populist image of a domineering J.P. Morgan seems to have been forever erased 
from the public’s mind” and that bank weakness, not bank strength, is the greater 
concern). 
 44. See Roe, supra note 2, at 11 (arguing that “American law and politics 
deliberately diminished the power of financial institutions to hold the large equity 
blocks that would foster serious oversight of managers”); see also Bainbridge, supra 
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become deeply embedded in the fundamental workings of our legal 
system. 
And yet, despite Roe’s admonition, much of the history of 
corporate governance reform has been directed at empowering some 
intermediary body to serve as a check against excessive managerial 
discretion.45  Thus, scholars and policymakers have, at various times 
and often at the same time, sought to enlist independent directors,46 
                                                          
note 29, at 4 (describing how current laws discourage the formation of large stock 
blocks as well as communication and coordination among shareholders); Black, 
supra note 2, at 530–64 (cataloguing the rules governing shareholder voting).  Coffee 
has added to this analysis the suggestion that various non-legal factors, such as 
conflicts of interest, also discourage shareholders from amassing too large a stake in 
any one company.  Coffee, supra note 2, at 1317–29. 
 45. See, e.g., Black, supra note 11, at 817 (explaining that “institutional voice 
means asking one set of agents (money managers) to watch another set of agents 
(corporate managers)”).  It is worth noting that this search for an effective monitor 
has not been linear, nor has it focused exclusively on one agent.  Rather, it has 
jumped from agent to agent, occasionally re-discovered a previously discarded agent, 
and often taken a shotgun approach, seeking to enlist the power of several monitors 
at once.  See, e.g., COFFEE, supra note 38, at 1–5 (attempting to enlist as monitors, 
simultaneously, auditors, attorneys, securities analysts, credit rating agencies, and 
investment bankers, among others). 
At the same time, it should also be recognized that there has been a countervailing 
push to expand managerial discretion and thus insulate managers from what is 
sometimes viewed as too much oversight.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director 
Primacy:  The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550–74 
(2003) (presenting a theory of corporate governance, director primacy, which is 
based on the notion that “the board of directors is not a mere agent of the 
shareholders, but rather is a sui generis body—a sort of Platonic guardian”).  This 
trend can be seen, for example, in the expansion of the business judgment rule and 
the more recent rollback of the fiduciary duties of care and good faith.  See supra 
note 35 (discussing Delaware caselaw that expanded protections for corporate 
directors).  In a more practical application of the trend, the founders of Google, 
Larry Page and Sergey Brin, took an unconventional approach to broad managerial 
discretion when they inserted in their IPO registration statement a letter to investors 
stating that its corporate structure “is likely to leave [the management team] with 
significant control over the company’s decisions and fate . . . . New investors will fully 
share in Google’s long term growth but will have less influence over its strategic 
decisions than they would at most public companies.”  Letter is Manifesto of Founders, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2004, at A10; see also Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Google Baloney, 
WALL ST. J., May 5, 2004, at A15 (critiquing Google’s efforts to “entrench insiders in 
control of the company” when it went public in 2004); Richard Waters, Google in Plan 
for $2.7 Bn Flotation, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2004, at A1 (describing Google’s unusual 
stock offering). 
 46. See, e.g., JAY W. LORSCH WITH ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES:  THE 
REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS 173–75 (1989) (recommending a reduced 
role for the CEO in selecting directors as a way to increase director independence 
and thereby improve corporate governance); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 20, at 
883–92 (proposing that institutional investors take an active role in electing 
independent, professional directors).  But see, e.g., Victor Brudney, The Independent 
Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 658 (1982) 
(analyzing past performance of independent directors and concluding that it is 
unrealistic to suggest that the independent director can be successful in fostering 
social responsibility).  For a more nuanced view, see Donald Langevoort, The Human 
Nature of Corporate Boards:  Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence 
and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 810–14 (2001) (arguing that the small group 
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hostile raiders,47 debtholders,48 institutional investors,49 and, most 
recently, gatekeepers50 as substitute corporate monitors.  The idea has 
been that, if it is impossible to completely align the interests of 
shareholders and managers, it may be possible to better align the 
interests of shareholders and these various market players, thus 
minimizing overall agency costs.51  In effect, by seeking to interpose a 
                                                          
dynamics of the board could be disrupted by too great a concentration of 
independent directors). 
 47. See Grundfest, supra note 40, at 869–73 (discussing the power of takeovers as 
a disciplinary mechanism); see also Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers:  Theory, 
Evidence and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 122–33 (1992) (analyzing two value-
maximizing efficiency explanations of takeovers:  realizing synergy gains and 
reducing agency costs); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 
73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965) (arguing that takeovers protect the interests of non-
controlling shareholders by providing some assurance of efficiency among corporate 
managers). 
 48. See Baker & Wruck, supra note 7, at 163, 169 (arguing that the pressure of 
servicing a high debt load following an LBO leads to improved firm performance); 
Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 
AM. ECON. REV. 323, 324 (1986) (arguing that a high debt load forces managers to 
become more disciplined in order to make periodic debt payments and meet 
quarterly financial goals); see also George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of 
Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1080 (1995) (proposing a 
theory of interactive corporate governance that is not centered on equity).  But see 
Roe, supra note 2, at 29 (noting that creditors tend to avoid exercising control 
because of the increased risk of liability). 
 49. See, e.g., Black, supra note 11, at 812–17 (arguing that legal reforms should be 
undertaken to facilitate oversight by institutional investors); Coffee, supra note 2, at 
1336 (stating that the benefits of institutional monitoring would outweigh the costs). 
 50. See COFFEE, supra note 38, at 6–8 (“Effective corporate governance requires a 
chain of actors:  directors, managers, and gatekeepers.”). 
 51. It is important to note, however, that an alternative thread of corporate law 
reform has been aimed at reducing agency costs by effectively reuniting ownership 
and control.  See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 31, at 309 (stating that “the 
issues associated with the ‘separation of ownership and control’ . . . are intimately 
associated with the general problem of agency”).  For example, a number of scholars 
have argued that business executives should be compensated primarily through 
grants of stock options that would serve to better align the interests of managers and 
shareholders.  See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How 
Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1990, at 138–39 (arguing that 
basing CEO salaries on a pay for performance structure would lead to a substantial 
increase in corporate performance).  Charles Elson has extended this argument to 
directors, and it was picked up by Bill Clinton as far back as his initial bid for the 
presidency.  Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured 
Board:  The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 164–73 (1996).  It has 
since been incorporated into the federal tax code.  See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2007) 
(imposing an excise tax on compensation paid to certain “covered employees” to the 
extent it exceeds $1 million, other than “remuneration payable solely on account of 
the attainment of one or more performance goals” including stock options). 
More recently, options have come under attack as creating perverse incentives for 
managers.  See, e.g., Roger L. Martin, Taking Stock, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 2003, at 19 
(“Motivating managers with company stock can do damage on a grand scale, 
encouraging them to pursue strategies that fatten their wallets at shareholders’ 
expense.”); M. P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Economic 
Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1605–07 (2007) 
(noting that when a manager participates in backdating, “shareholders may be 
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monitor between shareholders and managers, each of these reform 
efforts has sought to convert our two-tiered system of corporate 
governance into something more closely approximating a three-
tiered system.  Rather than merely involve managers and 
shareholders, such a system would involve managers, shareholders 
and monitors.  Each such effort, however, has disappointed, been the 
object of easy manipulation, or been defeated politically.52  Corporate 
managers therefore remain largely free of any significant oversight 
and the goal of enlisting an outside corporate monitor has remained 
both elusive and ongoing.  Thus, because shareholders are unable to 
discipline errant managers on their own, a new monitor is required 
to engage in discipline and oversight on their behalf.53 
B. The “Discovery” of Public Equity Funds 
Near the end of the 1980s, observers had begun to realize that the 
much-heralded market for corporate control would fail as a 
mechanism for causing managers to adhere more closely to 
                                                          
misled into believing that management’s interests are firmly aligned with theirs 
through the compensation package, when in fact executives can receive additional 
compensation without stock prices rising”); Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Perfect 
Storm, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 9 (2003) (noting that “stock option programs not only 
failed to meet their avowed goal of aligning managerial and shareholder interests, 
they created perverse incentives for abusing shareholders”). 
Interestingly, many important legal scholars have advocated both approaches to 
corporate governance reform, making it an overstatement to refer to them as 
different or competing schools of thought.  Rather, attempts to reunite ownership 
and control have lived side-by-side with attempts to add an additional layer of 
monitoring.  The goal of each has been to minimize net agency costs, and the 
internal conflict between the two approaches seems not to have been given much 
thought in the literature. 
 52. For example, it turns out that not only are gatekeepers and independent 
directors easily co-opted, but they also suffer from various innate psychological and 
other infirmities that impair that ability to serve as effective monitors.  See, e.g., 
Langevoort, supra note 46, at 810–14 (arguing that too much independence in the 
boardroom can create overly adversarial relationships and interfere with the board’s 
effectiveness).  Similarly, the market for corporate control was crushed in the late 
1980s by the political power of management, making the threat of hostile takeovers 
no longer effective at disciplining underperforming managers.  See, e.g., Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of 
Staggered Boards:  Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 889–91 (2002) 
(tracing the antitakeover protection that U.S. public companies now enjoy to 
shareholders’ approval of staggered boards prior to 1990). 
 53. Regarding what is meant by the terms “monitor” and “discipline,” see Rock, 
supra note 1, at 453–54: 
I use the term “discipline” rather than the more common term “monitoring” 
because effective oversight requires more than monitoring management’s 
performance; it requires doing something about suboptimal performance.  
“Discipline” thus encompasses a wide range of activities, from the subtle 
constraining influence of a watchful analyst, through the informal pressure 
of a large shareholder, to the drama of a change of management through a 
proxy fight or a sale of the firm. 
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shareholder interests.54  By then, corporate managers had begun to 
successfully fight back against most unfriendly takeover attempts.55  
Thenceforth, they would be protected by a combination of poison 
pills, staggered boards, and the wide discretion granted them by the 
business judgment rule.56  If management discretion was to be 
checked, a different monitor was clearly needed. 
Enter the institutional investor.  By the early 1990s, a series of 
forces had conspired to generate the incredible vastness that now 
epitomizes banks, insurance companies, mutual funds and pension 
                                                          
 54. See, e.g., Black, Empirical Evidence, supra note 10, at 896 (noting that “hostile 
takeovers are nearly dead, killed by a combination of lender retrenchment and 
political hostility.  And hostile bids were no panacea:  our corporate landscape is still 
littered with the carcasses of the overpriced deals of the late 1980s”); Grundfest, 
supra note 40, at 858 (“Although hostile tender offers remain technically possible, 
the legal and financial barriers in their path are far higher today than they were a few 
short years ago.  As a result, it will be difficult for hostile bidders to prevail in 
takeover battles, even if shareholders support the insurgents’ efforts.”); see also 
Coffee, supra note 2, at 1278 (noting the changes in academic thinking that were 
arising even “[a]s the takeover wave of the 1980s ebbs”).  A mere four percent of 
deals struck in 2000 were either hostile or unsolicited, although that number has 
climbed back up to twenty percent in 2007.  The Global Merger Boom:  The Beat Goes On, 
ECONOMIST, May 12, 2007, at 77.  Interestingly, the decline in takeover activity may 
also have encouraged academics to consider the question of the role that politics—as 
opposed to markets—play in shaping corporate governance.  Coffee, supra note 2, at 
1278. 
 55. Management’s war against hostile takeovers resulted in significant legal 
reform as well as repeatedly favorable judicial opinions, especially in Delaware.  
Examples of 1980s-era court victories by defenders of corporate prerogatives include 
Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1348 (Del. Ch. 1985) (upholding the 
validity of the poison pill), Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 
1985) (upholding the validity of certain discriminatory defensive techniques utilized 
by the target board and establishing a new fiduciary standard of review), and CTS 
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 70–71 (1987) (upholding the 
constitutionality of certain state antitakeover statutes).  For a lively description of the 
pro-management politics behind these statutes, see supra note 36.  See also R. Franklin 
Balotti & Michael J. Feinstein, State Takeover Statutes, in 2 HOSTILE BATTLES FOR 
CORPORATE CONTROL 119, 126–62 (1990) (compiling state antitakeover statutes 
adopted in the wake of the takeover wars of the 1980s). 
 56. In order to combat the efficacy of the poison pill, bidders began in the late 
1980s to combine tender offers with proxy fights.  The idea was that, after a 
successful proxy fight, the new directors could redeem the pill, thereby permitting 
the tender offer to move forward.  This was the strategy at issue in Blasius Industries, 
Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).  In order to thwart this strategy, 
companies began having staggered boards, so that it would take two successive proxy 
contests to take control of the board.  This combination, together with the 
protection of the business judgment rule, has proved almost unbeatable.  See 
Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 52, at 889–91 (discussing how the 
combination of staggered boards and poison pills drastically reduced the success of 
hostile takeovers).  Nonetheless, unsolicited bids still do occasionally work, provided 
the suitor offers a high enough premium (known as a “bear hug”) to convert an 
unfriendly deal into a friendly one.  See, e.g., David Carr, Once Again, Murdoch’s Siren 
Song, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2007, at C1 (correctly predicting at the outset that Rupert 
Murdoch’s hostile bid to acquire the Dow Jones Corporation “will be [completed] at 
some point, regardless of what the [controlling shareholders] said last week.  Brute-
force capital, like flood waters, always finds a way to break through”). 
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funds.  The Baby Boom generation had begun saving for retirement, 
and stocks seemed to be the best place to put their money.57  Then, in 
what became something of a virtuous cycle, the more the public 
invested, the more dollars were available for advertising, which in 
turn attracted more capital.58  At the same time, Congress accelerated 
the flow of funds into institutional investor coffers by creating certain 
tax advantages for fund investments, most notably the 401(k) savings 
account and the individual retirement account.59 
The results amounted to nothing less than an explosion in the size 
of American capital markets.  According to numbers that were in use 
at the time, institutional ownership of U.S. stocks surged from about 
eight percent in 1950 to over forty-five percent in 1989.60  In terms of 
dollars, the total value of institutional investor holdings grew from 
around $673 billion in 1970 to over $11 trillion in 1996—a sixteen-
                                                          
 57. See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 353; see also Michael J. McDermott, Boom Time 
with the Boomers, FIN. PLANNING, Oct. 1996, at 38 (“From now into the next century, 
one American will turn 50 years old every 8 seconds.  That makes the country’s 76 
million baby boomers the mother lode of financial planning.”). 
 58. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE CRASH:  THE GREAT BUBBLE AND ITS 
UNDOING 116–17 (2004) (describing this cycle). 
 59. Hamilton, supra note 1, at 353.  The moniker 401(k) refers to a section of the 
tax code adopted by the Internal Revenue Act of 1978.  IRAs were created in 1974 by 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and expanded under President 
Reagan by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.  Both sections establish tax 
advantages for retirement savings and were subsequently expanded and/or 
enhanced by rule and by statutes, including the Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001. 
As an interesting side note, section 401(k) was originally intended to expand 
profit-sharing opportunities, rather than retirement savings.  It was only when 
Theodore Benna, an employee benefit consultant in Newtown, Pennsylvania, 
realized that the provision could be used by employers to create savings plans that its 
true impact began to be understood.  See Robert Metz, Market Place; Little-Noticed Tax 
Shelter, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1981, at D8 (explaining contemporaneously the benefits 
of this heretofore unknown tax shelter); Fred Williams, R. Theodore Benna:  Founder, 
the 401(k) Association, Jersey Shore, Pa., PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, Oct. 27, 2003, at 16 
(noting that “Ted Benna didn’t set out to revolutionize the world of retirement 
saving . . . . Still, he wound up being credited with creating the first 401(k) plan”).  At 
the end of 2006, U.S. investors maintained approximately $2.7 trillion in 401(k) 
accounts, up from $385 billion in 1990, and $4.2 trillion in IRAs, up from $637 
billion in 1990.  INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 73, 77. 
 60. Rock, supra note 1, at 447 (citing the NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR FACT BOOK 4 (1990)).  Because of the difficulty associated 
with compiling accurate data regarding fund activities, and because definitions 
sometimes vary, estimates as to size also frequently vary.  According to another 
contemporary source, for example, institutional investor holdings represented thirty-
eight percent of all U.S. markets in 1981 and approximately fifty-three percent in 
1990.  Black, supra note 11, at 827 (citing CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO & PATRICK A. 
GAUGHAN, THE GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS tbl.10 
(1991 update)). 
  
246 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:225 
fold increase in under a generation.61  Today, various estimates 
suggest that institutional investors hold as much as $24 trillion in U.S. 
stocks, or over sixty percent of the market capitalization of all U.S. 
companies.62  Moreover, the trend continues to accelerate.  In 2006, 
$474 billion of new capital flowed into mutual funds, a rate that is up 
from the pace of the prior four years.63  All told, approximately half of 
all U.S. households now own shares in one or more investment 
funds.64 
It was in this context—the failure of hostile takeovers and the rise 
of the institutional investor—that a group of scholars began to think 
seriously about the potential for institutional investors to act as 
corporate monitors.65  Mark Roe, Bernard Black and John Coffee, 
each then teaching at Columbia, along with Ed Rock of the University 
of Pennsylvania, together produced a voluminous literature in the 
early 1990s regarding the potential for institutional investors to be 
enlisted in the quest for better corporate governance.66  Other 
scholars concurred in their support or argued closely related points.67  
                                                          
 61. Hamilton, supra note 1, at 354 (citing a series of “Institutional Investment 
Reports” published in 1998 by the Global Research Council of the Conference 
Board). 
 62. Institutional Investors Snap Up U.S. Stocks, supra note 33 (summarizing 2005 
data collected by the Conference Board).  Because of variations regarding how to 
define the various categories, different sources suggest different numbers.  The 
Reuters figures, for example, included “U.S. pension funds, money managers, 
insurance companies and foundations.”  Id.  Thus, bank holdings were omitted from 
these figures, as were the holdings of private equity funds. 
 63. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 17. 
 64. Id. at 57. 
 65. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 1, at 448 (noting that “dramatic developments” 
regarding institutional investors “hold the promise of enormous changes in the 
nature of corporate law”).  Coffee described the new attention being devoted to 
institutional investor monitoring as amounting to a “paradigm shift.”  Coffee, supra 
note 2, at 1278–79.  Interestingly, at the time of the discovery of the size and power 
of institutional investors, contemporaries estimated their combined holdings at $7.5 
trillion, or less than one-third of today’s estimates.  See Roe, supra note 2, at 16 
(noting—with some degree of awe—that commercial banks, mutual funds, insurance 
companies and pension funds held, respectively, assets worth $3.2 trillion, $548 
billion, $1.8 trillion, and $1.9 trillion). 
 66. Black, supra note 2, at 520 (1990–1991); Black, supra note 11, at 811 (1991–
1992); Black, Empirical Evidence, supra note 10, at 895 (1991–1992); Coffee, supra note 
2, at 1277 (1991); Coffee, supra note 12, at 837 (1993–1994); Rock, supra note 1, at 
445 (1990–1991); Mark J. Roe, Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of 
Public Companies, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 7, 29–35 (1990); Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the 
Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1469, 1470 (1991) [hereinafter 
Roe, Mutual Funds]; Roe, supra note 2, at 11 (1991); Mark J. Roe, The Modern 
Corporation and Private Pensions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 75, 76–79 (1993) [hereinafter Roe, 
Private Pensions]. 
 67. See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate 
Governance, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1135, 1138 (1991) (assessing the advantages of increasing 
institutional investor participation in corporate governance and recommending 
strategies for such participation); Bebchuk, supra note 20, at 836 (arguing 
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The hope was that institutional investors—and in particular, public 
equity funds—had the size, sophistication and, potentially, the 
incentive to serve as ideal corporate monitors.68 
It is important to note that the model of governance that these 
scholars contemplated was one of institutional investor voice.69  For 
the most part, they were comfortable with the common practice by 
institutional (and other) investors of owning a small fraction of the 
stock of any given company.  What they proposed was not for 
institutional investors to seek to acquire control over individual 
companies, but rather for them to work together to become more 
active in voting campaigns and more effective in informal 
communications with management.70  Thus, to this group of scholars, 
enlisting institutional investors as corporate monitors would only be 
an incremental change.  The fundamentals of the system would not 
be altered.  Rather, individual companies would continue to be 
owned by a large number of shareholders, but those shareholders 
would pool their resources to provide better oversight.71  Put 
differently, the hope was to obtain some of the benefits of a three-
tiered approach to corporate governance while retaining as much as 
possible of our two-tiered system. 
Black in particular, along with Ronald Gilson and Reinier 
Kraakman, also imagined that institutional investor voice would focus 
not on company-specific performance but on issues of corporate 
governance that affected the entire marketplace.72  This was because a 
                                                          
shareholders should be able to initiate and vote to adopt changes on a company’s 
basic corporate governance); Ronald J. Gilson, Lilli A. Gordon & John Pound, How 
the Proxy Rules Discourage Constructive Engagement:  Regulatory Barriers to Electing a 
Minority of Directors, 17 J. CORP. L. 29, 32–33 (1991) (arguing that appropriate barriers 
should be lowered to encourage institutional investors to nominate a minority of a 
company’s directors to serve as professional monitors); Gilson & Kraakman, supra 
note 20, at 883–92 (proposing actions that institutional investors could take, without 
the need for legal reform, in order to exercise greater influence over portfolio 
companies). 
 68. See, e.g., Black, supra note 11, at 815–16 (discussing the arguments in favor of 
institutional monitoring); Coffee, supra note 2, at 1336, 1367–70 (arguing that 
pension funds are “the optimal corporate monitor”).  But see Gilson & Kraakman, 
supra note 20, at 864 (noting that many corporate and money managers viewed 
institutional investors as poor candidates for monitors); Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, 
at 1048–62 (discussing the pluses and minuses of public equity fund monitoring). 
 69. See supra note 17 (discussing and defining “institutional investor voice”). 
 70. See Black, supra note 11, at 815 (“I believe that there is a strong case for 
measured reform that will facilitate joint shareholder action not directed at control, and 
reduce obstacles to particular institutions owning stakes not large enough to confer 
working control.”). 
 71. E.g., id. at 816–17; Rock, supra note 1, at 448–49. 
 72. Black, supra note 11, at 834–35 (“Institutional shareholders can’t and 
shouldn’t watch every step a manager takes . . . . In contrast, shareholders have 
stronger incentives to take an active interest on issues for which scale economies will 
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campaign to encourage all companies to, for example, eliminate 
confidential voting would create economies of scale.73  Thus, if 
barriers to shareholder voice were lowered, the first areas to succumb 
to shareholder activism would be those that yielded most readily to 
the reduced costs associated with repeated, and sometimes parallel, 
proxy campaigns.  To Black, these were “process and structural 
issues” and included topics such as those related to board structure 
and composition as well as antitakeover defenses.74  Coffee concurred 
insofar as he believed that institutional investor oversight could best 
be expressed through the formation of monitoring coalitions, led by 
public pension funds but joined by other institutional investors.75 
C. Passivity Explained 
Institutional investor voice had a flaw, however.  By the early 1990s, 
institutional investors—despite their great size and obvious 
potential—had not yet shown themselves to be active investors.76  If 
they truly were the ideal corporate monitor that some had suggested, 
they should already have begun to be more assertive.  Admittedly, 
there were anecdotal stories of activist shareholders, as well as 
additional reasons to hope that shareholder self-confidence would 
increase.77  However, given that the institutional investors had already 
                                                          
partly offset the incentives for passivity created by fractional ownership.”); Gilson & 
Kraakman, supra note 20, at 866–67 (arguing that institutional investors hoping to 
increase the value of their entire portfolio must focus on “improving the corporate 
governance system rather than by attempting to improve the management of 
particular companies”). 
 73. See Black, supra note 2, at 580–84, 589–91 (factoring economies of scale into 
his equations as to the costs and benefits of shareholder activism).  Black believed 
that economies of scale would be the largest for process and structural issues, such as 
issues relating to board structure and composition, confidential voting, asking 
managers to seek shareholder approval before taking various actions, rescinding or 
weakening poison pills, antitakeover amendments, and reincorporating in states with 
more desirable antitakeover statutes.  Black, supra note 11, at 836.  But see Rock, supra 
note 1, at 489–90 (arguing that fund managers do not care about confidential voting 
because the widespread adoption of confidential voting would benefit their 
portfolios equally and so provide them no selective benefits). 
 74. Black, supra note 2, at 836. 
 75. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 850–51, 856–57 (assessing the feasibility of 
forming institutional investor coalitions to monitor management and arguing that, 
“because institutional investors cannot hold large blocks and because they value 
liquidity, they can influence control only to the extent they can form broad-based 
coalitions”). 
 76. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 1, at 451 (acknowledging that “the actual 
manifestations of institutional shareholder activism have been puzzling and do not 
unambiguously support an optimistic scenario”).  Indeed, despite the hopes of 
scholars such as Rock, institutional investor passivity has remained the norm to this 
day.  See infra Part I.E. 
 77. See Black, supra note 2, at 570–75 (discussing the apparent rise in shareholder 
activism in the 1980s); Black, supra note 11, at 828–29, 840–42 (same); Rock, supra 
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grown to well beyond critical size before attracting the attention of 
legal scholars, the results were far less than had been predicted.  An 
explanation for their general passivity was needed. 
With respect to banks and insurance companies, there appears to 
be a general consensus that their passivity results from their close ties 
to management.78  Taking a position against a particular corporation 
might mean the loss of a potential customer for lucrative consulting, 
risk-management or other services.79  More significantly, however, it 
might also give the impression that the bank or insurance company 
was generally anti-management in its outlook, thereby jeopardizing 
its relationship not merely with the company in question but with all 
companies.80  The same is true for private pension funds, which are 
almost universally controlled by their corporate sponsors.81  Thus, 
significant conflicts of interest make banks, insurance companies and 
private pension funds poor candidates as corporate monitors. 
Mutual funds and public pension funds have been viewed as having 
the greatest potential as monitors.  For example, because they 
typically market themselves directly to individual investors, public 
equity funds probably suffer from fewer conflicts of interest.82  As a 
result, the search for an explanation for the continued passivity of 
institutional investors generally has focused on public equity funds. 
For Black and Roe, the passivity of public equity funds results from 
in the mesh of legal rules that make the exercise of shareholder voice 
                                                          
note 1, at 449–51, 481–90 (describing contemporary examples of shareholder 
activism, including a detailed examination of the 1987–1990 proxy seasons). 
 78. See Black, supra note 2, at 600 (noting that banks often vote with management 
because they usually own stock in companies with which they do business). 
 79. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Politics, supra note 21, at 725 (noting that “corporate 
managers are well-positioned to buy off most institutional investors that attempt to 
act as monitors”); Black, supra note 2, at 600–01 (noting, for example, that “banks 
have been relentlessly passive”); Coffee, supra note 12, at 857 (“By general consensus, 
banks and insurance companies have not been active investors and rarely oppose 
management.”); see also Roe, supra note 2, at 17–18, 22–23 (discussing regulatory 
impediments to activism on the part of banks and insurance companies). 
 80. See Black, supra note 2, at 600–01 (noting that a bank will not “want to 
develop a reputation for casting antimanager votes, lest it lose current or prospective 
banking clients”). 
 81. See Roe, Private Pensions, supra note 66, at 77 (“Few managers want their 
pension more active in the corporate governance of other companies than they 
would want their own stockholders to be active in their firm.”); see also Coffee, supra 
note 12, at 857–62 (comparing the corporate governance potential of public and 
private pension funds). 
 82. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 858 (“As a class, public pension funds are 
pressure resistant, because they have few (if any) conflicts of interest.”).  But see 
Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 795, 796 (1993) (arguing that “public pension funds face distinctive 
investment conflicts that limit the benefits of their activism”). 
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costly, burdensome, and sometimes risky.83  For example, increased 
reporting requirements, insider trading liability and other burdens 
all apply to shareholders who hold more than five (or sometimes ten) 
percent of a public company’s stock.84  Thus, although such rules 
were probably designed in good faith to address other unrelated 
abuses, they add significant costs and legal risks to anyone who 
chooses to exceed the five percent threshold.85  No one rule 
specifically prohibits monitoring, but their cumulative effect is 
sufficient to deter most shareholder activists.86  Moreover, even if a 
particular rule would not necessarily lead to liability, the culture of 
money management is such that the mere risk that a rule could lead 
to liability is often enough to deter the conduct in question.87  And 
                                                          
 83. See Black, supra note 2, at 523 (“In fact, institutional shareholders are 
hobbled by a complex web of legal rules that make it difficult, expensive, and legally 
risky to own large percentage stakes or undertake joint efforts.”); Roe, supra note 2, 
at 11 (arguing that “American law and politics deliberately diminished the power of 
financial institutions to hold the large equity blocks that would foster serious 
oversight of managers”).  Black also blamed management’s ability to control the 
agenda and conflicts of interest within institutional investor groups.  Black, supra 
note 2, at 591–607.  However, the main thrust of his argument was that legal rules 
were the most significant barrier to shareholder voice.  See id. at 566 (“Shareholder 
passivity may be partly a function of legal rules.  Institutional shareholders who want 
to become active face costs, legal limits, and legal risks wherever they turn.”).  But see 
Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate Management by 
Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 331, 332 (1996) (analyzing 
shareholders’ use of state corporate law inspection statutes as a means for obtaining 
the information necessary for active monitoring). 
 84. For example, under sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78m(g) (2000), any person or group that acquires 
more than five percent of a public company must file, and periodically update, a 
schedule 13D or schedule 13G.  Rule 13d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2007).  Other 
impediments generally apply once the investor has reached the ten-percent level.  
For example, section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits 
beneficial owners of ten percent of a public company’s stock to forfeit any “short-
swing” trading profits that accrue from buying and selling, or selling and buying, 
shares of that company in a six-month period.  15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000).  The 
impact of this rule is to significantly reduce the ability of ten-percent holders to exit 
their position if the company’s performance begins to sour.  In other words, short-
term liquidity is sacrificed for additional control.  See generally Black, supra note 2, at 
530–66 (surveying the rules governing shareholder voting and discussing the 
obstacles to shareholder action they create); Roe, supra note 2, at 16–31 (discussing 
the various regulatory impediments to activism on the part of institutional investors). 
 85. See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 565 (“Through much of the period from 1934 
to the present [1990], SEC staffers genuinely believed that the Proxy Rules helped 
shareholders by ensuring complete and accurate information as a basis for voting.  
The costs of disclosure rarely were part of the equation.”); Roe, supra note 2, at 11 
(“Many legal restraints had public-spirited backers; some rules would be those that 
wise regulators, unburdened by politics, would reach.”). 
 86. See Black, supra note 2, at 533, 542–45 (“The obstacles faced by shareholders 
who would be active are many.  No single rule is a show stopper, but their cumulative 
impact is large.”). 
 87. See id. at 532 (“Cultural factors reinforce the legal obstacles to shareholder 
action.  Money managers . . . expect to take market risk, but legal risk is beyond the 
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finally, to make matters worse, Congress and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) crafted the various rules broadly so as 
not to be easily circumvented by joint action.  As a result, they not 
only create disincentives for shareholders to accumulate large stakes 
in a given corporation, but they also make it more difficult for 
fractional shareholders to communicate and work together.88  Thus, 
for Black and Roe, institutional investors remain passive largely 
because a host of overlapping legal rules make monitoring too 
costly.89 
Coffee told a somewhat different, though related, story.  He 
compared the American system of corporate governance with those 
of Japan and various European countries and concluded, among 
other things, that American institutional investors are not subject to a 
significantly greater level of regulation than are their more active 
foreign counterparts.90  Instead, the concentration of share ownership 
is significantly higher, even in economies as similar to the United 
States as Great Britain, Canada, and Australia.91  As a result, without 
rejecting the significant role that legal rules play in causing 
institutional investor passivity, he argued that extra-legal factors also 
discourage active monitoring.92  In particular, he believed that there 
is an inherent tradeoff between exit and voice, such that an increase 
in influence (voice) would generally be coupled with a decrease in 
liquidity (exit).93  He therefore proposed a series of deregulatory 
                                                          
pale.”); see also id. at 562–64 (noting that, based on various informal discussions, 
money managers often overestimate the strength of legal obstacles). 
 88. See id. at 531 (noting that legal rules make it difficult for “shareholders who 
individually own smaller stakes [to] readily act together on a voting matter”); Black, 
supra note 11, at 817 (noting that “institutional voice requires a number of 
institutions, including different types of institutions, to join forces to exercise 
influence”); Roe, supra note 2, at 25–29 (arguing that four specific problems would 
afflict efforts of institutional investors to work together in joint ventures, including 
organizational fragility, regulatory costs, and fear that control would be criticized and 
politicized). 
 89. See Black, supra note 2, at 523 (summarizing his argument that “institutional 
shareholders are hobbled by a complex web of legal rules that make it difficult, 
expensive, and legally risky to own large percentage stakes or undertake joint 
efforts”); Roe, supra note 2, at 11 (“[L]aw prohibits or raises the cost of institutional 
influence in industrial companies.”). 
 90. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1287, 1313–17. 
 91. Coffee, supra note 12, at 852–56. 
 92. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1280.  He described the extra-legal factors as 
including an institutional investor’s need for liquidity, conflicts of interest, concern 
over the threat of political retaliation, desire for continued access to soft information 
and short-term thinking, as well as agent apathy and managerial manipulation of the 
agenda.  Id. at 1317–28. 
 93. Id. at 1286–89.  Coffee’s thinking on liquidity and control builds upon Albert 
Hirschman’s well-regarded earlier work.  See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 29, at 3–5 
(presenting his argument that managers become aware of criticisms of their activities 
either through “exit,” e.g., customers stop buying the company’s products or staff 
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reforms—aimed primarily at public pension funds—intended to 
make the exercise of voice more attractive, while at the same time 
making exit somewhat more difficult.94  He also proposed positive 
incentives for monitoring, including incentive compensation.95  For 
Coffee, however, the separation of ownership and control is unlikely 
to disappear even if legal constraints on shareholder activism are 
removed.96  Thus, he argued, “to create a truly activist institutional 
investor, it may be necessary to invent a new one.”97 
Although Rock also saw great promise in the rise of the 
institutional investor, he recognized that institutional investors 
themselves suffer from their own agency costs and so doubted 
whether they could be sufficiently incentivized to overcome the 
regulatory hurdles facing activist shareholders.98  Contrary to some of 
the others, he believed that individual fund managers have little 
incentive to engage in oversight activities that would improve the 
overall economy.99  This is because public equity fund managers are 
generally evaluated in comparison to other managers (or to market 
indices).100  Any efforts to improve overall corporate performance 
would therefore be of little benefit to the fund managers as they 
would not impact their relative performance.101 
Although Black, Roe, Coffee, and Rock differed in the details of 
their explanations for the persistence of institutional investor 
passivity, they shared much common ground.  In particular, they all 
believed that public equity funds had great potential as corporate 
monitors.  For them, the problem was simply how to tweak the cost-
benefit equation until it could be tipped in favor of shareholder 
voice.102  In their view, then, public equity funds wanted to exercise 
                                                          
leave the company, or “voice,” e.g., customers or shareholders or staff voice their 
dissatisfaction directly to the managers or through the form of protests). 
 94. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1336–67. 
 95. Coffee, supra note 12, at 845, 903–05. 
 96. Id. at 845. 
 97. Id. at 905. 
 98. Rock, supra note 1, at 452, 464 (summarizing his argument that “the 
collective action analysis indicates that as the concentration of shareholding 
increases, discipline by [institutional] shareholders becomes more rational”). 
 99. Id. at 473. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. (“To the extent that money managers are evaluated in comparison to 
other managers and to market indices, such money managers will have no selective 
incentives to engage in actions that improve the performance of widely diversified 
funds across the board.”) (citations omitted). 
 102. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 12, at 905 (noting that “the issue is how to lure 
into the money management market new entrepreneurs who will offer monitoring 
services in return for incentive compensation”). 
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voice, they simply could not justify the expense given the rather 
meager rewards then available to them. 
There can be little doubt that this body of scholarship was correct 
in its essential message—there are significant legal and other barriers 
that make shareholder activism unnecessarily burdensome and 
expensive.103  I in no way dispute this basic insight.  In fact, I seek to 
identify several additional legal reforms that are necessary to permit 
public equity funds to engage in active oversight through control 
acquisitions.104 
However, a comparison between public and private equity funds 
suggests that many of the legal rules that make activism so expensive 
for public equity funds apply equally to private equity funds.  What 
remains to distinguish them, therefore, are primarily the rules that 
limit the ability of public equity fund managers to share personally in 
the rewards that accrue from active corporate monitoring.105  Permit 
such managers to charge incentive fees similar to those charged by 
private equity funds, and one creates direct financial incentives that 
can be expected to result in aggressive oversight.  Passivity, therefore, 
may be explained not solely or even primarily by the combination of 
rules that make activism so expensive.  Rather, passivity may be 
explained by the fact that it is not currently profitable for public 
equity fund managers to compete based on their ability to discipline 
underperforming corporations. 
D. Efforts at Reform 
In the decade or so that followed publication of the first important 
articles on institutional investor monitoring, the SEC made no fewer 
than four major proposals to expand the power of shareholder voice 
                                                          
 103. As Black alluded to, however, their different analyses of shareholder passivity 
were based entirely on theory.  After all, one could not create a real-world 
experiment to test their various hypotheses.  See Black, supra note 11, at 815 (“Pure 
theory can’t tell us whether we’d be better off if imperfectly watched money 
managers did more watching of corporate managers.”).  However, this Article, while 
not an empirical study, seeks to use the activist investment strategies of private equity 
funds as a sort of naturally occurring experiment.  Unlike comparisons to foreign 
systems of corporate governance which, though helpful, suffer from the obvious 
defects of culture and history, the comparison between public and private equity 
funds is extremely direct.  Understanding the different incentives and regulatory 
regimes facing these two groups of investment funds should therefore shed light on 
the underlying question of institutional investor passivity.  See discussion supra note 
12 (noting that this Article does not attempt to draw conclusions based on 
distinctions between American private equity markets from those of Europe or Asia). 
 104. See infra Parts IV.B and IV.C (discussing two categories of legal rules that 
differentiate the monitoring by public and private equity funds). 
 105. See generally infra Part IV (discussing three categories of legal rules that 
explain the different investment strategies of public and private equity funds). 
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by amending the federal proxy rules.106  In all four instances, the 
proposals borrowed directly from this body of scholarship—as well as 
from work by Lucien Bebchuk—by attempting to eliminate or reduce 
barriers to the exercise of shareholder voice.107  Although only three 
were eventually adopted, proxy reform remains an open issue.108 
The first proposed amendment came in 1991, when the SEC 
recommended rule changes aimed at reducing the costs associated 
with shareholder-initiated proxy proposals and opening informal 
channels of communication among shareholders.109  In response to 
strong opposition by pro-management groups such as the Business 
Roundtable, the SEC was forced to revise the proposal to eliminate its 
most controversial aspects.110  However, the final measure, which was 
                                                          
 106. In a related effort to enhance the power of institutional investors, Congress 
in 1995 included a provision in the landmark Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 102, 109 Stat. 737 (1995), which had the stated purpose of 
encouraging institutional investors to serve as the “lead plaintiff” in securities fraud 
class action lawsuits.  See generally Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Do 
Institutions Matter?  The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 869 (2005). 
 107. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 20, at 833; Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the 
Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 676 (2007) (offering proposals for reforming 
corporate elections) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise]; Lucian A. Bebchuk, 
Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1784–85 (2005) (discussing 
proposals to increase shareholder oversight of corporate governance).  But see 
Coffee, supra note 12, at 876 (arguing that the SEC’s attitude towards proxy reform is 
“equivocal, that it is torn between the standard impulse of a bureaucratic agency to 
expand its jurisdiction and defend its existing turf and the recognition that a 
regulatory system must have some relevant end purpose if it is to survive”); Jill E. 
Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic:  Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 
1132 (1993) (arguing that the SEC’s efforts at proxy reform were subject to 
significant political forces). 
 108. Infra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.  The proxy rules were also 
amended in 2007 to permit companies to utilize the Internet to distribute certain 
proxy materials.  Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-55146, [2006–2007 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,745, at 84,137 
(Jan. 22, 2007).  The amendment did not materially change the rules for 
shareholders, however. 
 109. Regulation of Securityholder Communications, Exchange Act Release No. 
29,315, Investment Company Act Release No. 18,201, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,811, at 81,845 (June 17, 1991).  The proposal sought to 
eliminate the pre-clearance requirement for most solicitation materials, eliminate 
the filing requirements for parties that provide proxy information but are otherwise 
disinterested, permit the use of solicitation materials even if they are not 
accompanied by a proxy card, and permit shareholders to obtain a full shareholder 
list.  See id.; see also Black, supra note 11, at 829–30 (discussing the 1991 proxy reform 
proposals).  For a contemporary critique of the proposal, see Coffee, supra note 2, at 
1351–52 (arguing that the proposal “would largely remove the chill on shareholder 
communications that the current proxy rules create” but that they would do little to 
address the underlying problem of rational shareholder apathy). 
 110. Black, supra note 11, at 830; Coffee, supra note 12, at 839–40.  The proposal 
received over 900 comments.  See Regulation of Communications Among 
Securityholders, Exchange Act Release No. 30,849, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 18,803, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,002, at 82,825 
(June 24, 1992); see also Bernard S. Black, Disclosure, Not Censorship:  The Case for Proxy 
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adopted in October 1992, significantly eased shareholder 
communications by allowing shareholders to publicly announce how 
and why they intended to cast their votes without the requirement of 
filing a formal proxy statement.111  It was therefore an important early 
victory for proponents of shareholder voice. 
The second major amendment came in 1997 in response to the 
SEC’s infamous “Cracker Barrel” no-action letter.112  The ruling in 
Cracker Barrel had been viewed as a setback by most proponents of 
increased shareholder activism because it permitted management to 
exclude certain shareholder proposals from its proxy statement.113  
The amendment sought to reverse this decision and at the same time 
remove some of the existing impediments to shareholder proposals.114  
                                                          
Reform, 17 J. CORP. L. 49, 50–53 (1991) (discussing his support, and that of other 
corporate law scholars, for the SEC’s original proxy reform proposals); Bernard S. 
Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform, 18 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (1993) (arguing in favor of proxy 
reform); Nell Minow, Proxy Reform:  The Case for Increased Shareholder Communication, 
17 J. CORP. L. 149, 151 (1991) (presenting arguments by the president of 
Institutional Shareholder Services in favor of proxy reform).  But see Robert D. 
Rosenbaum, Foundations of Sand:  The Weak Premises Underlying the Current Push for 
Proxy Rule Changes, 17 J. CORP. L. 163, 165 (1991) (arguing that proxy reform was 
unnecessary). 
 111. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release 
No. 31,326, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,031, [1992 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,051, at 83,362 (Oct. 16, 1992).  On the same day, the 
SEC also issued Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, 
Exchange Act Release No. 31,327, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,032, 
[1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,056, at 83,414 (Oct. 16, 1992), 
which set new requirements on disclosure of executive compensation.  For an 
analysis of the rule changes, see Joseph Even Calio & Rafael Xavier Zahralddin, The 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s 1992 Proxy Amendments:  Questions of Accountability, 
14 PACE L. REV. 459 (1994).  See also Fisch, supra note 107, at 1165–70 (discussing the 
1992 rule changes in light of the SEC’s authority to regulate the proxy system). 
 112. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 
39,093, Investment Company Act Release No. 22,828, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,961, at 89,848 (Sept. 18, 1997). 
 113. Exchange Act rule 14a-8 requires management to include certain 
shareholder proposals in its proxy statement.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007).  
However, management may exclude a proposal on the basis that, among other 
things, it deals with the “ordinary business operations” of the issuer, is not a proper 
subject for shareholder action, or relates to an election of directors.  Id.  The ruling 
in Cracker Barrel reversed a long-standing position of the SEC, by holding that 
proposals dealing with rank-and-file employees may be excluded under the ordinary 
business matters exception.  Cracker Barrel, SEC No-Action Letter, [1992–1993 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,418, at 77,284 (Oct. 13, 1992); see Op-
Ed, Shareholders and Corporate Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1998, at A14 (discussing the 
proposed changes to the Cracker Barrel decision).  See generally GARY M. BROWN, 
SODERQUIST ON THE SECURITIES LAWS § 10:4.3, at 10-13 to -15 (5th ed. 2007) 
(discussing the process by which corporations are required to disseminate 
information on proxy statement proposals and can exclude proposals). 
 114. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 
39,093, Investment Company Act Release No. 22,828, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,961, at 89,849 (Sept. 18, 1997) (attempting to clarify the 
rules regarding which shareholder proposals were excludable and requiring 
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By attempting to be even-handed, however, it attracted criticism from 
both advocates and opponents of shareholder democracy.115  In the 
end, the amendment passed, handing shareholder activists their 
second significant victory in a little under six years.116 
The most recent and by far the most ambitious effort at reforming 
the proxy process to encourage institutional investor monitoring was 
initiated by the SEC in a pair of related releases in the fall of 2003.117  
The first was fairly modest and generated little controversy, requiring 
only that existing disclosures regarding the practices of the issuer’s 
nominating committee be expanded and clarified.118  It was adopted 
with minor changes in November of 2003 and thus served as a third, 
albeit minor, victory for proponents of institutional investor voice.119 
                                                          
additional disclosure regarding a corporation’s procedures regarding whether to 
include or exclude shareholder proposals). 
 115. See, e.g., Brett D. Fromson, SEC Criticized for Plan on Shareholder Voting:  
Companies, Social Activists Dislike Rule Changes, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1997, at C3 
(noting that neither management nor shareholder activists were pleased with the 
SEC’s new rules); Michael Schroeder, SEC Expected to Adopt Compromise On Votes For 
Shareholder Resolutions, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1998, at C19 (discussing the SEC’s efforts 
to develop a compromise on when management can exclude certain shareholder 
proposals). 
 116. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 
40,018, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,018, at 80,535 (May 21, 
1998).  The amendment overturned the Cracker Barrel no-action letter, required 
that management disclosures regarding the operation of Rule 14a-8 be drafted in a 
“Question and Answer” format that would be easier for a lay person to understand, 
and clarified the rules granting management certain discretionary voting authority.  
Id. at 80,536.  For an analysis of the final rules, see Maya Mueller, The Shareholder 
Proposal Rule:  Cracker Barrel, Institutional Investors, and the 1998 Amendments, 28 
STETSON L. REV. 451 (1998). 
 117. Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and 
Communication Between Security Holders and Board of Directors, Exchange Act 
Release No. 48,301, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,145, [2003 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,954, at 88,044 (Aug. 8, 2003); Security Holder 
Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,206, [2003–2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,101, 
at 88,401 (Oct. 14, 2003). 
 118. Specifically, the proposed amendments required management to include in 
its proxy statement a statement as to whether the company’s board of directors had a 
nominating committee (and if not, an explanation for why not), the names of the 
directors serving on such committee, an explanation of the nominating process, and 
instructions for how and where shareholders could submit nominations.  Disclosure 
Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communication Between Security 
Holders and Board of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 48,301, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,145, [2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 86,954, at 88,047 (Aug. 8, 2003). 
 119. See Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and 
Communication Between Security Holders and Board of Directors, Securities Act 
Release No. 8340, Exchange Act Release No. 48,825, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,262, [2003–2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,116, 
at 88,718 (Nov. 24, 2003); see also Election Changes Approved, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 
2003, at E2 (describing the new rules). 
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The second proposal of 2003 was nothing short of an attempt to 
completely overhaul the role of institutional investors in the proxy 
process.120  Building on the work of Bebchuk, the idea was to create a 
mechanism whereby shareholders could use management’s proxy to 
make substantive proposals, including the nomination of directors 
opposed by management, if certain triggering events had occurred.121  
The SEC, however, did not want the proposal to distort the business 
function of the proxy process by converting the proxy into a vehicle 
for every disgruntled shareholder to give voice to her own personal 
politics.122  Thus, the proposed amendments applied only to 
shareholders (or shareholder groups) who had continuously held five 
percent of the company’s shares for at least two years.123  Effectively, 
this aspect of the proposal disqualified all but large institutional 
investors.  Had they been adopted, the amendments would therefore 
have constituted a near-direct application of the scholarship on 
institutional investor voice, as well as a major victory for proponents 
of shareholder activism.124 
The proxy access release attracted the opposition of both the Bush 
Administration and business groups, and even generated a party-line 
split within the SEC.125  It was ultimately defeated politically.126  
                                                          
 120. See Bebchuk, supra note 20, at 835–36; see also Eisenberg, supra note 20, at 
1502–17 (arguing that five-percent shareholders should be entitled to use 
management’s proxy materials).  For opponents of increased shareholder access to 
the proxy statement, see supra note 21.  See also Strine, supra note 21, at 1759 
(presenting a critique of Bebchuk’s proposed reforms to increase shareholder 
power). 
 121. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, [2003–2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,101, at 88,408 (Oct. 14, 2003).  The triggering events included 
(1) the receipt by a director of “withhold” votes from at least thirty-five percent of the 
shareholders at an annual meeting, or (2) a shareholder proposal that rule 14a–11 
should apply be adopted by fifty percent of the shareholders at an annual meeting.  
Id. 
 122. See Thomas J. Donohue, SEC Proxy Plan Is a Threat to Business, Boon to Labor, 
INVESTORS’ BUS. DAILY, Dec. 4, 2003, at A14, reprinted at http://www.uschamber.com/ 
press/opeds/0312donohuesecproxy.htm (presenting the arguments of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce in opposition to the proposal); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43, 54–56 (2003) (describing 
the arguments). 
 123. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, [2003–2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,101, at 88,413 (Oct. 14, 2003).  The rule was also inapplicable to 
shareholders who sought to acquire control over the issuer.  Id. 
 124. Interestingly, however, the proposal was opposed by some institutional 
investor activists on the grounds that it did not go far enough in providing them 
access to management’s proxy.  Patrick McGeehan, It’s Voting Time Again, But No Isn’t 
an Option, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2005, (Sunday Business) at 4. 
 125. See Herb Allison, Editorial, Giving Investors a Say, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2004, 
at A25 (advocating a proposed SEC rule which would give shareholders more say in 
board elections and oversight); Carrie Johnson, Commissioner Condemns SEC Inaction, 
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Interestingly, however, the SEC appears at the time of this Article to 
be once again revisiting the subject.  In an unusual move that drew 
immediate criticism from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the SEC 
in July 2007 issued two contradictory releases for public comment—
one granting access to the proxy to five-percent shareholders (i.e., 
public equity funds) and the other denying such access.127  Given the 
highly fluid political environment, it is an open question whether 
further reform in favor of institutional investor voice is in the 
offing.128 
E. The Persistence of Passivity 
Despite the rule changes described above, and notwithstanding the 
occasional burst of well-publicized shareholder revolt, institutional 
investor activism remains today the exception, not the rule.  The 
number of shareholder-initiated resolutions and proxy contests has 
increased only slightly since 1990, and such efforts achieve success 
only in rare instances.  Huge amounts of money have shifted away 
from actively managed funds and into indexed investments, removing 
such resources from potential monitors.  Finally, well-known 
shareholder activist groups that had been hailed in the early 1990s as 
potential change agents have instead merged or closed their doors.  
All told, shareholder activism has had only a marginal impact on 
                                                          
WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2004, at E1 (reporting on a Democratic SEC Commissioner’s 
annoyance with the SEC’s inability to adopt pro-shareholder rule); Stephen Labaton, 
Big Pension Funds Object to Proposal On Proxy Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2003, at C1 
(indicating that many pension funds believed the proposed rules did not change the 
status quo and provided no new reform of the system); Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. at 
Odds On Plan to Let Big Investors Pick Directors, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2004, at C1 
(indicating that the SEC was unlikely to adopt a rule allowing large shareholders to 
nominate independent directors to corporate boards); Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. 
Rebuffs Investors on Board Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at C2 (reporting on the death 
of the proposed 2003 rule to give large shareholders a greater ability to nominate 
board members); see also Elizabeth Consenza, The Holy Grail of Corporate Governance 
Reform:  Independence or Democracy?, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 43–51 (2007) (advocating 
increased shareholder access to the corporate proxy system as the catalyst for 
corporate governance reform). 
 126. See Arthur Levitt, Jr., Editorial, Stocks Populi, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2006, at A14 
(discussing the defeat and more recent attempts by shareholder advocates to achieve 
similar reform through by-law amendments).  But see Judith Burns, SEC Proxy-Access 
Proposal Draws Fire From Investors, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2007, at D2 (reporting that 
proxy reform is still being considered). 
 127. See Stephen Labaton, A Public Airing for Proposals on Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 26, 2007, at C3 (noting that the text of the proposal has not yet been released); 
Kara Scannell, SEC’s Solomon?  Cox Splits Vote on Proxy Access, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2007, 
at C1 (discussing the decision by SEC Chairman Cox to support both proposals, 
indicating he did so to gain the perspectives of both sides of the issue during the 
decision making process). 
 128. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 892–905 (setting forth an agenda for further 
reform intended to boost the influence of institutional investors). 
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corporate governance and has never experienced growth to match its 
potential. 
1. Shareholder apathy 
As predicted by economic theory, the American system of 
corporate governance is presently characterized by shareholder 
apathy.129  Shareholders in general continue to shun active 
monitoring.  Georgeson, a leading proxy solicitation firm, 
summarized the current mood in its most recent review of the annual 
proxy season: 
Once again the intensity of shareholder activism and demands for 
improved corporate governance boiled below the surface of the 
2006 annual meeting season.  No records were set for shareholder-
sponsored governance resolutions and there was only a modest 
increase in proxy contest activity . . . .130 
Admittedly, there are positive signs that shareholder activism is 
working.  In the first place, proxy contests and shareholder 
resolutions are prevalent enough during annual proxy seasons to 
have taken on an almost ritualistic air.131  For example, according to 
an annual review of the S&P 1500 by Georgeson, 2006 saw 385 
shareholder proposals at 189 companies.132  For the first half of 2007, 
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) reported an increase in 
support for “say on pay” resolutions that seek an annual shareholder 
vote on executive compensation.133  ISS also reported that major 
shareholder insurgencies occurred in 2007 at KB Home, 
                                                          
 129. For an explanation of the theory behind shareholder apathy, see Rock, supra 
note 1, at 453–63.  For an argument that the “old” narrative of shareholder apathy is 
no longer accurate, see Black, supra note 2, at 523. 
 130. GEORGESON, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.georgeson.com/en_uk/download/news/2006_ACGR_FINAL.pdf.  For a 
similar impression of the generally subdued nature of current proxy contests, see 
Gretchen Morgenson, Proxy Fights More Muted, for Most Part, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2007, 
at C1. 
 131. According to Georgeson’s annual survey, 385 corporate governance 
proposals were voted on during 2006.  GEORGESON, supra note 130, at 9.  Of these, 
fifty-five percent were related to board composition and structure, while another 
twenty-four percent addressed executive compensation.  Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Reed Walton, U.S. Midseason Review, RISK & GOVERNANCE WKLY., July 2007, 
http://www.issproxy.com/governance_weekly/2007/034.html (analyzing support of 
institutional shareholders for various corporate board proposals, including say-on-
pay, majority voting, and poison pill proposals); see also Erin White & Aaron O. 
Patrick, Shareholders Push for Vote on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2007, at B1 
(stating that shareholders at roughly sixty companies have submitted proposals for 
an advisory vote on executive pay). 
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International Paper, Mead/Westvaco, McGraw-Hill, Honeywell, 
Convergys, Blockbuster, and Goodyear Tire & Rubber.134 
Various well-known contests also provide anecdotal evidence of 
shareholder interest in corporate governance.135  Perhaps the best 
known modern example was the attempt by Walter Hewlett to derail 
the proposed merger of Hewlett-Packard and Compaq in 2002.136  
Another was the successful ouster of embattled Walt Disney CEO 
Michael Eisner in 2004, where the opposition of Fidelity, T. Rowe 
Price, and other institutional investors proved decisive.137  Both also 
gave rise to substantial shareholder litigation.138 
Finally, it is possible that many proposals are not made—or not 
voted on—because management chooses to accede to shareholder 
demands and so avoid a costly and embarrassing fight.  For example, 
fully forty-four percent of corporate governance proposals in 2006 
were withdrawn or omitted before the date of the annual meeting, 
suggesting that many may have been mooted by management 
                                                          
 134. See Walton, supra note 133 (listing notable votes on shareholder proposals at 
major corporations). 
 135. For two recent, if otherwise unremarkable, examples, see Erin White, Stage-
Managing the Annual Meeting, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2007, at B1 (citing instances of 
shareholder activism and alleged intimidation of shareholders by corporate agents at 
the board meetings of Home Depot and Brinker International, among others), and 
White & Patrick, supra note 133, at B1 (indicating that shareholder activism resulted 
in changes in corporate pay at GlaxoSmithKline). 
 136. See generally Steve Lohr, Clash Over Legacy Fuels Computer Merger Battle, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, (Sunday Business), at 28 (discussing the opposition of the 
merger between Hewlett-Packard and Compaq by the Hewlett and Packard families); 
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Hewletts Vow to Oppose Hewlett-Packard Merger with Compaq, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2001, at C1 (discussing opposition to the merger by the Hewlett 
family). 
 137. See Laura M. Holson, For Disney’s Embattled Chief, a Double Rebuke from Fidelity, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at C7 (noting that Fidelity showed its opposition to 
Eisner’s continued tenure twice:  once by withholding the votes on the shares it 
owned, and once by withholding the votes on the shares it controlled as 
administrator of Disney’s 401(k) plan).  Much of the opposition by institutional 
investors arose because proxy advisor ISS recommended that its members withhold 
their votes for Eisner.  See Frank Ahrens, Disney’s New Drama:  Dissension, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 1, 2004, at A1 (noting that up to thirty-five percent of Disney’s investors would 
likely not support Eisner’s reelection).  In all, forty-three percent of shareholders 
withheld their votes for Eisner.  David A. Vise, Some Stockholders Think Disney Stopped 
Short, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2004, at E1.  Although the no-confidence vote was only 
symbolic, Eisner was finally forced to resign a year early on September 30, 2004.  See 
Richard Verrier & Claudia Eller, Disney Names One of Its Own as New Chief, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 14, 2005, at A1 (discussing Eisner’s departure from Disney and indicating that 
Eisner was criticized for his authoritarian management style, poor relations with 
other partners and companies, and sub-par corporate performance). 
 138. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 34 (Del. 
2006) (shareholder derivative action alleging violations of fiduciary duties in 
connection with the termination of Michael Ovitz); Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 
No. 19513-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 35, at *2–3 (Apr. 30, 2002) (shareholder 
derivative action alleging vote buying and misrepresentation in connection with 
shareholder approval of the merger). 
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acquiescence.139  Similarly, of the forty-six companies that held a vote 
on shareholder proposals to eliminate staggered boards, forty-five of 
them actually supported the change.140   
Unfortunately, however, there is no way to know how often 
shareholders made informal requests or how effective these informal 
communications may be.  Also, many shareholder proposals may be 
omitted not because of their merit but because of their lack of 
merit.141 
Despite these apparent bright spots, the real incidence of 
shareholder activism remains quite small.  The fact that there were 
385 shareholder proposals at 189 companies in the S&P 1500 during 
2006 means that there were no shareholder proposals at the other 
1311 companies.142  In other words, more than eighty-seven percent of 
large U.S. companies were not subject to any level of formal 
shareholder activism in 2006.  Moreover, those that were generally 
found it easy to defeat the attempted discipline.143  Indeed, Walter 
Hewlett’s attempt to defeat the HP-Compaq merger ultimately failed 
when Deutsche Bank was persuaded to side with management.144  At 
                                                          
 139. See GEORGESON, supra note 130, at 12; see also Amy Cortese, Better to Switch 
Than Fight?, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, July 2004, at 8 (reporting that, during the 2004 proxy 
season, “[a] growing number of companies took steps to cooperate with shareholder 
groups and head off potentially damaging situations”); Walton, supra note 133 
(reporting that twelve shareholder proposals regarding executive compensation had 
been withdrawn in the first half of 2007, “indicating companies are more willing to 
engage with stockholders in drawing up performance metrics for calculating 
executive pay”). 
 140. GEORGESON, supra note 130, at 3. 
 141. Although Exchange Act rule 14a-8 requires management to include certain 
shareholder proposals in its proxy statement, the rule also permits management to 
exclude proposals that lack merit or are otherwise not a proper subject for 
shareholder action.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007) (addressing when a company 
must include a shareholder’s proposal in its proxy statement and indicating when it 
is proper to exclude a shareholder’s proposal).  See generally supra note 113 (noting 
that some companies routinely use § 14a-8 to exclude shareholder proposals). 
 142. See GEORGESON, supra note 130, at 1 (listing statistics of number of 
shareholder proposals at S&P 1500 companies); see also Bebchuk, Shareholder 
Franchise, supra note 107, at 682–87 (arguing that the actual number of contested 
proxy solicitations is quite low). 
 143. See Walton, supra note 133 (reporting that, for example, investors had filed 
more than sixty proposals in the first half of 2007 requesting that companies more 
closely link executive pay and company performance, but that the average support 
for such proposals was only thirty-five percent); White, supra note 135 (cataloguing 
strategies utilized by management to avoid or defuse potential controversies). 
 144. This decision, which Walter Hewlett alleged was the result of an illegal vote-
buying scheme on the part of Hewlett Packard CEO Carly Fiorina, was ultimately 
upheld by the Delaware Chancery Court.  Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 19513-
NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 35 (Apr. 30, 2002).  As a result of subsequent investigations 
by the SEC and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, 
however, Deutsche Asset Management later agreed to pay a $750,000 settlement for 
failing to disclose its conflict of interest.  See Deutsche Bank Settles Proxy-Votes Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2003, at C3 (reporting that Deutsche Asset Management agreed to 
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the same time, opponents of Michael Eisner were successful in 
ousting him only after ten turbulent years of sub-par performance, 
the end of Disney’s successful partnership with Pixar Animation 
Studios, the announcement of an unpopular takeover bid by 
Comcast, and a negative public relations campaign by former board 
members including Walt Disney’s nephew, Roy.145  In fact, perhaps 
the greatest indictment against American shareholder activism is the 
fact that headlines are made each time even a modest fraction of a 
company’s shareholders are roused to express their dissatisfaction 
with management. 
Overall, the 2006 proxy season saw a fourteen-percent decrease 
from 2005 in the number of shareholder resolutions that were 
submitted.146  Similarly, although there was a slight increase in actual 
proxy contests between 2005 and 2006, there were fewer contests in 
2006 than in 1990.147  In fact, the 2006 total of thirty-one proxy 
contests hovered only just above the long-term average of twenty-
seven.148  Shareholder anger—at least as expressed through the proxy 
process—has grown increasingly muted.149 
Equally important as the relative number of shareholder-initiated 
proposals is their dismal rate of success.  In 2006, for example, only 
twenty-nine percent of outstanding shares were voted in favor of 
                                                          
pay $750,000 to the SEC to settle wrongdoing allegations but admitted no fault as 
part of the settlement).  Carly Fiorina, the prominent CEO of Hewlett Packard 
credited with engineering the merger, was ousted in 2005.  See Ben Elgin, The Inside 
Story of Carly’s Ouster, BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 21, 2005, at 34 (describing the events that 
led to Fiorina’s removal). 
 145. See Ahrens, supra note 137 (reporting on the company’s poor performance 
and Disney and Gold’s efforts to oust Eisner); Geraldine Fabrikant, Comcast 
Shareholders Have Little Difficulty Containing Enthusiasm, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at 
C1 (noting that Comcast’s shares tumbled twelve percent after the announcement 
that it was offering a nine-percent premium for Disney); Peter Grant, Comcast Will 
Adopt Strategy of Patience in Bid for Disney, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2004, at B6 (following 
the ongoing takeover attempt by Comcast).  Comcast’s bid was ultimately 
unsuccessful.  See Geraldine Fabrikant, Comcast Pulls Disney Bid Off the Table, and Wall 
Street Breathes a Sigh of Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004, at C1 (discussing Comcast’s 
pulling of its bid for Disney and highlighting that the process put the spotlight on 
corporate governance issues at Disney and Comcast).  Instead, Disney purchased 
Pixar in January 2006.  See Mark A. Stein, Carmaking Bites Bullet; Other Industries Dine 
Well, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2006, at C2 (indicating that Pixar’s CEO would be Disney’s 
largest shareholder and have a seat on the Disney Board and that Disney’s CEO had 
made reconciliation a top priority in the merger).  For the full story of Eisner’s 
turbulent twenty-one-year reign as CEO, see generally JAMES B. STEWART, DISNEYWAR 
(2005). 
 146. GEORGESON, supra note 130, at 1. 
 147. See id. at 45 (providing statistics of contested proxy solicitations for 1982 
through 2006). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Morgenson, supra note 130 (“With stock indexes near their record highs, 
investor anger, not surprisingly, has been muted.”). 
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board-related shareholder resolutions, and a mere twenty-one 
percent were voted in favor of hot-button executive compensation 
reforms.150  Moreover, although a respectable—though still 
insufficient—forty-nine percent of outstanding shares were voted in 
favor of proposals to repeal classified boards as a takeover defense, 
this level of support remains almost unchanged from prior years.151  
The numbers are even worse with respect to efforts to repeal poison 
pills, where there has been a steady decline in support.152  Finally, 
hidden in the ISS data on the 2007 proxy season is the fact that the 
level of support for the much-heralded “say on pay” resolutions was 
actually down from 2006, although the number of proposals was up.153  
In fact, ISS reports that shareholder resolutions attracted majority 
support at only eight of 1500 U.S. companies in the first half of 
2007.154  Thus, even where shareholders are able to successfully launch 
some kind of insurgency, such efforts almost never succeed. 
The very nature of public equity fund activism also seems unlikely 
to produce significant results.  According to Marcel Kahan and Ed 
Rock, the strategy of seeking governance changes through 
shareholder proposals, while perhaps inexpensive, is “unlikely to 
result in big changes in specific companies.”155  Likewise, behind-the-
scenes discussions with company management also seem likely to 
produce only modest, incremental improvements.156 
Implicit in this picture of general shareholder apathy is a lack of 
activism on the part of institutional investors.  If few shareholders are 
involved in active monitoring campaigns, it must also be true that few 
institutional investors are so engaged.  In fact, the available data bear 
this out.  According to the Georgeson study, for example, pension 
funds initiated only nineteen proxy proposals in 2006, while mutual 
funds, banks and insurance companies initiated none.157  Thus, in 
2006, fully ninety-nine percent of the S&P 1500 companies were 
                                                          
 150. See GEORGESON, supra note 130, at 15 (listing a summary of figures of selected 
voting results for proposals during the 2006 annual meeting season). 
 151. See id. at 16 (indicating that forty-six percent of outstanding shares were voted 
in favor of proposals to repeal classified boards in 2002, while fifty-one percent were 
so voted in 2004). 
 152. See id. (noting that support for efforts to repeal poison pills fell from forty-two 
percent in 2002 to thirty-six percent in 2006). 
 153. See Walton, supra note 133 (reporting that executive compensation reform 
proposals averaged thirty-five percent support during the first half of 2007, as 
compared to thirty-six percent in the first half of 2006). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 1044. 
 156. Id. 
 157. GEORGESON, supra note 130, at 10. 
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completely unconstrained by formal institutional investor oversight.158  
As an added insult, this level of passivity has persisted even as proxy 
reforms have made institutional investor activism less expensive.159 
2. Fewer monitors 
Pessimism regarding the level of monitoring would also be 
appropriate for those market players that Rock hoped would serve as 
corporate governance entrepreneurs.160  One example is the United 
Shareholders’ Association (“USA”), a non-profit advocacy group that 
was founded in 1986 with the aim of targeting firms with poor 
performance, excessive executive pay, and limited shareholder input.  
Despite its initial successes, USA closed its doors only two years after 
Rock’s article.161  Likewise, the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (“IRRC”), a non-profit research center aimed at assisting 
investors with socially responsible agendas, was acquired by its rival, 
ISS, in 2005.162  ISS itself was sold in 2006.163 
Admittedly, whether these changes can be interpreted as an 
unmitigated defeat for advocates of shareholder voice is doubtful.  
USA only dissolved after successfully lobbying the SEC to ease rules 
governing shareholder communication, while IRRC continues to 
                                                          
 158. See id. (listing the names and categories of shareholder groups who 
sponsored governance proposals and the number of proposals each shareholder 
group sponsored). 
 159. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 12, at 840–41 & n.18 (citing an estimate by the 
United Shareholders Association that a mailing that once cost $1 million could now 
be completed for as little as $5,000). 
 160. See Rock, supra note 1, at 479–81 (discussing the activities of, and the 
potential for, providing oversight of corporate governance by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center, the Council for Institutional Investors, and the 
United Shareholders Association). 
 161. See Deon Strickland, Kenneth W. Wiles & Marc Zenner, A Requiem for the USA:  
Is Small Shareholder Monitoring Effective?, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 319, 320, 336–37 (1996) 
(analyzing the positive contribution of USA to the process of shareholder monitoring 
and indicating that it discontinued operations because it had met its goal of giving 
shareholders the ability to influence the corporate board decision-making process). 
 162. See Dean Starkman, Rockville’s ISS to Buy Rival in Cash Deal, WASH. POST, July 
14, 2005, at D4  (discussing ISS’s purchase of IRRC).  IRRC was conceived of by then-
Harvard University President Derek Bok.  Victor F. Zonana, Activist Shareholder Spur 
Growth of a New Kind of Advice Industry, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1991, at D3.  Founded in 
1972, its original mission was to assist American investors, who desired to invest in 
South Africa without lending assistance to its regime of apartheid.  Id.; cf. Thomas W. 
Briggs, Shareholder Activism and Insurgency Under the New Proxy Rules, 50 BUS. LAW. 99, 
147–49 (1994) (arguing that proxy reforms aimed at empowering passive 
institutional investors had instead empowered shareholder activists). 
 163. See David S. Hilzenrath, Investor Adviser ISS is Sold to RiskMetrics, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 2, 2006, at D1 (discussing the sale of ISS).  The acquirer, RiskMetrics Group, 
Inc., has since commenced an IPO of its stock.  RiskMetrics Group Files for $200 Million 
IPO, REUTERS, Sept. 19, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/governme 
ntFilingsNews/idUSN1929815720070919. 
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exist (and operate) as a division of ISS.164  Moreover, some have 
argued that ISS, under its new owner, is more powerful than ever, if 
only because it has fewer competitors.165  In the minds of some 
proponents, in fact, “the beginnings of a new corporate social 
responsibility movement are under foot.”166 
Even so, Rock’s larger point that monitoring by entrepreneurs was, 
in 1991, set to take off, has been disproved by events.  For example, 
the merger of IRRC and ISS appears to have resulted in a decrease in 
services for activist shareholders.167  Similarly, in 2006, only seventeen 
proposals were sponsored by institutional shareholder activists.168  
Instead, forty-seven percent of all proposals were sponsored by 
individuals, suggesting that shareholder activism remains largely an 
avocation, pursued primarily by those without the means to make a 
truly credible threat against managerial discretion.169  Another forty-
five percent of shareholder proposals in 2006 were sponsored by 
labor unions and related public pension funds, suggesting as well that 
shareholder activism retains a significant political, as opposed to 
economic, dimension.170 
                                                          
 164. See Strickland, Wiles & Zenner, supra note 161, at 320–21 (indicating that 
USA did not disband until it had met its goal of positively influencing the 
relationship between shareholders and corporate boards); Starkman, supra note 162 
(indicating ISS intended to operate IRRC as a subsidiary).  For a discussion of the 
SEC’s rule change easing stockholder communication restrictions, see supra notes 
108–110 and accompanying text. 
 165. See John Plender, ISS to Dominate, FIN. TIMES, July 25, 2005, at 20 (citing one 
analyst’s belief that a recommendation by ISS can sway as much as twenty percent of 
the vote in a proxy contest); Starkman, supra note 162 (noting the role played by ISS 
in the 2004 ouster of Disney CEO Michael Eisner as well as in the 2002 proxy 
campaign surrounding the proposed merger of Hewlett-Packard and Compaq).  As 
of 2005, ISS and “its analysts cover[ed] 28,000 listed companies on behalf of 1,300 
institutional clients.”  Sundeep Tucker, ISS Buys US Research Group IRRC, FIN. TIMES, 
July 14, 2005, at 27. 
 166. Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 605 (2001). 
 167. For example, the combined ISS/IRRC canceled publication of Corporate 
Governance Highlights and The Friday Report early in 2006 and instead merged the two 
into Governance Weekly, thereby diminishing the number of publications that actively 
follow proxy news.  See Press Release, Institutional S’holder Servs., Institutional 
Shareholder Services Introduces Governance Weekly (Jan. 11, 2006), available at 
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/GovernanceWeekly011106.pdf (introducing Governance 
Weekly and noting that it continues in the steps of The Friday Report and Corporate 
Governance Weekly). 
 168. See GEORGESON, supra note 130, at 10, 13 (listing figures for sponsorship of 
governance proposals in 2005 and 2006). 
 169. See id. at 13 (displaying types of sponsors of governance proposals in 2005 
and 2006); see also Bratton, supra note 10, at 1403 (noting that the average proxy 
contest costs between $250,000 and $1 million). 
 170. See GEORGESON, supra note 130, at 13 (displaying types of sponsors of 
governance proposals in 2005 and 2006).  See generally Romano, supra note 82, at 796 
(arguing that public pension fund managers “must navigate carefully around the 
shoals of considerable political pressure to temper investment policies with local 
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3. Index funds 
Another reason for the lack of monitoring by public equity funds 
may be the revolution that has occurred with respect to indexed 
investing since the early 1990s.  Index mutual funds and their more 
recent cousin, exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”), both hold investment 
portfolios that are designed to match—rather than outperform—the 
results of particular market indices.171  Because they seek only to 
mirror market performance, such funds cannot be expected to 
engage in oversight activities or other activist trading strategies.172  
Thus, to the extent they expand their influence, such funds will suck 
capital away from funds that might be more prone to engage in active 
monitoring.  Moreover, even those mutual funds that are not indexed 
                                                          
considerations, such as fostering in-state employment, which are not aimed at 
maximizing the value of their portfolios’ assets”). 
Examples of the mix of politics and pension fund management are many.  For 
example, former California state treasurer Phil Angelides, who was considering 
running for governor in 2006, was accused of causing the California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”) to engage in shareholder activism in 
order to fuel his political ambitions.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Pension Funds Play 
Politics, TCS DAILY, Apr. 21, 2004, http://www.techcentralstation.com/042104G.html 
(noting that unions and public pension funds, such as CalPERS, have political goals  
as well as financial ones, and so are likely to be activist shareholders (quoting Aaron 
Lucchetti & Joann S. Lublin, Calpers Targets Directors Who Neglect Holders, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 16, 2004, at C1)).  Meanwhile, the Department of Labor under President 
Clinton encouraged state and local pension funds to make “targeted investments” 
intended to achieve some social goal rather than turn a profit.  Jim Saxton, A Raid on 
America’s Pension Funds, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1994, at A12.  More recent examples of 
the infusion of politics into public pension fund investing may be found in the 
growing number of shareholder resolutions related to global warming, especially at 
carbon-intensive companies such as ExxonMobil, Ford and General Motors.  See, e.g., 
Steven Mufson, At Exxon Meeting, a Storm Outside but Calm Within, WASH. POST, May 31, 
207, at D2 (stating that thirty-one percent of shareholders voted for a shareholder 
resolution intended to force Exxon to reduce its carbon emissions and produce 
technology to assist others to do the same).  Companies that do business with states 
that sponsor terrorism have also come under recent scrutiny by politicians hoping to 
influence public pension fund managers.  See, e.g., Craig Karmin, Missouri Treasurer’s 
Demand:  ‘Terror-Free’ Pension Funds, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2007, at C1 (discussing the 
passage, in a dozen states, of legislation to compel pension funds to divest from 
companies who do business with state sponsors of terrorism and noting that pension 
funds are beginning to take the issue seriously); see also Harwell Wells, The Cycles of 
Corporate Social Responsibility:  An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 77, 113–18 (2002) (discussing the history and events surrounding 
“Campaign GM,” a push in the late-1960s and early-1970s which never gained more 
than three percent of shareholder votes, to demand that corporations, most notably 
General Motors, to adopt polices for social good). 
 171. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 31. 
 172. Indeed, much of the appeal of indexed investing is that it offers competitive 
returns at extremely low cost.  See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S, STANDARD & POOR’S 
INDICES VERSUS ACTIVE FUNDS SCORECARD, FIRST QUARTER 2007 3 (Apr. 25, 2007), 
available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/SPIVA_2007_q1.pdf 
(reporting that, over the prior five years, the S&P 500 index had outperformed 
approximately three-quarters of all actively managed funds). 
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are heavily diversified, reducing their incentives to monitor in much 
the same way.173 
The growth of indexed investing has been explosive.  In 1976 there 
was only one index fund, derided by some as “Bogle’s Folly,” and by 
1984 there were still only two.174  Today, however, over seventeen 
percent of all equity fund assets—more than $1 trillion—is held by 
index mutual funds.175  Just over $31 billion in new cash flowed into 
index mutual funds during 2006.176  In an eerily similar pattern, it 
took several years after the first ETF was founded in 1993 for the 
second to be established.177  However, today, there are at least 359 
ETFs holding over $422 billion of assets.178  Moreover, pension plans 
increasingly appear to be relying heavily on indexed investments as 
well.179 
All told, institutional investors have thus far remained passive, 
doing relatively little to change the fundamental nature of corporate 
governance or to improve the performance of individual firms.  In 
fact, several empirical studies have found that what little institutional 
investor monitoring there is has produced no measurable effect on 
stock prices or earnings.180  It is also true that, although there are 
mutual funds that engage in active monitoring, their response to 
evidence of poor performance is to exit the investment rather than to 
                                                          
 173. See Black, supra note 11, at 834 (noting that some institutional investors “own 
a thousand or more ‘names’”); see also LOUIS LOWENSTEIN, SENSE AND NONSENSE IN 
CORPORATE FINANCE 217 (1991) (noting that one pension fund holds shares in 1400 
different companies). 
 174. John C. Bogle, ‘Value’ Strategies, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2007, at A11.  Bogle, the 
founder and long-time chief of Vanguard Group, launched the first index fund for 
retail investors in 1975.  See Len Costa, Power & Influence:  Heart of the Matter, 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May 2007, at 100, 100–03 (discussing the creation and 
growth of Vanguard Group). 
 175. See INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 39 (listing yearly net 
cash flow to index mutual funds for 1993 through 2006). 
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. at 32 (listing yearly numbers of ETFs for 1993 through 2006). 
 178. See id. at 32–33 (listing yearly numbers of ETFs for 1993 through 2006 and 
amount of assets in ETFs for 1993 through 2006). 
 179. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 20, at 863–64 (estimating that CalPERS 
would soon devote as much as eighty-five percent of its portfolios to passive indexed 
investments). 
 180. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the 
United States, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459, 462 
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) (finding “no strong evidence of a correlation between 
firm performance and percentage of shares owned by institutions”); Black, Empirical 
Evidence, supra note 10, at 917–24 (finding minimal research into the impact of 
oversight by institutional investors); Roberta Romano, Less is More:  Making 
Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON 
REG. 174, 177 (2001) (highlighting the dearth of studies that found oversight by 
institutional investors to have a positive impact on stock prices). 
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take action against management.181  Therefore, institutional investors 
in general, and public equity funds in particular, have thus far failed 
to seize their historic opportunity to become active monitors of 
corporate wrongdoing. 
II. PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 
In Part I of this Article, the focus was on public equity funds.  
When one traces their recent history, it becomes readily apparent 
that, despite their promise and despite several attempts by the SEC to 
make the exercise of shareholder voice less burdensome, public 
equity funds remain today extremely passive in their outlook.  Rather 
than expend resources on corporate oversight, most are either 
indexed or widely diversified.  They keep costs low and sell when 
performance lags.  The promise of institutional investor voice thus 
remains largely unfulfilled. 
Part II shifts the focus to private equity funds.182  It first provides an 
overview of their typology and history, regulatory environment, and 
legal structure.  It then sets forth their unique compensation 
structure. 
A. Overview and History 
An investment fund is a business entity whose only important asset 
is its capital and whose primary business purpose is to acquire 
securities or other assets in the hope that they will appreciate.183  By 
                                                          
 181. For an example of such a fund, see Fidelity Investments, Fidelity Value Fund, 
http://personal.fidelity.com/products/funds/mfl_frame.shtml?316464106 (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2007). 
 182. Omitted from the discussion in Part II are funds of funds, which invest 
primarily in other private equity funds, as well as university endowments.  For 
corporate governance purposes, funds of funds are largely irrelevant.  They simply 
serve as a conduit for diversifying investments and so do little to change the 
incentives of fund managers.  University endowments are more complicated.  Some 
are quite large and sophisticated, but many are neither.  As a result, they defy easy 
classification and lack homogeneity.  Depending upon their particular size and 
investment outlook, then, they may be assumed to mimic the governance, behavior 
and incentive structure of other categories of funds.  See generally JAMES M. SCHELL, 
PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS:  BUSINESS STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS § 1.06, at 1-32 to -35 
(2006) (describing how a Fund of Funds is organized, operates, and invests); 
THOMAS MEYER & PIERRE-YVES MATHONET, BEYOND THE J-CURVE:  MANAGING A 
PORTFOLIO OF VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS ch. 5 (2005). 
 183. See SCHELL, supra note 182, § 8.03, at 8-36 to -38 (noting that investment 
companies such as mutual funds and private equity funds engage primarily in the 
business of investing and reinvesting in the securities of other companies).  Note that 
private equity funds typically pursue a long-only investment strategy.  Unlike 
traditional hedge funds, which may take both long and short positions in a given 
stock, private equity funds seek to gain from capital appreciation only.  See SCHELL, 
supra note 182, § 1.03[1], at 1-19 (discussing the investment strategies of venture 
capital funds). 
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contrast, a bank or insurance company, while also being 
predominantly a pool of cash, utilizes its capital to engage in a variety 
of other businesses, such as loan origination and the underwriting of 
risk.184  If an investment fund purchases primarily equity securities, as 
opposed to real estate or other assets, it can be referred to as an 
equity fund.185  If it is exempt from most federal regulation, it is 
commonly known as a private equity fund. 
The term “private equity fund” is a business term, not a legal one.  
Therefore, there is no one standard definition for this group of 
investors.  However, the term is generally used to refer to a category 
of investment funds that seek to avoid regulation under various 
federal securities laws, most notably the Investment Company Act and 
the Investment Advisers Act.186  Private equity funds also commonly 
seek to acquire control over a limited portfolio of corporations.187  
Once control is established, they cause management to take actions 
that favor shareholder interests, thus reducing agency costs.188  In 
order to pursue different investment strategies, private equity funds 
have developed into several distinct categories—venture capital 
                                                          
 184. See generally MILTON R. SCHROEDER, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS (1995) (distinguishing investment funds from other financial entities 
such as banks and insurance companies). 
 185. Thus, for example, a real estate investment trust or “REIT,” though also 
primarily a pooled investment vehicle, differs from an equity fund in that it invests 
primarily or exclusively in real estate.  See generally SCHELL, supra note 182, § 1.06[A], 
at 1-38 to -39 (describing, among other things, the investment strategy and 
organizational structure of real estate funds). 
 186. See infra Part II.B (describing the complexity of the regulatory environment 
for equity funds). 
 187. JACK S. LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND 
ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS, ¶ 102, at 1–3 (2005); SCHELL, supra note 182, 
§ 1.04[1], at 1-25 (2006); see George W. Dent, Jr., Venture Capital and the Future of 
Corporate Finance, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1035–64 (1992) (describing methods by 
which venture capital funds exercise de facto control over their portfolio of 
companies without owning a majority of the shares).  But see Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & 
Thomas, supra note 7, at 4 (finding that most activist hedge funds do not seek to 
acquire a majority of their targets’ stock).  For a discussion of the unique nature of 
hedge fund oversight, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 1021 (arguing that hedge 
fund monitoring is both strategic and ex ante, rather than incidental and ex post).  For 
examples of contractual terms that permit private equity funds with a minority 
position to effectively wield power, see Douglas G. Smith, The Venture Capital 
Company:  A Contractarian Rebuttal to the Political Theory of American Corporate Finance?, 
65 TENN. L. REV. 79, 107–33 (1997); Shannon Wells Stevenson, The Venture Capital 
Solution to the Problem of Close Corporation Shareholder Fiduciary Duties, 51 DUKE L.J. 1139, 
1155–64 (2001). 
 188. See Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 7, at 2–3, 37 (finding that 
hedge fund activism “can reduce the agency costs of equity by focusing managers on 
creating shareholder value instead of pursuing other agendas”). 
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funds, leveraged buyout funds and, in certain cases, hedge funds.189  
There is also a great deal of variation within each category.190 
Venture capital funds typically invest in a limited number of early 
stage companies with the expectation that most will ultimately fail.191  
However, given the potential for huge profits, it only takes one 
Google to make an entire fund profitable.192  Venture capital funds 
                                                          
 189. For general background on the development and workings of the venture 
capital industry, see generally THOMAS M. DOERFLINGER & JACK L. REVKIN, RISK AND 
REWARD:  VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA’S GREAT INDUSTRIES (1987) 
(describing how venture capitalists’ resources, contacts, and flexibility are vital to the 
success of innovative entrepreneurs); DONE DEALS:  VENTURE CAPITALISTS TELL THEIR 
STORIES (Udayan Gupta ed., 2000) (reviewing the careers of thirty-five successful 
venture capitalists); PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE (2d 
ed. 2004) (outlining the development of the venture capital industry, and drawing 
on original data to illustrate how venture capital funds operate through each stage of 
the investment process); THE FIRST VENTURE CAPITALIST:  GEORGES DORIOT ON 
LEADERSHIP, CAPITAL, & BUSINESS ORGANIZATION (Udayan Gupta ed., 2004) (a 
biography of the pioneering mid-20th century venture capitalist); UNDERSTANDING 
SILICON VALLEY:  THE ANATOMY OF AN ENTREPRENEURIAL REGION (Martin Kenny ed., 
2000) (examining the history, development, and entrepreneurial dynamics of Silicon 
Valley); Dent, supra note 187, at 1029 (defining and explaining the venture capital 
system and its implications for corporate law).  See also Small Business Innovation 
Research:  What is the Optimal Role of Venture Capital?:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Environment, Technology, and Standards Of the H. Comm. on Science, 109th Cong. (2005) 
(discussing the performance of the Small Business Innovation Research grant 
program and suggesting that government and private venture capital efforts can 
effectively complement each other); Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital 
Market:  Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1069–76 (2003) 
(tracing the development of the United States’ venture capital system and discussing 
efforts by other countries to emulate America’s success). 
Considerably less has been written on the history of the hedge fund industry.  The 
most notable (and controversial) exception is BARTON BIGGS, HEDGE HOGGING 
(2006).  Another colorful source is Joseph Nocera, The Strange Inner Workings of the 
[Too-Good-to-Last?] Hedge-Fund Machine, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE:  THE MONEY ISSUE, June 
5, 2005, at 44. 
   For histories and background on LBOs, see generally GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE 
DAVID SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL CAPITALISTS:  KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE 
CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE (1998) (discussing key events in the twenty-year 
history of the firm that pioneered leveraged buyouts); BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN 
HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE:  THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO (1990) (describing the 
$25 billion LBO of RJR Nabisco).  Cf. CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS’ BALL:  THE 
INSIDE STORY OF DREXEL BURNHAM AND THE RISE OF THE JUNK BOND RAIDERS (1989) 
(describing how Michael Milken popularized the use of high-yield debt and helped 
fuel the leveraged buyout boom). 
 190. For example, venture capital funds may invest primarily in early stage 
companies or more mature companies.  Likewise, their focus is often limited to a 
particular industry or market segment. 
 191. See SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 5, at 8.  A venture capital fund can 
be profitable if as few as ten to thirty percent of its investments prove successful.  
BRIAN E. HILL & DEE POWER, INSIDE SECRETS TO VENTURE CAPITAL 9–11 (2001). 
 192. See, e.g., Rebecca Buckman, Silicon Valley’s Backers Grapple With Era of 
Diminished Returns, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2006, at A1 (comparing current rates of 
return with the profits generated by the Google IPO); Andrew Clark, Sequoia Grows 
Another Golden Fruit for the Welshman with the Midas Touch, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 19, 
2006, at 29 (noting the enormous success of San Francisco based Sequoia Capital, 
which made billions from its investment in Google); Gary Rivlin, So You Want to be a 
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are long-term investors, with a time horizon often ranging between 
seven and ten years, and they generally prefer to acquire a majority of 
the outstanding equity of a given portfolio company.193  Alternatively, 
they often acquire a smaller stake coupled with various contractual 
rights of control.194  They generally seek to exit their investments by 
means of an initial public offering or a sale or other business 
combination involving the portfolio company.195 
Leveraged buyout funds generally seek to acquire control of more 
mature companies, frequently in industries that are out of favor with 
Wall Street.196  Often in conjunction with existing management, they 
may take public corporations private or acquire divisions of public 
companies in privately negotiated transactions.197  They generally 
utilize significant leverage, limiting the equity portion of the 
purchase price to as little as twenty to forty percent or less.198  LBO 
funds frequently cause their target companies to sell various assets 
                                                          
Venture Capitalist, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2005, at C1 (quoting a prominent venture 
capitalist on the success of early Google investors). 
 193. Typically, this is in the form of debentures and/or preferred stock that is 
convertible into common stock.  See LEVIN, supra note 187, ¶ 202, at 2-9 to -25 
(outlining a venture capital fund’s preferred investment structure with respect to a 
hypothetical start-up transaction).  One survey of venture capital investment terms 
suggested that twenty-six percent of venture capital funds “always” or “often” demand 
and receive a controlling interest, while another thirty-three percent “sometimes” do.  
JOSEPH A. BARTLETT, ROSS BARRETT & MICHAEL BUTLER, ADVANCED PRIVATE EQUITY 
TERM SHEETS AND SERIES A DOCUMENTS § 7.02, at 7-5 (2004). 
 194. See BARTLETT, BARRETT & BUTLER, supra note 193,  § 7.03[4], at 7-10 
(summarizing the results of a survey of the frequency with which venture capital 
funds “always” or “often” demand and receive certain other control rights:  board 
seats (ninety-six percent), anti-dilution privileges (ninety-three percent), post-IPO 
registration rights (eighty-nine percent), redemption rights (seventy-eight percent), 
various negative covenants (seventy-three percent), and drag-along rights (sixty-five 
percent)).  Interestingly, however, only twenty-two percent of venture capital funds 
“always” or “often” select the CEO.  Id. 
 195. SCHELL, supra note 182,  § 1.03[1], at 1-20.  For a discussion of the exit and 
control rights obtained by venture capital funds, see generally D. Gordon Smith, The 
Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315 (2005). 
 196. DOW JONES, PRIVATE EQUITY PARTNERSHIP TERMS & CONDITIONS 18 (2007).  It is 
also critical for debt repayment purposes that the target has large and steady cash 
flows.  For this reason, LBOs tend to be concentrated in mature industries.  JEAN 
TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 48 (2006). 
 197. PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE 
RESTRUCTURINGS 297 (4th ed. 2007); cf. Michelle Haynes, Steve Thompson & Mike 
Wright, Sources of Venture Capital Deals:  MBOs, IBOs and Corporate Refocusing, in 
MANAGEMENT BUY-OUTS AND VENTURE CAPITAL:  INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 219 (Mike 
Wright & Ken Robbie eds., 1999) (noting that many buyouts occur as a result of 
management’s decision to refocus and narrow its strategy and summarizing research 
regarding the causes of such a decision). 
 198. TUCK SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AT DARTMOUTH, NOTE ON LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 3, 5 
(2003), http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pecenter/research/pdfs/LBO_Note.pdf.  
Unsecured lenders to the transaction generally also receive warrants to purchase 
common stock, bringing this portion of the debt closer to an equity-like position.  
GAUGHAN, supra note 197, at 313. 
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shortly after closing in order to pay off a portion of the debt.199  The 
remainder is secured by the target companies’ assets.200  Thereafter, 
they hope to fund the remaining debt payments from a combination 
of corporate profits and tax savings.201  As an exit strategy, LBO funds 
generally sell off their portfolio companies to another buyer or via a 
public offering of stock, often after six or seven years.202 
Hedge funds have typically been thought to acquire more esoteric 
investments, such as derivative securities, commodities and 
currencies.203  Indeed, hedge funds that engage in such investments 
are not properly thought of as private equity funds.204  More recently, 
however, as profitable investment opportunities have become 
scarcer—even as more money has poured into the hedge fund 
industry—many hedge funds have become more active in acquiring 
corporate equities.205  One notable example of this trend is Cerberus 
Capital Management, which recently agreed to acquire eighty percent 
of Chrysler.206  Another is ESL Investments which, in the past few 
                                                          
 199. See ROBERT F. BRUNER, APPLIED MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 394–95 (2004) 
(noting that LBOs are often concentrated in firms suffering from financial distress 
which therefore lend themselves to improved efficiency and the disposition of 
unnecessary assets). 
 200. GAUGHAN, supra note 197, at 307. 
 201. See David Cay Johnston, Tax Loopholes Sweeten Deal for Blackstone, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 13, 2007, at A1 (describing the tax savings obtained by Blackstone); Steven 
Kaplan, Management Buyouts:  Evidence on Taxes As a Source of Value, 44 J. FIN. 611, 611–
32 (1989) (noting the importance of tax benefits as a source of wealth gains in 
management buyouts).  For data on post-LBO corporate profits, see generally Steven 
Kaplan, Management Buyouts:  Efficiency Gains or Value Transfers 43–45 (University of 
Chicago Working Paper No. 244, 1988) (“Post-buyout investors, in those buyout 
companies which can be valued, earn returns in excess of the market return.”); 
BRUNER, supra note 199, at 56 ex. 3.11 (summarizing data on profits from five 
separate empirical studies). 
 202. See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan, The Staying Power of Leveraged Buyouts, 29 J. FIN. 
ECON. 287, 290 (1991) (finding that targets of LBOs remain private for a median of 
6.82 years). 
 203. See, e.g., SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 5, at viii (“Hedge funds utilize a 
number of different investment styles and strategies and invest in a wide variety of 
financial instruments.  Hedge funds invest in equity and fixed income securities, 
currencies, over-the-counter derivatives, futures contracts and other assets.”). 
 204. See id. (noting that, “although similar to hedge funds, there are other 
unregistered pools of investments, including venture capital funds, private equity 
funds and commodity pools that generally are not categorized as hedge funds”). 
 205. See id. at 33 (noting that a number of hedge funds “adopt traditional, long-
only strategies similar to those used by most registered investment companies”); see 
also Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 7, at 2 (reviewing the corporate 
governance activities of 131 activist hedge funds); Gina Chon, Jason Singer & Jeffrey 
McCracken, Driver’s Seat:  Chrysler Deal Heralds New Direction for Detroit:  Cerberus Takes 
Gamble on Union Concessions; GM, Ford May Benefit, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2007, at A1 
(noting that “[p]rivate-equity firms like Cerberus, which often buy public equity 
companies and slash costs, have amassed large war chests of capital and have been 
aiming for bigger and bigger targets”). 
 206. See, e.g., Emily Thornton, What’s Bigger Than Cisco, Coke, or McDonald’s?, 
BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 3, 2005, at 100 (following the “secretive” Cerberus in its usual 
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years, has purchased a controlling stake in such American icons as 
Sears Roebuck and Kmart.207  Thus, to the extent hedge funds move 
into the territory traditionally held by LBO and venture capital funds, 
they may also be considered private equity funds. 
Prior to the 1970s, private equity investing was extremely limited, 
never exceeding more than a few hundred million dollars in any 
given year.208  Originally dominated by wealthy families such as the 
Phippes, Rockefellers, Vanderbilts, and Whitneys, the industry 
gradually gave way to more professional investors, with the first 
formal private equity funds being organized in the years following 
World War II.209  Although they scored some notable successes, these 
early funds attracted relatively little capital from traditional 
institutional investors.210 
All this began to change in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as 
institutional capital began to be available to private equity funds.211  
                                                          
operations).  With respect to Cerberus’ eighty-percent acquisition of Chrysler and 
the deal in general, see Chon, Singer & McCracken, supra note 205, at A1 
(“Daimler’s deal with Cerberus . . . represents a watershed moment for both the U.S. 
auto industry and the burgeoning private-equity sector that is transforming global 
finance . . . . With Chrysler, Cerberus is betting that it can run one of the nation’s 
largest industrial companies more effectively as a private company.”); Divorced, 
ECONOMIST, May 19, 2007, at 67 (noting that “Cerberus clinched the deal . . . mainly 
because of the speed and certainty with which it will be able to complete the 
transaction”); Gregory Zuckerman, Serena Ng & Dana Cimilluca, Cerberus Finds Luster 
in Detroit, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2007, at C1 (“With its acquisition of Chrysler, Cerberus 
Capital Management isn’t just becoming a force in Detroit.  It’s also becoming a 
force on Wall Street, with a stable of financial institutions that make it by far the 
biggest auto lender in the nation and a broader financial power around the globe.”).  
In fact, the financial arrangements are so favorable to Cerberus that Daimler, in 
effect, could end up paying as much as $670 million to get rid of Chrysler.  Divorced, 
supra, at 67. 
 207. Robert Berner, The Next Warren Buffett?, BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 22, 2004, at 144 
(noting as part of a cover story on fund manager Eddie Lampert that ESL’s 
acquisitions of large retailers include not only Sears Roebuck and Kmart, but also 
AutoZone and AutoNation, as well as long-distance telecom MCI); see also Sandra 
Guy, Private Party for Sears?  With Flat Quarter, Sears Might be Bought Outright by 
Billionaire, Analyst Speculates, CHI. SUN TIMES, June 1, 2007, at 51 (speculating whether 
ESL might be tempted to acquire that portion of Sears Roebuck that it does not 
already own). 
 208. LERNER, HARDYMON & LEAMON, supra note 7, at 2. 
 209. Id. at 1–2. MIT President Karl Compton and Harvard Business School 
Professor Georges F. Doriot are typically credited with founding the first formal 
private equity fund—American Research and Development—in 1946.  Id. at 2.  Its 
goal was to work with institutional investors rather than with wealthy families or 
individuals.  MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 73.  The first venture capital 
partnership was formed in 1958, with others soon following.  LERNER, HARDYMON & 
LEAMON, supra note 7, at 2. 
 210. LERNER, HARDYMON & LEAMON, supra note 7, at 2.  Prominent early successes 
of investing in and advising business enterprises included AT&T, Eastern Airlines, 
McDonnell Douglas, and Digital Equipment Company.  Id. 
 211. Id.  Many industry watchers attribute this to changes in the Department of 
Labor’s interpretation of ERISA’s “prudent investor” standard.  Id.  Prior 
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Although the flow of investment dollars ebbed and flowed unevenly, 
this period saw the rise of the modern venture capital industry, 
centered in large part on Sand Hill Road in California’s Silicon 
Valley.212  It was during this period that soon-to-be industry giants 
such as Cisco, Genentech, Microsoft, and Sun Microsystems all 
received their initial funding.  Leading the way were venture capital 
funds such as Sequoia Capital and Kleiner Perkins Caufield & 
Byers.213 
Meanwhile, LBO funds were cataloguing their own string of 
successful turn-arounds, especially in the 1980s.214  The combination 
of cheap credit available through the issuance of junk bonds, lax 
antitrust enforcement under the Reagan Administration, and 
changing attitudes as to proper corporate behavior led to a boom of 
takeovers, many of which were structured as leveraged buyouts.215  
Initially, LBO specialists like the Carlyle Group, the Blackstone 
Group, and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts were dominant.216  Investment 
banks have also joined the game using their own in-house capital.217  
Moreover, although private equity was for many years a largely 
                                                          
interpretations had left uncertain whether pension funds could safely invest in 
venture capital and other high-risk asset classes.  However, in 1979, the Department 
of Labor issued a release that clarified the standard to permit such investments.  
MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 73.  Another factor may have been the rise of 
limited partnerships, which—unlike Small Business Investment Companies—were 
not restricted in investment options, and which made possible performance-based 
fee arrangements.  Id. 
 212. Sand Hill Road, which connects El Camino Real with Interstate 280 in Menlo 
Park, California, has come to symbolize the venture capital industry much in the way 
that Wall Street symbolizes high finance.  See Clark, supra note 192 (calling Sand Hill 
Road “Silicon Valley’s equivalent of Wall Street”).  It is home to some of the world’s 
most famous venture capital funds, including Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers and 
Sequoia Capital.  See Laura M. Holson, Investing; Still Feeding an Internet Frenzy, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 6, 1999, (Sunday Business) at 1 (referring to Kleiner Perkins Caufield & 
Byers as “the godfather of Silicon Valley”). 
 213. See Erika Brown & Claire Cain Miller, Technology’s Top Dealmakers, FORBES, Feb. 
12, 2007, at 49–54 (ranking the twenty-five “best dealmakers in tech and life 
sciences,” a list that includes Michael Moritz of Sequoia Capital, John Doerr of  
Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, and Larry Sonsini of the law firm Wilson Sonsini 
Goodrich & Rosati, among other industry notables). 
 214. See, e.g., LERNER, HARDYMON & LEAMON, supra note 7, at 1–3 (summarizing the 
history of the private equity industry in the United States, with particular emphasis 
on the spike in activity in the early 1980s). 
 215. See GAUGHAN, supra note 197, at 53-59 (providing data and historical analysis 
regarding the “fourth wave” of merger activity occurring between 1981 and 1989). 
 216. See The PEI 50, PRIVATE EQUITY INTERNATIONAL, May 2007, at 62, reprinted at 
http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=196487 (ranking The Carlyle 
Group, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, and The Blackstone Group among the world’s four 
largest private equity funds). 
 217. See id. at 64 (noting that some investment banks have invested their own 
capital in private equity investments); see also Jenny Anderson, Goldman Bets Hedge 
Money of Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2007, at C1 (describing Goldman Sachs’s 
creation of, and investment in, a new hedge fund). 
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American phenomenon, European firms have increasingly gained 
ground.218 
The overall private equity market continues to be both vibrant and 
growing.  The past two years, for example, have witnessed nine of the 
ten largest leveraged buyouts in history.219  Only the epic $25 billion 
buyout of RJR Nabisco in 1989 remains on the top-ten list.220  
Meanwhile, an estimated $215 billion flowed into the coffers of 
private equity funds during 2006, an increase of thirty-three percent 
over the prior year and far above the record $177 billion raised in 
2000.221  In total, the industry is estimated to actively manage as much 
as $3 trillion in investment capital.222 
B. Regulatory Environment 
Under normal circumstances, an equity fund of any sort would be 
the subject of multiple and extensive federal regulations.  The 
Investment Company Act of 1940223 would govern the fund itself, 
                                                          
 218. See generally PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 61–71 
(contrasting European firms’ progress with American firms’ established practices 
and suggesting actions that the European firms can take to narrow the gap even 
more). 
 219. See Andrew R. Sorkin, The Money Binge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, at H1 
(reporting on record-setting LBOs, including the $45 billion buyout of TXU, the $33 
billion buyout of HCA, and the $29 billion buyout of First Data); cf. Ip & Sender, 
supra note 9 (noting that the just-announced acquisition of hospital chain HCA 
would be the second-largest in history, as well as the second such acquisition of HCA 
since 1989). 
 220. See Factbox—Top 10 Largest Leveraged Buyouts, REUTERS, Feb. 23, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/mergersNews/idUSN2335158320070224 (placing 
the RJR Nabisco buyout in the number two spot of the top-ten list).  This infamous 
LBO has been immortalized in BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE 
GATE:  THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO (1990).  It was also made into an HBO movie.  
BARBARIANS AT THE GATE (Columbia Pictures Television 1993).  The recent LBO of 
HCA, however—if one includes the $10.6 billion of debt to be assumed—would top 
even the RJR Nabisco deal.  See Randall Smith, Dennis K. Berman & Gautam Naik, 
HCA Is in Talks on Buyout Offer Worth $21 Billion, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2006, at A1 
(describing HCA’s buyout negotiations with Merrill Lynch, Kohlberg Kravis, and 
Bain Capital). 
 221. Tennille Tracy, Private-Equity Firms Raked in Record Amounts Last Year, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 11, 2007, at C6.  Of this $215 billion, approximately $25 billion, or eleven 
percent of the total, went to venture capital funds.  Id.  $149 billion, or sixty-nine 
percent of the total, went to LBO funds.  Id. 
 222. See Henny Sender, Investors Riding the ‘Cash’ Rapids, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2007, 
at C1 (citing data provided by J.P. Morgan Securities). 
 223. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (2000).  The 1940 Act requires investment 
companies to register with the SEC and to abide by extensive substantive rules that 
are not generally compatible with the business plan and management structure of 
most private equity funds.  See SCHELL, supra note 182, § 8.03, at 8-36 to -38 
(explaining the policy behind the Investment Company Act and its impact on private 
equity funds).  The term “investment company” is defined in section 3(a)(1) of the 
1940 Act to include any issuer that holds itself out as being engaged “primarily” in 
the business of investing or trading securities, or that owns investment securities 
whose value exceeds forty percent of the issuer’s total assets (exclusive of cash and 
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while the Investment Advisers Act of 1940224 would regulate the fund’s 
managers.  Offerings of fund securities to potential investors would 
be subject to regulation under the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.225  In addition, depending on their 
particular investment strategies and the nature of their investors, 
investment funds could be subject to the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (“ERISA”),226 the Commodities Futures Trading 
Act,227 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization 
Act,228 and even the USA PATRIOT Act,229 among other potentially 
                                                          
cash equivalents).  15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1).  Thus, under either definition, a private 
equity fund would normally qualify as an investment company subject to regulation 
under the 1940 Act. 
 224. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to -21 (2000).  The “other” 1940 Act, as it is sometimes 
called, requires investment advisers with more than $25 million in assets under 
management to register with the SEC.  15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a.  This is important not only 
because of the costs associated with filing, but because rules promulgated under the 
Act place severe limits on adviser compensation, advertising, and related-party 
transactions, among other compliance requirements.  17 C.F.R. §§ 275.204, 275.206 
(2007).  The term “investment adviser” is defined broadly in section 202(a)(11) of 
the Act to include any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of 
advising others with respect to investments in securities.  In the case of a private 
equity fund, it is the fund manager or general partner that makes investment 
decisions with respect to the fund’s capital.  As a result, the SEC takes the position 
that the fund’s general partner should under normal circumstances be deemed to be 
an investment adviser.  SCHELL, supra note 182, § 8.02[1], at 8-12 to -15; see 
Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that the general 
partner was an investment adviser subject to regulation under the Act). 
 225. Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 requires all securities offered or sold to 
the public to be registered with the SEC.  15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).  Thus, the sale of 
the fund’s limited partnership interests to investors would normally require 
registration.  See Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 96 F. Supp. 2d 376, 391 
(D. Del. 2000) (noting that courts generally treat passive interests in limited 
partnerships as constituting securities for purposes of federal law).  Similarly, 
sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 require all 
“brokers” and “dealers” to register with the SEC pursuant to section 15(a)(1).  15 
U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4)–(5) (2000).  Depending on the nature of their activities, the 
fund’s managers could be deemed to be brokers and/or dealers of securities.  
SCHELL, supra note 182, § 8.04[1], at 8-38.25 to -42. 
 226. A fund that receives a “significant” portion of its capital from ERISA-
regulated pension plans may itself be deemed to be an ERISA fiduciary.  Rules and 
Regulations for Fiduciary Responsibility; Proposed Regulations Relating to Definition 
of Plan Assets and to Establishment of Trust, 44 Fed. Reg. 50,363 (proposed Aug. 28, 
1979). 
 227. A fund that engages in currency hedging or similar investment strategies may 
be deemed to be a “commodity pool” and subject to regulation by the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission.  7 U.S.C. § 1a(5) (2000). 
 228. Gramm-Leach-Bliley, among other things, requires funds to abide by privacy 
rules.  15 U.S.C. § 6801-10 (2000). 
 229. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act”) 
requires most financial institutions to adopt and implement an anti-money 
laundering program.  31 U.S.C.S. § 5318(h) (LexisNexis 2007). 
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applicable federal statutes.  State law also applies.230  Public equity 
funds may therefore be considered among the most highly regulated 
of American businesses.231 
Private equity funds, by contrast, typically seek to avoid the brunt of 
each of these regulatory schemes.  By limiting themselves to fifteen 
“clients,” for example, a private equity fund manager may be exempt 
from regulation under the Investment Advisers Act.232  Similarly, the 
fund may avoid the limitations imposed by the Investment Company 
Act by either permitting fewer than one hundred “accredited 
investors” to purchase interests, or restricting membership to those 
meeting the test for “qualified clients.”233  Other structuring 
techniques are available to avoid most of the other applicable 
regulatory schemes, thereby making the private equity fund a largely 
unregulated, if highly stylized, investment vehicle.234  In fact, 
                                                          
 230. See, e.g., CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION:  A STEP-BY-STEP 
GUIDE TO COMPLIANCE AND THE LAW ch. 2A (2007) (discussing the application of state 
law to investment advisers). 
 231. But see Conwill, supra note 34, at 664–65 (characterizing the regulation of 
mutual funds as “mild,” at least in comparison to the original draft of the Investment 
Company Act). 
 232. Investment advisers that would otherwise be subject to regulation under the 
Investment Advisers Act are generally exempt from registration if they have fewer 
than fifteen clients within a rolling one-year period.  15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000).  
For purposes of the exemption, a private equity fund is normally treated as a single 
client.  17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(a) (2007).  In practice, this means that a fund 
manager can advise up to fifteen funds at any one time and still remain exempt from 
federal registration. 
 233. Private equity funds typically utilize one of two different exemptions in order 
to avoid registration under the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to -52 
(2000).  So-called 3(c)(1) funds are prohibited from having more than one hundred 
beneficial owners.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1).  Although there are complicated look-
through and integration rules to avoid manipulation, for purposes of this exemption, 
investors that are entities or husband-and-wife teams are typically counted as a single 
investor.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1)(A).  So-called 3(c)(7) funds are not limited in the 
number of investors, but may only accept investments from qualified purchasers.  15 
U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (adopted as part of the National Securities Markets 
Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416).  To be a “qualified 
purchaser,” an individual must own at least $5 million in investments, and an entity 
must own at least $25 million in investments.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51).  The term 
“investments,” for this purpose, does not include most cash or mixed-use assets such 
as real estate that the investor uses as a residence or for business purposes.  17 C.F.R. 
§ 270.2a51-1 (2007).  Interestingly, section 3(c)(7)(E) of the Act permits the creation 
of side-by-side 3(c)(7) and 3(c)(1) funds—each with the same adviser—such that a 
family of related funds is generally able to admit an unlimited number of qualified 
purchasers and up to one hundred other investors.  See infra notes 250–252 and 
accompanying text (describing other uses for a dual-fund structure).  Note, however, 
that in order to utilize the rule 506 exemption from registration under Regulation D 
of the Securities Act, even the investors who are not qualified purchasers must 
nonetheless be “accredited investors.”  See infra note 234 (outlining a venture capital 
fund’s preferred investment structure). 
 234. For example, to avoid registration of the limited partnership interests under 
the Securities Act, most funds avoid general solicitation and advertising and only 
accept investments from accredited investors.  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv) 
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considering the lengths to which they contort themselves in order to 
qualify for the various exemptions, private equity funds may arguably 
be considered either highly regulated or highly unregulated.  
Semantics aside, however, and despite increasing calls for greater 
regulation—particularly of hedge funds235—they remain at present 
exempt from nearly all disclosure requirements and are free to 
engage in any risky or exotic investment strategies to which their 
investors consent.236 
C. Structure and Organization 
As a result of their ability to avoid most federal disclosure 
requirements, private equity funds are frequently able to avoid the 
limelight, typically keeping their activities obscured from the general 
public.  Indeed, more than half of buyout funds require their 
investors to agree to be kept in the dark regarding the nature of the 
fund’s activities.237  Thus, data regarding private equity funds tends to 
be either self-reported or estimated, and accurate empirical 
                                                          
(2006) (excluding accredited investors for purposes of calculating the number of 
purchasers under rules 505(b) and 506(b)).  The definition of “accredited investor” 
includes banks, insurance companies, broker-dealers, business entities having total 
assets in excess of $5 million, and individuals with total assets in excess of $1 million.  
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).  It is also necessary to have fewer than 500 investors in any 
fund so as to avoid the public reporting requirements of the Securities Act.  See 15 
U.S.C.  § 78(l)(g)(1)(B) (2000) (requiring firms with $1 million in assets and over 
500 shareholders to file periodic reports with the SEC and the public).  Having 
ninety-nine or fewer investors also permits a fund to utilize a safe harbor to avoid 
being taxed as a publicly traded partnership.  Treas. Reg. § 1.7704-1(h)(1).  For a 
general discussion of the taxation of publicly traded partnerships, including private 
equity funds that do not satisfy the safe harbor requirements, see SCHELL, supra note 
182, § 5.01[2], at 5-3 to -9. 
 235. See, e.g., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Hedge Fund Roundtable (May 15, 2003), 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge2trans.txt.  For recent scholarship 
assessing the need for greater regulation of hedge funds, see Troy A. Paredes, On the 
Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds:  The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 
2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975 (2006). 
 236. See infra Part IV.C.1 (comparing the disclosure rules applicable to private and 
public equity funds).  An interesting development on the disclosure side has arisen 
due to a series of recent lawsuits filed under state Freedom of Information Acts.  The 
result is that state pension funds and university endowments are increasingly 
required to disclose information regarding their investments in private equity funds.  
See generally Steven E. Hurdle, Jr., A Blow to Public Investing:  Reforming the System of 
Private Equity Fund Disclosures, 53 UCLA L. REV. 239, 254–59 (2005) (describing how 
public institutional investors in Michigan, California, and Texas have been forced to 
disclose details of their investments in private equity funds).  Whether the funds will 
acquiesce in such disclosures or instead prohibit investments from applicable state 
pension funds and university endowments remains to be seen.  See id. at 259–67 
(detailing winners and losers in a system of increased disclosure). 
 237. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 58.  This has 
apparently occurred in response to recent attempts by certain public pension fund 
managers to disclose publicly information regarding the private equity funds in 
which they invest.  Id. at 57–59. 
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information regarding private equity markets is difficult to acquire.238  
Even the SEC remains unclear as to exactly how many private equity 
funds exist, how large they are, and how often they fail.239  Partly as a 
result of this secrecy, a discrete group of national law firms has thus 
far been able to maintain a stranglehold on the market for private 
equity legal work.240 
Paradoxically, although they operate in a secretive world, private 
equity funds are subject to significant market forces.241  This is 
because they tend to compete for the investment dollars of the same 
group of wealthy individuals and institutions.  In fact, given that 
interests in private equity funds are generally offered on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis, fund managers often find themselves negotiating 
                                                          
 238. In an effort to acquire more accurate information about the market for 
private equity investments, a group of nine state retirement and pension funds 
commissioned a report in 1996 by the consulting firm William M. Mercer, Inc.  See 
MERCER REPORT, supra note 9 (exploring contractual issues and investment practices 
in private equity funds and the relationship between general partners and limited 
partners in those funds).  Dow Jones, the publisher of The Private Equity Analyst, has 
since undertaken an annual survey of prevailing terms and conditions among 
venture capital and buyout funds.  See PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra 
note 196 (summarizing the typical terms of private equity partnerships, such as fund 
formation, fees and expenses, profit sharing, and governance, among other issues).  
Both are excellent sources for attorneys and other advisers to private equity funds. 
 239. SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 5, at x (noting that the SEC “lacks 
information about hedge fund advisers” and “has only indirect information about 
these entities and their trading practices”).  In order to improve its understanding of 
the hedge fund industry, the SEC in 2004 expanded the definition of an investment 
adviser in a manner intended to catch hedge funds but not private equity funds.  See 
17 C.F.R. §§ 275, 279 (2007) (re-defining “client” to be any natural person, thereby 
effectively eliminating the fifteen client exemption for funds that permit 
redemptions within the first two years of operation).  The purpose of the rule was to 
gather information about hedge funds by requiring their advisers to register with the 
SEC.  See generally Sue Ann Mota, Hedge Funds:  Their Advisers Do Not Have to Register 
with the SEC, But More Information and Other Alternatives are Recommended, 67 LA. L. REV. 
55 (2006) (providing an overview of the current hedge fund regulatory environment 
and recommending policy changes to protect individual investors).  However, the 
rule was struck down in 2006 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, on the grounds that the SEC lacked the authority to change the 
definition of a term contained in a federal statute.  Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, 451 F.3d 873, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 240. See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Cutting Hedge:  Law Firm Grows with Funds, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 3, 2006, at C1 (reporting on the increasingly large revenue source hedge funds 
are proving to be for major law firms).  For a list, see Most Active Law Firms, DOWJONES 
PRIVATE EQUITY ANALYST Apr. 2007, reprinted at http://webreprints.djreprints.com/16 
86610715025.pdf (providing rankings of the most number of deals closed in 2005 
based on self-reported data). 
 241. See SCHELL, supra note 182, § 1.02, at 1-9 (noting that the relationship 
between investors and fund managers in private equity funds is characterized by 
voluntary agreement, rather than dictated by regulation, and so is the result of 
negotiations that take place within a market for pooled investments).  Market 
information remains difficult to obtain, however.  See SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra 
note 5, at x (noting the SEC’s lack of information on hedge fund industry data). 
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against themselves.242  If their offering documents differ too much 
from the market standard, for example, potential investors will simply 
seek other investment opportunities.  As a result of such market 
forces, the legal structure and compensation arrangements of private 
equity funds have become highly uniform.243  This is even the case 
across fund categories; the structure and fees of a typical hedge fund 
look very much like those of a typical venture capital fund.244 
Private equity funds are typically structured as limited partnerships 
with a limited liability company as the general partner.245  Wealthy 
investors contribute most of the capital and receive limited 
                                                          
 242. See MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 63 (noting that existing “‘standards’ will 
ebb and flow with market conditions and supply and demand forces”); see also TAMAR 
FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS:  MUTUAL 
FUNDS AND ADVISERS § 12.03[C], 12–67 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that investment adviser 
fees are not negotiated at arm’s length). 
 243. See MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 70 (“The basic premise underlying our 
[study] was that general partners will attempt to negotiate terms and conditions that 
the market will bear.”). 
 244. See SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 5, at 8 (giving a brief description of 
the structure and purpose of a venture capital fund).  The differences in fund 
structure between venture capital, LBO, and hedge funds occur primarily as a result 
of their different investment strategies.  Thus, for example, because hedge funds 
often purchase liquid securities, hedge funds are generally able to permit their 
investors to make voluntary redemptions on a periodic basis after some initial lock-
up period.  SCHELL, supra note 182, § 9.04, at 9-15 to -16.  Venture capital and LBO 
funds, on the other hand, make illiquid investments and so generally prohibit such 
redemptions.  Id.  Similarly, hedge fund profits are easier to calculate on an ongoing 
basis than venture capital or LBO profits because hedge fund investments are more 
readily valued.  Id. § 2.02[2][d], at 2-11 to -14.  However, to the extent that a hedge 
fund behaves more like a traditional private equity fund, it is likely to have terms that 
are more similar to those traditionally adopted by venture capital and LBO funds.  
Id. 
 245. Id. § 9.01, at 9-2; MEYER & MATHONET, supra note 182, at 29.  Given the 
flexibility of most modern limited liability company statutes, it is also possible that 
the fund would be structured as an LLC.  See MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 52–53 
(discussing the benefits of an LLC for public funds).  Still, the structure of such an 
LLC would closely resemble that of a limited partnership, with the fund managers 
retaining operational control over the fund and the remaining investors being 
largely passive, and the tax and liability results would be essentially the same.  Id.  
Perhaps as a result, private equity funds have largely resisted what may be the general 
market temptation to prefer LLCs over limited partnerships.  Mutual funds, although 
similar to private equity funds in being essentially pooled investment vehicles, are 
more commonly organized as Massachusetts business trusts.  See Sheldon A. Jones, 
Laura M. Moret & James M. Storey, The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered 
Investment Companies, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 421, 422 (1988) (reporting that half of new 
investment companies who registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 
from July 1985 to December 1987 were in the form of Massachusetts business trusts); 
cf. Tamar Frankel, The Delaware Business Trust Act Failure as the New Corporate Law, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 325, 330 (2001) (noting that commercial and manufacturing 
enterprises generally do not utilize the Delaware Business Trust Act because other 
legal forms of organization are more amenable to change and the Delaware Act 
offers no tax advantages). 
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partnership or similar interests in return.246  Such interests are 
passive, with very few control rights, and highly illiquid.  Depending 
on the type of fund, a limited partner may be restricted from 
redeeming her interest for as many as seven to ten years.247  The fund 
managers, through their ownership of the fund’s general partner, 
control its affairs and investment decisions.248  They also typically 
invest a significant portion of their personal net worth directly in the 
fund as limited partners in order to discourage them from taking 
excessive risks with the fund’s capital.249 
                                                          
 246. SCHELL, supra note 182, § 3.01[4], at 3-8 to -10.1.  Traditionally, the passivity 
of the limited partners was a response to the requirement that they be generally 
passive in order to maintain their limited liability.  Id. § 3.01[4], at 3-8.  However, the 
law in this regard has evolved toward a presumption of limited liability.  Id. § 3.01[4], 
at 3-8 to -9.  The Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, for example, 
contains a list of activities that fall within the statutory safe harbor and so do not 
jeopardize the limited liability of limited partners.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303(b) 
(2007).  Protected activities include, among other things, transacting business with 
the limited partnership, advising the general partner with respect to the business of 
the limited partnership, guaranteeing the debts of the limited partnership, serving 
on a committee of the limited partnership, and voting on matters of limited 
partnership business.  Id. 
 247. See SCHELL, supra note 182, § 2.04[1], at 2-20 (finding that “holding periods 
of three to seven years are common”).  The typical timeline for a venture capital 
fund, for example, is such that it might take three to five years for all of the capital to 
be invested, after which point the fund changes to a liquidation mode.  Id. § 2.05[2], 
at 2-30 to -31.  During that time, it is hoped that one or more of the investments 
results in a profitable exit.  HILL & POWER, supra note 191, at 11.  However, the bulk 
of the investments are expected to take as many as seven to ten years to pay off.  Id.  
Thus, venture capital funds typically prohibit redemptions during that period, but 
may make early payouts to the extent the fund returns a profit prior to being wound 
up.  SCHELL, supra note 182, § 1.03[7], at 1-24, 2.04[2], at 2-22.  See generally PRIVATE 
EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 17–20 (reporting that most private 
equity partnerships have a term of ten years and an investment period of five or 
more years).  Some funds also provide for extensions of two or three years.  MERCER 
REPORT, supra note 9, at 45. 
Traditional hedge funds, which invest primarily in liquid, marketable securities, 
are able to permit redemptions at almost any time.  SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra 
note 5, at ix.  For administrative convenience, however, they generally require that 
redemptions be made only on set dates, often quarterly.  Id.  In addition, to ensure 
the viability of the fund, redemptions are generally prohibited during the first year 
or so of the fund’s existence.  Id.  Such hedge funds, however, are not properly 
thought of as private equity funds within the meaning of this Article.  See supra notes 
203–207 and accompanying text (explaining that hedge funds have greater liquidity 
than most private equity funds).  Thus, their shorter time horizon and greater 
flexibility with respect to redemptions are outside the norm of the private equity 
community.  Presumably, hedge funds that operate more like private equity funds 
would require a longer lock-up period.  See SCHELL, supra note 182, § 1.05[7], at 1-32 
(noting that, although typical lock-up periods may last from one to three years, “to 
the extent a particular Hedge Fund is allowed to invest in non-marketable securities 
or other non-marketable assets, the ability to fund redemption requests on short 
notice may be impaired”). 
 248. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-403(a) (2007) (granting general partners in a 
limited partnership the same rights and powers as partners in a partnership). 
 249. SCHELL, supra note 182, § 3.02[2], at 3-21.  Historically, for tax purposes, 
general partners were required to contribute at least one percent of the fund’s 
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For regulatory purposes, a single “fund” is often actually structured 
as a family of several funds, each with the same fund 
manager/general partner but each with different limited partners.250  
For example, funds that sell interests to not-for-profit corporations, 
non-U.S. entities, and/or ERISA pension plans may seek to isolate 
such investors in separate legal entities.251  Each separate limited 
partnership would then make the same investments, pro rata, to 
account for their differing sizes.252  As a result, from an economic 
standpoint, the funds operate as one, even though they are 
structured as distinct legal entities for regulatory purposes. 
D. Alignment of Interests 
The overriding goal of private equity fund governance is to align 
the interests of the fund managers with the interests of their 
investors.253  In fact, the alignment of interests within private equity 
funds is much closer than in a typical corporation.254  As a result, the 
internal agency costs are generally much lower.255 
                                                          
capital.  Id.  More recently, this tradition has continued as a way to ensure that fund 
managers have some downside risk, so that they will not lose their aversion to 
excessive risk whenever the fund’s value drops below its historical value.  See generally 
infra notes 263–267 and accompanying text. 
 250. SCHELL, supra note 182, § 3.02[4], at 3-25 to -26. 
 251. See id. §§ 5.04[2], at 5-26 to -28 (tax-exempt investors), 8.07[1]-[4], at 8-66 to -
72 (non-U.S. investors), 8.06[4], at 8-63 to -65 (ERISA plan investors). 
 252. Id. § 3.02[4], at 3-26. 
 253. See, e.g., id. § 1.02[3], at 1-14 (“The concept of alignment of interest can 
provide an important element of consistency to the consideration of the numerous 
financial and other terms embedded in the contracts governing the organization and 
operation of a private equity fund.  It can also provide a basis for identifying 
economic and other terms that, even if widely accepted as ‘market,’ should be 
resisted when possible.”); MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 2 (“The carried interest 
represents a financial alignment of interests.”); PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, 
supra note 196, at 7 (“Private equity finance derives its strength from an 
organizational characteristic that sets it apart from most other types of finance:  It is 
structured so that the entrepreneurs, the investment managers, and the providers of 
capital all benefit in very material ways from the success of the businesses receiving 
financing.  This alignment of interest ensures, at least in theory, that all decisions are 
made in a way that is likely to maximize the success of the business being financed.”). 
 254. See infra note 272 and accompanying text.  The alignment of interests 
between the portfolio company and the private equity fund are also quite strong.  See 
Gilson, supra note 189, at 1083–84 (“Perhaps more starkly than any other 
organizational or contractual technique, the portfolio company’s compensation 
structure creates extremely high-powered performance incentives that serve to align 
the incentives of the portfolio company management and the venture capital 
fund.”). 
 255. See Jensen, supra note 7, at 65 (arguing that post-LBO companies, with their 
close monitoring, have an incentive structure that is superior to that of public 
corporations); see also BRUNER, supra note 199, at 56 (summarizing several empirical 
studies that found increased value in transactions where managers had more at stake, 
including leveraged buyouts); Black, Empirical Evidence, supra note 10, at 924 (noting 
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The linchpin of private equity fund compensation is the so-called 
“carried interest.”256  The concept behind a carried interest is a 
formula for dividing profits that has developed as the marketplace 
norm.257  A fund’s investors are typically entitled to receive 
distributions equal to their pro rata portion of one hundred percent 
of the profits of the fund until their investments are completely paid 
back.258  To use a numerical example, if investors purchase interests 
equal to $10 million and the fund returns only $10 million, the 
investors go home even, having neither gained nor lost anything.  
However, once their initial investment has been returned in full, they 
are entitled to only eighty percent of any profits thereafter, leaving 
twenty percent for the fund managers.259  Thus, to continue the 
example, if the fund yielded a net profit of $5 million (after the 
initial $10 million was recouped), the investors would receive 
collectively $14 million (their initial $10 million investment plus $4 
million of the profit) and the managers would receive $1 million.  If 
the profit in this example were repeated the following year, the split 
would again be $4 million for the limited partners and $1 million for 
the fund managers, making the overall two-year split $18 million for 
the investors and $2 million for the managers.260 
                                                          
the existence of “substantial evidence suggesting that LBOs often led to improved 
corporate performance, at least up through about 1986”). 
 256. This is sometimes also referred to as a “promote,” “promoted interest,” or an 
“override.”  SCHELL, supra note 182, § 2.02, at 2-5.  See generally MERCER REPORT, supra 
note 9, at 12-14 (defining a carried interest as “the share of the partnership profits 
received by the general partner” and discussing how the carried interest motivates 
the general partner). 
 257. See Schell, supra note 182, § 2.02[1], at 2-5 (noting a carried interest of twenty 
percent is the current market standard for hedge funds).  Increasingly, many funds 
also vary the percentage payable to the fund advisers depending on the fund’s 
performance.  For example, a firm might charge a twenty percent carried interest if 
the internal rate of return is below twenty percent, but a twenty-five percent carried 
interest if performance exceeds the twenty-five percent level.  PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS 
& CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 39. 
 258. SCHELL, supra note 182, § 2.02[1], at 2-7.  Occasionally, this structure leads to 
complicated timing questions, especially in venture capital funds where an early 
investment might pay off quickly while others die a slower death.  The result is that 
fund managers and investors have developed a complicated set of provisions—
including so-called “clawbacks”—that ensure that the economics of the fund balance 
correctly over its life, even if one party or another is inadvertently paid too much at 
one time or another.  See id. § 2.04, at 2-23 (explaining that a typical clawback 
provision may require the general partner to return excess distributions of carried 
interest). 
 259. Id. § 2.02[1], at 2-5 to -8.  In fact, the actual percentage may in many cases be 
far higher, as it is industry practice for the fund managers to invest a portion of their 
own net worth in the funds they manage.  Id. § 3.02[2], at 3-22.  Thus, not only are 
they likely to receive their twenty percent share of the profits, but they are also likely 
to receive an additional eighty percent share with respect to any capital they invested. 
 260. During the 1980s, buyout fund advisers typically calculated their carried 
interest on each individual investment.  PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra 
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The result of this scheme is such that the fund managers have a 
strong incentive to make profitable investments.  If there is no profit, 
as in the first example above, the fund managers are paid nothing.261  
Moreover, because the fund managers earn an extra twenty cents for 
every additional dollar they are able to squeeze out of their 
investments, the incentives continue to operate even after the fund 
has returned a profit.262  In other words, the incentive never 
disappears or decreases, no matter how high the profits.  Thus, the 
interests of private equity fund investors and fund managers are 
closely aligned—both primarily seek profit enhancement. 
The basic structure of the carried interest does have two flaws, 
however, which serve to undermine somewhat this otherwise elegant 
alignment of interests.  As a result, the typical compensation structure 
of private equity managers has evolved two additional elements aimed 
at ameliorating such flaws. 
The first risk is that a straight carried interest, without more, could 
encourage excessive risk taking, especially when a fund’s activities are 
yielding a loss.263  At that point, one might worry that a fund manager 
would engage in highly risky speculation since she would have 
nothing more to risk.  For a manager who is only paid a percentage 
of the profit, a large loss is the same as a small one—both equal no 
compensation for the manager.264 
                                                          
note 196, at 7.  This meant that they could earn a profit on successful investments 
while avoiding any major loss on unsuccessful ones.  Id.  Over time, however, the 
operation of private equity capital markets resulted in the current practice of 
charging the carried interest on the aggregate of all fund investments, as had been 
the tradition among venture capital funds.  Id.; MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 6. 
 261. SCHELL, supra note 182, § 2.02[1], at 2-5 to -8.  It should be noted, however, 
that private equity funds typically charge, in addition to the incentive-based carried 
interest, a flat management fee.  Id. § 2.05[1], at 2-27.  The management fee is 
intended to be just large enough to cover the expenses of the fund.  Id.  It is usually 
based on the total assets under management and typically ranges between 1.5% and 
2.5%, depending on the size of the fund.  Id.  Thus, in the example in the text, 
although the fund managers do not take home any profit, the management fee 
should be sufficient to cover their expenses such that they do not suffer a financial 
loss.  In addition, because fund managers are generally expected to invest a sizeable 
portion of their net worth in the fund, the fund managers also risk losing their own 
capital.  See infra notes 265-267 and accompanying text. 
 262. These incentives can be quite large in practice.  Witness the incredible pay 
packages for the top hedge fund managers.  See Taub, supra note 9, at 41–42 
(reporting that the top twenty-five hedge fund managers each earned over $240 
million in 2006). 
 263. See SCHELL, supra note 182, § 3.02[2], at 3-22 (noting many investors see large 
capital contributions by the general partner as fundamental to ensuring a fund’s 
success). 
 264. Id. 
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To address this possibility, fund managers are usually required to 
invest a significant portion of their personal wealth in the fund.265  In 
addition, they also frequently co-invest their own capital in portfolio 
companies alongside the fund.266  Thus, the typical private equity 
compensation structure already accounts for the down-side risk by 
giving the managers something to lose.267  The fund managers are 
themselves investors with their own capital at risk. 
The second additional element limits the ability of private equity 
fund managers to receive the benefit of general market movements.  
For example, the carried interest would presumably yield a relatively 
high profit for the fund managers even if they simply purchased low-
yield treasury bills or passive index funds.268  But why should investors 
pay a premium for an investment strategy that they could easily 
duplicate at a much lower cost?  Again, the market for private equity 
fund fees has produced an answer. 
Many fund managers, including most of the bigger and more 
profitable ones, charge a carried interest only to the extent that fund 
profits exceed a so-called “hurdle rate” or “priority return” (such as 
the London Interbank Offered Rate or the yield on twelve-month 
treasury bills).269  Thus, the fund managers receive their twenty 
                                                          
 265. See PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 23 (reporting that 
the mean contribution by advisers in the survey was 3.25% for buyout funds and 
2.1% for venture capital funds).  Historically, the typical investment by the general 
partners was slightly lower.  See MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 9–10 (noting that the 
industry standard is that general partners commit one percent of the fund in either 
cash or capital); MEYER & MATHONET, supra note 182, at 34–35 (stating that a one 
percent investment is typical).  Note, however, that such an investment by a public 
equity fund manager would probably violate the prohibition against self-dealing.  See 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000) (explaining the duties of a fiduciary to act “solely in 
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries”). 
 266. See PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 24–25 (reporting 
that thirty percent of buyout fund advisers, and 15.7% of venture capital fund 
advisers, retain the option of co-investing). 
 267. SCHELL, supra note 182, § 3.02[2], at 3-21 to -23. 
 268. See id. § 2.03, at 2-15 (arguing that investors are less likely to contribute 
capital unless the carried interest is linked to superior performance because money 
market funds would produce the same results with less risk).  However, some fund 
advisers have argued that priority returns force them to make more conservative 
investments than they might otherwise, thereby reducing the profits for fund 
investors.  PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 42. 
 269. See PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 41–42 (reporting 
that eighty-eight percent of buyout funds, and forty-two percent of venture capital 
funds, in the survey provided for the payment of priority returns before the advisers 
earned their carried interest).  See generally MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 25–28 
(discussing hurdle rates and noting that they have reached as high as twenty-five 
percent); MEYER & MATHONET, supra note 182, at 33–34 (stating that the rationale for 
preferred returns is to ensure general partners are only compensated for superior 
performance).  But see Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 J. CORP. L. 77, 
86 (2005) (noting that venture capital funds, unlike leveraged buyout funds, typically 
do not calculate fund manager compensation by reference to a preferred return). 
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percent profits interest only to the extent they are able to produce 
returns that exceed the yield on debt securities.270  The portion of the 
fund’s success that is not attributable to the fund’s performance is 
factored out of the equation unless and until the priority return is 
met.271  In this sense, private equity fund fees are far superior to most 
corporate stock options which allow corporate managers to share in 
the upside of general market movements.272 
Private equity funds also typically charge their investors a 
management fee that is intended to pay for the firm’s expenses.273  
These fees are generally in the range of two to three percent, with 
smaller funds charging larger fees, but with downward pressure on 
management fees overall.274  Additionally, many funds are structured 
such that the fund’s advisers must return the management fees to 
their investors, in addition to the investors’ invested capital, before 
                                                          
 270. Thus, for example, if a $10 million fund returned $15 million during its first 
year, and if the hurdle rate were set at five percent, the first $10 million would be 
returned to the investors as repayment of their initial capital, as would five percent of 
the $5 million profit (or $250,000).  The remaining $4.75 million—which is 
attributable to the effort and skill of the fund managers—would then be split eighty-
twenty between the fund investors and the fund managers.  At the end of the day, 
then, the investors would receive $14.05 million ($10 million plus $250,000 plus $3.8 
million) while the fund managers would receive $950,000. 
 271. Most funds that provide for priority returns also adjust the calculation of the 
carried interest to permit the fund advisers to “catch up” once they have satisfied the 
priority amount.  PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 42 
(providing a mathematical example). 
 272. See Jensen, supra note 7, at 65 (arguing that post-LBO companies, with their 
close monitoring, have an incentive structure that is superior to that of public 
corporations); Mark Maremont & Charles Forelle, Bosses’ Pay:  How Stock Options 
Become Part of the Problem, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2006, at A1 (discussing the related 
problems of stock reloads, re-pricings and backdating).  Stock options also create 
significant opportunities for fraud.  See, e.g., Walter M. Cadette, How Stock Options 
Lead to Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2002, at A19 (describing the powerful incentives 
that options create to produce fraudulent accountings); Hannah Clark, Stock Scandal:  
Who’s Next?, FORBES, July 24, 2006, available at http://www.forbes.com/home/leaders 
hip/2006/07/24/leadership-brocade-backdating-cx_hc_0724stockscandalwhosnext.h 
tml (reporting that more than eighty companies are under investigation by the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission and many more are likely to follow); Aaron 
Siegel, Backdating Scandals Seen as Tapering Off, INVESTMENT NEWS, Jan. 15, 2007, at 14, 
available at http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070115/ 
REG/70111011/-1/INIssueAlert04&ht= (detailing the recent backdating scandals of 
many major corporations). 
 273. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 30; see MEYER & 
MATHONET, supra note 182, at 33 (quoting industry wisdom that fund managers 
generally “eat sandwiches on the management charges, and eat caviar on the carry”).  
See generally MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 19–24 (defining and discussing 
traditional fees, budgeted fees, sliding-fee scales, and transaction fees). 
 274. See PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 30–31 (noting 
that Blackstone Group’s newest fund will charge a management fee of 1.5% for the 
first $6 billion and one percent for the remainder of the fund). 
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taking their carried interest.275  Thus, management fees are intended 
to have a neutral impact on the fundamental alignment of interests 
between fund managers and fund investors. 
A final source of income for private equity fund managers—which 
is not necessarily tied to fund performance—is transaction fees.276  
They include break-up fees for transactions that are not 
consummated, investment banking fees, and consulting fees.277  These 
are typically charged to portfolio companies and so are not paid 
directly by fund investors.278  Until the early 1990s, fund managers 
generally retained the entire amount of such fees.279  More recently, 
however, fund investors have begun to claim as much as eighty 
percent of such fees so as to neutralize their impact on the incentives 
of the fund advisers.280  Performance therefore remains by far the 
most significant element in the compensation of private equity fund 
managers. 
III. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS COMPARED—INTERNAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
As described in Part II, private equity funds are active investors who 
seek to bring discipline to the companies in which they invest.  Their 
particular investment strategy involves acquiring control of a target 
company and then utilizing that control position to reduce corporate 
agency costs.  In this respect, at least, they are an ideal corporate 
monitor.281  Public equity funds, meanwhile, are passive investors who 
do little or no monitoring.  Despite their resources and 
sophistication, they prefer to sell when a portfolio company’s 
performance lags rather than expend effort at improving such 
performance. 
This juxtaposition creates a near-perfect natural experiment.  To 
better understand the incentives of public equity funds, there is no 
need to contrast them to their foreign counterparts, where language, 
culture and history make such comparisons difficult and at times 
suspect.  Rather, a cleaner approach would be to compare the 
                                                          
 275. See id. at 38 (noting that eighty-seven percent of funds surveyed calculated the 
carried interest net of management fees and other expenses). 
 276. Id. at 35. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 35–36. 
 281. The larger question of whether it would be desirable from an overall 
standpoint to enlist public equity funds as monitors remains open, however.  For a 
discussion of some of the concerns that have been voiced with respect to institutional 
investor monitoring, see Coffee, supra note 2, at 1329–36. 
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characteristics and regulation of public equity funds with those of 
private equity funds.  Both are pools of money that professional fund 
managers use to purchase securities on behalf of passive investors.282  
Both would therefore appear to have the potential to act as monitors 
of errant corporate managers.  However, only private equity funds do 
so.  Why, then, the difference? 
Parts III and IV compare and contrast the internal characteristics 
and external regulatory regimes that impact public and private equity 
funds.  In doing so, they attempt to uncover the factors that explain 
the funds’ different investment strategies.  My goal is to explore ways 
in which the law could be amended to incentivize public equity funds 
to join their private counterparts by participating in a deeper market 
for good corporate governance. 
A. Size and Resources 
Perhaps the most obvious trait that distinguishes most public and 
private equity funds is their relative size.  In one study, the average 
sized venture capital fund had as little as $122 million in capital.283  
For buyout funds, the numbers were larger, with the average fund 
managing slightly over $1 billion.284  However, because of the 
presence in the sample of several enormous funds, the median 
buyout fund held only $415 million.285  Thus, most private equity 
funds remain relatively modest in size.286  Moreover, there appears to 
                                                          
 282. See LERNER, HARDYMON & LEAMON, supra note 7, at 1 (explaining how private 
equity funds usually form by seeking prospective investors much in the same manner 
as public funds); INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 145 (“An 
investment company is a corporation, trust, or partnership organized under state law 
that invests pooled shareholder dollars in securities appropriate to the entity’s—and 
its shareholders’—investment objective.”). 
 283. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 11. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id.  According to a recent survey by Private Equity International, for example, 
six buyout funds had assets in excess of $20 billion, with another sixteen having assets 
in excess of $10 billion.  PRIVATE EQUITY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 216, at 62–63.  
The top six were, in order:  The Carlyle Group, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, Goldman 
Sachs Principal Investment Area, The Blackstone Group, TPG, and Permira.  Id. at 
62.  Meanwhile, seven hedge funds managed assets in excess of $20 billion.  Britt 
Erica Tunick, Capital Gains, ALPHA, May 2007, at 39 (ranking the world’s one 
hundred largest hedge funds). 
 286. Blackstone Group may be the largest U.S. buyout fund, having raised over 
$15 billion in 2006.  See Dennis K. Berman & Nicole Lee, Blackstone Fund Sets a Record 
at $15.6 Billion, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2006, at C4 (charting the fund-raising success of 
so-called “megafunds”—funds with assets in excess of $3 billion).  Europe’s largest 
appears to be Permira Advisers Ltd., with $14 billion.  Id.  The largest ever first-time 
fund was Centerbridge Partners LP, which raised $3.2 billion in 2006.  Henny 
Sender, EGL Nears Buyout Led by Its Chief, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2007, at B6. 
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be a trend among venture capital funds toward slightly smaller asset 
pools.287 
At first glance, mutual funds do not appear to be significantly 
larger than private equity funds.  For example, according to the 
Investment Company Institute, the median sized mutual fund 
managed $221 million in assets, while the top ten percent of mutual 
funds averaged $2.2 billion in capital.288 
These numbers are misleading, however, because mutual fund 
complexes tend to be broken down into a number of individual sub-
funds, each with its own investment objective.  These might include, 
for example, growth funds, aggressive growth funds, sector funds, 
income equity funds and international equity funds.289  Thus, a single 
sponsor, such as Fidelity, might operate hundreds of sub-funds, each 
a legally distinct entity, but each operating as part of a larger unit and 
subject to the ultimate control of Fidelity’s senior management.290  As 
a result, for purposes of monitoring potential, a more significant 
number is the size of a mutual fund complex, where the numbers are 
much larger.291  Thus, for example, three mutual fund families—
Fidelity, Vanguard, and American Funds—each manage over $1 
trillion in assets.292 
Individual pension funds, meanwhile, are generally not subdivided 
in the manner of the mutual fund industry.  However, their greater 
number and variety tends to make for a more varied landscape.293  
                                                          
 287. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 6. 
 288. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 52. 
 289. Id. at 51. 
 290. According to its website, Fidelity boasts of sponsoring over 2300 funds.  See 
Fidelity Investments,  http://personal.fidelity.com/products/wealth/content/howit 
works/how_investment_team.shtml.cvsr (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) (“In-depth 
research and analysis results in a pool of over 2300 funds and other investments that 
make up our managed portfolios.”). 
 291. Thus, while the median sized mutual fund has only $221 million, and the 
largest ten percent of mutual funds average only $2.2 billion, INVESTMENT COMPANY 
FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 52, several mutual fund complexes have over $1 trillion.  
Infra note 292 and accompanying text. 
 292. See  Muralikumar Anantharaman, Fidelity Lags Main Rivals But Slow Recovery 
Seen, REUTERS, Jan. 10, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNewsAndPR/ 
idUSN1031582020070110 (reporting that the Fidelity family of funds manages about 
$1.3 trillion of assets, Vanguard more than $1.1 trillion, and American Funds about 
$1 trillion); Murray Coleman, Profit Rises at Four Mutual-Fund Firms, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
27, 2007, at C11 (reporting that Fidelity’s assets had risen nineteen percent to $1.77 
trillion, American Funds had exceeded $1 trillion in stock and bond mutual fund 
assets, and Vanguard had $989 billion under management); see also INVESTMENT 
COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 16 (noting that the share of assets managed by 
the twenty-five largest mutual funds has been above seventy percent since at least 
1985). 
 293. See Roe, supra note 2, at 23–24 (noting that the pension fund industry is 
highly fragmented).  Pension funds, for example, may be sponsored either by a state 
or local governmental entity, in which case they are referred to as public pension 
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Although many are quite small, the nation’s largest public pension 
fund, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(“CalPERS”), has about $244 billion in total assets.294 
In addition to having larger individual funds, the public equity 
fund industry is also much larger than the private equity fund 
industry.  U.S.-registered investment companies managed over $11 
trillion at year-end 2006, with mutual funds accounting for ninety-
three percent of the total.295  At the same time, approximately $3 
trillion was held by public pension funds.296  Private equity funds, in 
contrast, appear to have managed closer to $1.8 trillion.297 
Size, however, would appear to favor public equity funds—rather 
than private ones—as effective corporate monitors.  The sheer size of 
a large mutual fund complex should provide it with both the 
sophistication and the financial resources to engage in an active 
investment strategy.  Moreover, the economies of scale that would 
accrue to a large fund would likely be sufficient for it to devote 
consistent and broad-based efforts toward corporate monitoring.298  
Thus, it is unlikely that the larger size of public equity funds can 
adequately explain their passivity. 
Larger funds would also appear to be better able to balance active 
investment strategies with a preference for diversification.  Venture 
capital funds, for example, are often thought to invest in as few as ten 
companies.299  A large mutual fund or public pension fund, on the 
other hand, would be able to invest in many more.  The average size 
of the top one hundred companies listed on the New York Stock 
                                                          
funds, or by a union or corporate employer, in which case they are referred to as 
private pension funds.  Another difference among pension funds arises due to the 
differing political leanings of corporate and union sponsors of private pension funds.  
See generally Camara, supra note 4, at 235, 239–41 (categorizing different types of 
institutional investors). 
 294. Karmin, supra note 170, at C1. 
 295. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 7; see Tamar Frankel, The 
Scope and Jurisprudence of the Investment Management Regulation, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 939, 
944 (2005) (“At the end of 1974, the total net assets of mutual funds was $46 billion; 
at the end of 2000 it had reached $12 trillion.”). 
 296. Daisy Maxey, Pension Funds May Feel Little Subprime Strain, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 
2007, at C15.  But see Neil King, Jr., Should States Sell Stocks to Protest Links to Iran?, 
WALL ST. J., June 14, 2007, at A1 (estimating the size of the industry at closer to $1 
trillion). 
 297. See PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 7 (reporting that 
private equity funds had raised approximately $1.8 trillion over the prior decade).  
Because private equity funds have a definite term, after which they are wound up and 
liquidated, it is difficult to measure the total assets under management.  Thus, 
because the term of most funds is ten years or less, the best gauge of the industry’s 
size may be the amount of funds raised over a rolling ten-year period. 
 298. Black, supra note 2, at 580–84, 589–91. 
 299. E.g., HILL & POWER, supra note 191, at 9–11. 
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Exchange, measured in terms of market capitalization, is a little 
under $6 billion.300  This number is dwarfed by the size of many of the 
large pension funds and mutual fund complexes.301  Thus, even 
without the boost that would come from leverage, a large pension 
fund or mutual fund complex (if legally permitted) could buy 
outright a large number of such companies and still remain 
adequately diversified.302  The larger the fund, the easier it would 
appear to be to engage in active corporate monitoring while avoiding 
the downside risks associated with an overly concentrated investment 
portfolio.  If anything, then, size would appear to have an inverse 
relationship to passivity. 
A different possibility, however, is that size operates in a more 
subtle fashion, incentivizing smaller funds to be more active investors.  
Perhaps the relatively smaller size of private equity funds forces them 
to invest in fewer companies, thereby making it more critical that 
they closely monitor those few companies.303  In other words, active 
monitoring by private equity funds might be more of a necessity than 
a choice. 
Intriguing though this possibility may be, it does not hold up to 
close scrutiny.  Modern corporate finance theory suggests that ninety-
five percent of the benefits from diversification can be obtained by 
owning as few as twenty different stocks, while ninety-nine percent of 
the benefits attain from owning as few as one hundred.304  Thus, even 
                                                          
 300. According to the New York Stock Exchange, the one hundred largest listed 
companies have a combined market capitalization of $5.95 trillion, making the mean 
average $5.95 billion.  NYSE U.S. 100 Index,http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/index 
es/nyid.shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2007). 
 301. See Coleman, supra note 292, at C11 (providing examples of three mutual 
funds with assets totaling $989 billion, $1.77 trillion, and $1 trillion, respectively). 
 302. For a $1 trillion mutual fund complex, purchasing one hundred companies 
for $6 billion each—assuming this could be accomplished—would cost $600 billion, 
leaving $400 billion to invest in other assets.  Modern corporate finance theory holds 
that ninety-nine percent of the benefits that accrue from diversification are obtained 
by owning as few as one hundred different stocks.  See John L. Evans & Stephen H. 
Archer, Diversification and the Reduction of Dispersion:  An Empirical Analysis, 23 J. FIN. 
761, 767 (1968) (arguing, based on empirical analysis, that there are doubts as to 
whether increasing portfolio diversity beyond ten securities is economically justified); 
Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 89 (1952) (explaining that the 
benefits of diversification do not depend solely on the number of different stocks 
held but also on holding stocks in diverse industries).  Thus, even a massive 
acquisition program would be unlikely to have much impact on the diversification of 
such a large fund. 
 303. This approach was espoused by no worse an entrepreneur than Andrew 
Carnegie.  See ANDREW CARNEGIE, THE EMPIRE OF BUSINESS 17 (1902) (“The concerns 
which fail are those which have scattered their capital, which means that they have 
scattered their brains also. . . . ‘Don’t put all your eggs in one basket’ is all wrong.  I 
tell you ‘put all your eggs in one basket, and then watch that basket.’”). 
 304. Notably, some finance textbooks state that as few as eight stocks are sufficient 
to provide reasonable diversity.  See Gerald D. Newbould & Percy S. Poon, The 
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a relatively small $100 million private equity fund is more than large 
enough to pursue a strategy of low-cost, passive diversification.305  
Moreover, if smallness truly does lead to activism, it does not explain 
why mutual fund complexes do not engage partly in activist 
monitoring and partly in diversified investing.  Raw size, in other 
words, appears to have little impact on monitoring ability. 
B. Use of Leverage 
Closely related to the relative size of public and private equity 
funds is their differing use of the power of leverage.  Mutual funds 
and pension funds are prohibited from using borrowed capital to 
purchase securities.306  It is considered by regulators to be too risky.  
Venture capital funds similarly abstain from the use of leverage.307 
Leverage buyout funds, by contrast, use primarily borrowed capital 
to purchase control over large corporate enterprises.308  As the term 
suggests, their use of leverage significantly magnifies the power and 
impact of their equity.309  Through leverage, LBO funds are able to 
acquire control of much larger companies than would otherwise be 
possible.310  As a result, they are often involved in “going private” 
                                                          
Minimum Number of Stocks Needed for Diversification, 3 FIN. PRAC. & EDUC. 85, 85 (1993) 
(surveying the recommendations of twelve prominent finance textbooks).  The idea 
is that firm-specific risks will be minimized or even eliminated in a balanced portfolio 
of stocks whose risks are negatively correlated, leaving only market-wide risks.  For a 
classic example, assume that high oil prices will be good for oil stocks but bad for 
airline stocks.  Presumably, the changes in the price of the two stocks will offset one 
another.  A sagging economy, by contrast, will be bad for both.  See generally 
Markowitz, supra note 302, at 87–89 (arguing investors should diversify over different 
economic sectors to lessen their economic risk); Evans & Archer, supra note 302, at 
761 (finding that an investor may be sufficiently diversified while possessing as few as 
ten different securities). 
 305. See generally Evans & Archer, supra note 302, at 761 (finding a stable 
relationship between the number of securities in a portfolio and the level of portfolio 
dispersion); Markowitz, supra note 302, at 87–89 (finding that holding a variety of 
securities is just as important for diversification purposes as examining the individual 
securities’ interrelationships in the marketplace). 
 306. Although the Investment Company Act does not expressly prohibit the use of 
leverage, the SEC has interpreted its prohibition against open-end mutual funds 
issuing “senior securities” broadly to include debt or preferred stock.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-18(f) (2000).  See generally KIRSCH, supra note 230, § 11:3.5, at 11-11. 
 307. One notable, but isolated, exception is the use of short-term bridge loans 
that are sometimes used to cover firm expenses between scheduled capital calls.  
SCHELL, supra note 182, § 1.03[8], at 1-24. 
 308. See GAUGHAN, supra note 197, at 314–21 (discussing financing sources and 
techniques for leveraged buyouts and noting that common stock may account for as 
little as one to twenty percent of the total capital). 
 309. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE 454–57 (1996) (discussing the impact of leverage on earnings). 
 310. One of the major results of the innovations leading to leveraged buyouts was 
that smaller companies, through the issuance of junk bonds and other financing 
techniques, could acquire larger ones. 
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transactions, wherein the fund, generally with the assistance of 
management, refinances a public company with debt and then 
purchases the remaining equity.311 
Much like size, however, leverage does not seem to offer an 
adequate explanation for the relative passivity of public equity funds.  
Although such funds typically do not use leverage, their immense 
resources nonetheless provide them the capacity to acquire 
controlling positions in quite large companies.312  Admittedly, an 
additional benefit of leverage is that it permits LBO funds to commit 
less of their capital to any one project.313  Again, however, public 
equity funds are large enough that even an acquisition of one 
hundred percent of the equity of a medium-sized public company 
would not commit a disproportionately large percentage of their 
capital.314  Moreover, because public equity funds regularly purchase 
equity securities from corporations which themselves are partly 
financed with debt, one could even argue that mutual funds and 
pension funds are themselves partly leveraged.  However one looks at 
the matter, leverage alone does not seem to be enough to explain the 
different monitoring strategies of public and private equity funds. 
One impact that leverage may have, however, is in the nature of 
monitoring that public and private equity funds would undertake.  
One of the central insights of corporate finance theory is that equity 
holders in a highly leveraged firm should prefer the firm to engage in 
higher risk strategies than would equity holders in a less leveraged 
firm.315  Thus, were public equity funds to engage in greater 
monitoring, they might encourage the firms in which they invest to 
take on relatively less risk than would highly leveraged private equity 
investors. 
C. Need for Liquidity 
Another plausible explanation for the continued passivity of public 
equity funds vis-à-vis their private counterparts may lie in their 
                                                          
 311. See GAUGHAN, supra note 197, at 297-300 (describing management buyouts); 
Haynes, Thompson & Wright, supra note 197, at 219 (noting that many buyouts 
occur as a result of management’s decision to refocus and narrow its strategy and 
summarizing research regarding the causes of such a decision). 
 312. See supra note 292 and accompanying text (providing details regarding the 
size of the world’s largest mutual funds). 
 313. This, in turn, minimizes the impact of any one acquisition on a fund’s ability 
to diversify its risk. 
 314. See supra note 302 and accompanying text (explaining the effect acquisitions 
have on diversification). 
 315. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1333 (applying the work of Stephen Prowse to the 
question of institutional investor monitoring). 
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greater liquidity requirements.  Unlike private equity funds, mutual 
funds and pension funds must be ready to redeem their investors’ 
capital on short notice.  Open-end mutual funds—the most popular 
and common of mutual funds—must be ready to redeem their shares 
on a daily basis and to pay redeeming shareholders within seven days 
of receiving a request.316  To satisfy such requirements, mutual funds 
must therefore retain a high degree of liquidity.317  Although there is 
no express statutory requirement as to the required level, the SEC has 
stated that it would be prudent for a mutual fund to limit its holdings 
of illiquid securities to fifteen percent of the fund’s net assets.318  
Pension funds are similarly constrained in that they must retain 
sufficient liquidity to meet plan obligations.319  These limitations are 
in sharp contrast to the illiquid nature of most private equity funds, 
which commonly prohibit redemptions for as many as seven to ten 
years.320 
As Coffee pointed out, the need for liquidity over the short term 
makes active monitoring both less attractive and less viable.321  
Monitoring is less attractive to a short-term investor because the 
benefits from improved corporate governance are likely to accrue 
over the long-term.322  Moreover, monitoring is less viable because a 
short-term investor may not retain her stake in a given company long 
enough to take successful action against underperforming managers 
(or to make a credible threat of such action).323  To use the language 
                                                          
 316. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2000). 
 317. KIRSCH, supra note 230, § 11:3.3, at 11-10 (“[T]o meet the redemption 
requests, a mutual fund must maintain a high degree of portfolio liquidity.”). 
 318. Id. (citing 1992 revisions to the Guidelines to Form N-1A). 
 319. See Susan P. Serota, Introduction, in ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW 20–21 (Susan P. 
Serota ed., 1995) (describing specific factors that a plan fiduciary should consider). 
 320. See Is Private Equity a Good Investment?, MONEYWEEK, Mar. 30, 2007, 
http://www.moneyweek.com/file/27707/is-private-equity-a-good-investment-.html 
(noting the lock-up of capital for seven to ten years). 
 321. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1318–21 (describing the impact that a lack of liquidity 
or thin equity may have on a fund’s monitoring ability). 
 322. In this way, liquidity is closely related to investment horizons.  An investor 
willing to maintain a given position for a long period may obtain a better return but 
at the cost of lower liquidity.  See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 309, at 180 (explaining 
that investors require a higher return for a given investment in order to compensate 
for greater risk); BRUNER, supra note 199, at 457 (“Whenever liquidity and/or control 
change, value changes.”); see also University Endowments:  The Ivory Trade, ECONOMIST, 
Jan. 20, 2007, at 81–82 (noting that large university endowments earned average 
returns of over fifteen percent in 2006, largely because of their extremely long-time 
investment horizons). 
 323. The SEC’s proposed rule 14a-11, for example, applied only to investors who 
were able (and willing) to hold their interest for over two years.  Security Holder 
Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,206, [2003–2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,101, 
at 88,401 (Oct. 14, 2003). 
  
2007] WHAT HEDGE FUNDS CAN TEACH CORPORATE AMERICA 295 
of Albert Hirschman, as exit becomes more viable, voice becomes less 
so.324  Public equity funds may therefore be passive for the simple 
reason that they must remain liquid. 
Public equity funds do not require so much liquidity as to interfere 
with their monitoring ability, however.  From a statutory standpoint, 
public equity funds are not required to maintain any particular level 
of liquidity.325  Rather, their need for liquidity arises from their need 
to satisfy redemption requests.  However, many—perhaps even 
most—investors in mutual funds are retail investors with long-term 
goals.326  They tend to be saving for retirement or perhaps for a 
child’s education.  Thus, on any given day, relatively few mutual fund 
investors will redeem their shares.327  A public equity fund could 
therefore conduct an actuarial analysis to determine what level of 
liquidity is actually necessary.328  Just as a bank does not in practice 
need to stand ready to return all of its depositors’ cash on any given 
day, a mutual fund or pension fund need retain only a portion of its 
investments in liquid form.329 
Additionally, the scale of many public equity funds already reduces 
their liquidity because there is an inherent trade-off between liquidity 
and the size of an investment.330  Once an investment becomes too 
large, the number of potential purchasers—and hence the market for 
such security—becomes smaller.  Thus, even a small fractional stake 
in a public company would be too large to exit quickly.  Likewise, one 
is left to wonder to whom Cerberus will be able to sell Chrysler, even 
if it is successful in turning around the failing automobile 
manufacturer.331  The number of potential buyers is not large.  As a 
                                                          
 324. See generally HIRSCHMAN, supra note 29, at 3–5 (introducing the interplay 
between exit and voice). 
 325. See KIRSCH, supra note 230, § 11:3.3, at 11–10 (noting that, although the SEC 
at one point stated that it would be prudent for mutual funds to limit illiquid 
securities to ten percent, a later statement suggested that a fifteen percent level 
would also be prudent (citing 1992 changes to the Guidelines to Form N-1A)). 
 326. See INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 15 (noting that “U.S. 
households’ growing reliance on stock, bond, and hybrid mutual funds reflects 
investor desire to meet long-term personal financial objectives such as preparing for 
retirement”). 
 327. Cf. id. at 107 (showing historic liquidity ratios for mutual funds from 1984 to 
2006). 
 328. Cf. id. at 117 (showing historic redemption rates for long-term mutual funds 
from 1985 to 2006). 
 329. See id. at 107 (reporting that mutual funds have seldom maintained more 
than ten percent of their assets in liquid form). 
 330. See TIROLE, supra note 196, at 207–13 (calculating the decrease in liquidity 
that results from an increase in investment size). 
 331. See supra note 206 (describing the conditions under which Cerberus bought 
Chrysler from Daimler). 
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result, the larger mutual funds are already forced to make very 
illiquid investments to invest all of their capital.332 
Their greater apparent need for liquidity does not therefore 
suggest that public equity funds are incapable of long-term monitoring 
so much as it suggests that they are incapable of only monitoring.  
Certainly, some degree of liquidity must be maintained.  However, 
the size of most public equity funds is such that their need for 
liquidity, like their preference for diversification, can easily co-exist 
with a strategy of active monitoring.  For example, even if a Fidelity or 
Vanguard were to conclude that seventy-five percent of its assets 
might be subject to call on any given day—an amount that seems 
clearly excessive—that would still leave each with as much as $250 
billion of capital that could be actively invested (and monitored) over 
the long-term. 
What this analysis misses, however, is that liquidity itself, at any 
level, is a choice.  Within statutory limits, public equity funds could 
easily contract to limit the withdrawal rights of their investors.  
Certainly, such a fund would be less attractive because its relative lack 
of liquidity would increase its level of risk.  In the event an investment 
went sour, investors would find it more difficult to exit at a time of 
their choosing or at all.  For this reason, closed-end mutual funds 
trade at a significant discount to open-end mutual funds.333  However, 
this is simply a function of the fundamental relationship between risk 
and reward.  As the risk caused by short-term illiquidity increases, a 
greater potential reward is needed to induce investors to hazard an 
investment.334  Thus, a public equity fund could successfully contract 
for fewer redemption rights only if it offered its investors the promise 
of a greater return. 
In fact, this is exactly the strategy pursued by private equity funds.  
Investors in such funds agree to have their assets locked up for 
lengthy periods only because the fund managers promise to translate 
their freedom to make long-term investments into proportionately 
                                                          
 332. See Black, supra note 2, at 568 (describing the substantial stakes that many 
institutions own in single companies). 
 333. See Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously:  The Implications of 
‘Discounted’ Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 901–08 (1988) 
(reporting discounts as high as twenty percent that were attributable to a decrease in 
liquidity). 
 334. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 309, at 173–203 (discussing the relationship 
between risk and return); see also MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 74 (“Most private 
equity investors expect to earn 15% to 20% in order to be compensated for the 
added risks and illiquid nature of private equity.”). 
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greater annual returns.335  Put differently, private equity funds choose 
their illiquidity and then use it to create increased profits through 
corporate monitoring.  Within limits, public equity funds could make 
the same choice. 
What this means for corporate governance is that their preference 
for liquidity does not cause public equity funds to be passive.  Rather, 
public equity funds choose to be passive because they believe it is 
more profitable for them to offer their investors a low-risk, low-
reward investment strategy.336  Their preference for liquidity is not a 
necessary precondition of their status.  It is, instead, nothing more 
than a response to prevailing market forces.  Private equity funds are 
more aggressive monitors, then, not because they lack liquidity or 
because public equity funds require it.  Rather, they are more active 
because they believe it to be a more profitable strategy.  The need for 
liquidity, then, does not explain the different investment strategies of 
public and private equity funds.  Instead, the different investment 
strategies explain their different approaches to liquidity.   
D. Investment Culture 
The culture of mutual funds and pension funds is very different 
from the culture of private equity funds.  Public equity fund 
managers typically invest with the goal of slow, steady returns, and 
their outlook reflects this attitude.337  Unlike managers of private 
equity funds, they are not used to active monitoring and are unlikely 
to view their jobs as involving efforts to improve the performance of 
the companies in which they invest.338  Even the language they use 
reflects this difference in attitude and outlook.  The name Fidelity, 
for example, “implies strict and continuing faithfulness to an 
obligation, trust, or duty.”339  In contrast, Cerberus is the name that 
                                                          
 335. See MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 74 (noting that “annual returns range 
from 0% to more than 30%, with an average of 10% to 20%, far surpassing that 9% 
to 10% average returns historically realized by common stock investors”). 
 336. In other words, the retail investment market currently offers only one basic 
choice for retirement savings in terms of the risk-reward tradeoff.  The goal of 
deregulating public equity fund compensation would be to permit the market to 
offer true alternatives. 
 337. See Black, supra note 11, at 885 (“Despite the recent surge of interest in 
corporate governance, many money managers still hope to beat the market by 
trading rather than by monitoring corporate managers.”). 
 338. See id. at 886 (describing how cultural factors delay monitoring); see also 
Coffee, supra note 12, at 859 (comparing fund managers to civil servants in a large 
bureaucracy and observing that “they have a rational reason to be risk averse, 
because a visible mistake could be embarrassing (if a large investment were to fail), 
but a below-market performance will not cost them their jobs”). 
 339. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 432 (10th ed. 1998) (defining 
fidelity as synonymous with “allegiance, fealty, loyalty, devotion, piety”). 
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Greek mythology gives to the three-headed dog that guards the gates 
of hell.340  Indeed, one could even question whether public equity 
fund managers are capable of effective monitoring.  Though they are 
sophisticated players in financial markets, few have honed the skill set 
necessary to bring discipline to errant corporate managers.341 
Culture, however, is less likely to explain the difference in outlook 
and behavior between public and private equity funds as it is to 
reflect such difference.  Moreover, although culture may present an 
impediment to active monitoring, it is one that would probably be 
overcome in time were other obstacles removed.342  Wall Street would 
hardly overlook an opportunity for significant profit simply because 
such opportunity had not been pursued in the past.  Certainly the 
relatively staid culture of bond traders changed in the early 1980s 
after Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker announced that 
interest rates—and hence bond prices—would no longer be fixed.343  
Similarly, and more relevant to my thesis, when the U.S. Department 
of Labor agreed in 1979 to permit pension funds to invest in venture 
capital funds, pension fund managers quickly changed their behavior 
and poured money into the more risky venture funds, thereby greatly 
accelerating the growth of the private equity market.344  Thus, culture, 
while perhaps likely to slow the pace of change, is nonetheless 
inadequate to explain the drastically different approaches to 
monitoring taken by public and private equity funds. 
                                                          
 340. THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFINCH’S MYTHOLOGY:  THE AGE OF FABLE, THE AGE OF 
CHIVALRY, LEGENDS OF CHARLEMAGNE 83 (1993).  For the etymology of the name, see 
William Safire, On Language:  A Sop to Cerberus, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 3, 2007, at 16 
(“There were six guys when we started, and the name sounded pretty cool, but 
nobody really researched it.” (quoting Tim Price, one of the managing directors of 
Cerberus Capital)). 
 341. See Black, supra note 11, at 886 (noting that the culture of money managers is 
such that most have not developed the skills necessary to monitor corporate 
managers). 
 342. See id. (“Cultural factors, though, are more likely to delay monitoring than to 
prevent it altogether.”). 
 343. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 173, at 1–5 (describing the transformation of 
financial markets that took place in the 1970s and 1980s); Boyer, supra note 21, at 
1000 (“After Volcker’s speech . . . the bond market was transformed from a 
backwater into a casino.” (quoting MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER:  RISING THROUGH 
THE WRECKAGE ON WALL STREET 35 (1989))).  Lewis’s book describes in colorful detail 
the aggressive, macho culture that developed at the bond trading desk of Solomon 
Brothers after Federal Reserve announced that the money supply would be fixed and 
interest rates would float.  LEWIS, supra, at 35.  The story of JM’s subsequent career as 
a principal of the notoriously failed hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management is 
continued in ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED:  THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-
TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000) [hereinafter LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED]. 
 344. MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 73–74. 
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IV. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS COMPARED—EXTERNAL 
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
Part III of this Article examined various internal characteristics that 
differentiate public and private equity funds, including their size, use 
of leverage, need for liquidity and investment culture.  In each case, I 
concluded that these characteristics are a result, rather than the 
cause, of the funds’ initial choice of investment strategy.  Such 
differences therefore do not seem sufficient to explain the funds’ 
different approaches to monitoring.  Thus, the real question remains:  
why did public equity funds develop a passive strategy while private 
equity funds developed an active one? 
Black and Roe posited that the most important explanation for 
institutional investor passivity was the web of legal rules that make 
monitoring burdensome and expensive.345  Part IV tests this 
hypothesis by comparing the legal regimes that impact public and 
private equity funds.  To the extent legal rules create different 
incentives for the two categories of funds, it may be possible to infer 
that such rules are the cause of their different investment strategies. 
The legal rules affecting public equity fund monitoring may be 
divided into three categories.  The first includes those rules that 
create impediments to the exercise of shareholder voice, primarily 
with respect to the proxy system.  They are discussed in Part IV.A.  
The second includes those rules that may limit the ability of certain 
funds to acquire a controlling stake in a particular corporation.  They 
are discussed in Part IV.B.  The third are those rules that regulate the 
internal structure and governance of the funds themselves, including 
their compensation structures.  They are discussed in Part IV.C. 
In Part IV, I conclude that, just as Black and Roe posited, legal 
rules are critical to a fund’s decision of whether to actively monitor its 
investments.  Without some degree of reform, active monitoring is 
likely to remain out of reach for most public equity funds.  However, 
the crucial set of rules are those that govern the compensation of 
fund managers.  Private equity fund managers are active monitors 
because the lack of regulation has allowed a market to develop that 
creates incentives for such managers to engage in active oversight.  
Public equity fund managers, however, are largely prohibited from 
entering that market.  While the removal of legal barriers may be a 
necessary precondition to their entering the market, they are likely to 
                                                          
 345. See supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text (illustrating the various ways in 
which legal rules make exercising shareholder voice expensive). 
  
300 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:225 
continue their strategy of passive investing unless they are given clear 
incentives to do otherwise. 
A. Rules Limiting Voice 
Corporate law is replete with rules that limit the ability of investors 
to actively exercise their voice.  For the most part, these have already 
been catalogued by Black and Roe, and so there is little to be gained 
by simply repeating the list here.346  Suffice it to say that the law limits 
voice in two primary ways.  First, it makes communication among 
shareholders expensive.347  Second, it imposes burdens and risks on 
shareholders who acquire more than five (or sometimes ten) percent 
of the stock of a particular company.348 
In the first place, federal proxy rules have generally imposed 
significant expenses on shareholders who seek to communicate with 
one another regarding an outstanding proxy proposal.349  Despite 
regulatory reforms over the past two decades,350 they also make it 
difficult for shareholders to make proxy proposals on their own.  
Such proposals tend to either be limited to an advisory role or 
require a full-blown proxy contest, with associated costs frequently 
reaching seven figures.351 
The second set of legal impediments are those that make it 
burdensome or risky for an investor to acquire more than five (or 
sometimes ten) percent of the equity of a given public company.  
Most notable among these is Exchange Act § 16(b).352  It prohibits a 
ten-percent shareholder from purchasing and selling securities of a 
single issuer within a rolling six-month period, thereby drastically 
                                                          
 346. See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 530–66 (discussing the many rules and 
procedures governing shareholder voting); Roe, supra note 2, at 16–31 (discussing 
the various regulatory impediments to activism on the part of institutional investors); 
see also supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text (describing the monetary 
constraints on shareholder activism). 
 347. Cf. supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 348. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text (listing requirements that apply 
to shareholders who acquire more than five and ten percent of a given company’s 
stock). 
 349. See Black, supra note 2, at 536 (maintaining that the proxy rules impose costs, 
delays, and risks on communication efforts).  But see generally supra Part I.C (finding 
that the ease with which shareholders may communicate with one another has 
improved since Black was writing in 1991). 
 350. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 840–41 (noting that “proxy reform has radically 
reduced the cost of shareholder communications” since 1990). 
 351. See Bratton, supra note 10, at 1403 (revealing that the average contest is 
estimated to range between $250,000 and $1 million).  Meanwhile, the recent proxy 
fight over the merger of Hewlett-Packard and Compaq is estimated to have cost over 
$100 million.  Steve Lohr, He Said.  She Said.  It Just Gets Uglier., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 
2002, at B1. 
 352. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000). 
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reducing such shareholder’s short-term liquidity.353  Other important 
hurdles include rule 10b-5, which makes it risky for an institutional 
investor to control one of the issuer’s board seats lest they be deemed 
to be engaged in insider trading.354  State antitakeover statutes also 
discourage investors from amassing too great a share of a given 
stock.355 
Although the rules affecting the acquisition and exercise of 
influence over corporate policy are real, numerous and oftentimes 
onerous, they do not explain the relative passivity of public equity 
funds vis-à-vis private equity funds.  This is because, on their face, the 
same rules apply equally to any investor.  For example, anyone who 
acquires ten percent of a public company, including any private 
equity fund, must confront the limited liquidity imposed by section 
16(b).356  Thus, private equity funds appear to be engaged in active 
monitoring despite the cumulative impact of these rules.357  The rules 
                                                          
 353. Id.  The same rule applies if the sale precedes the purchase during the rolling 
six-month period.  Id. 
 354. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).  The risk is that the knowledge of the director 
will be imputed to the institution, whether or not such knowledge is actually 
transferred.  As a result, an otherwise innocent trade might be deemed to have been 
made on the basis of non-public information in contravention of insider trading 
rules.  Black, supra note 2, at 545–48. 
 355. Currently, over forty states have some form of antitakeover legislation.  See 
Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory:  Legal Innovation and State Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. REG. 209, 215 tbl.1 (2006).  State antitakeover laws come 
in four basic forms:  control share acquisition statutes, fair price provisions, rights of 
redemption, and business combination statutes.  BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., Inc., 683 
F. Supp. 458, 463 (D. Del. 1988).  Of particular importance for corporate governance 
purposes are the control share acquisition statutes, like the one at issue in BNS.  
Typically, such statutes work much like a poison pill, imposing massive dilution on, 
or removing voting rights from, shareholders who acquire more than a fixed 
percentage of the issuer’s stock without prior approval of the issuer’s board of 
directors.  E.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-3, 23-1-42-7, 23-1-42-10(b) (West 2007).  
Delaware’s control statute takes a different approach, prohibiting “business 
combinations” between unapproved stockholders and the target corporation for 
three years following the initial purchase.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a) (2007).  It 
is modeled after New York’s statute.  N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 2007).  
Initially, many such statutes were effectively invalidated on Commerce Clause 
grounds by the Supreme Court’s decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 
(1982).  However, the so-called “second generation” statutes, which were re-drafted 
in light of Edgar, have thus far passed constitutional muster.  See, e.g., BNS, 683 F. 
Supp. at 472–73 (upholding the constitutionality of the Delaware antitakeover 
statute). 
 356. See Black, supra note 2, at 545–47 (noting that Exchange Act section 16(b), 15 
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000), requires a company’s ten percent shareholders to report to 
the SEC their purchases and sales of such company’s stock and to forfeit any profits 
that result from any “short-swing” trades they make during any given six-month 
period). 
 357. As an alternative explanation, one might argue that the failure of private 
equity funds to invest in public equities other than to acquire control suggests that 
section 16(b) and rule 10b-5 do indeed serve as deterrents to corporate monitoring.  
However, this phenomenon is probably better understood as being the result of a 
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themselves, however burdensome, are therefore insufficient to 
explain the continued passivity of public equity funds. 
Before dismissing the impact of this set of legal rules altogether, 
however, it is worth asking how private equity funds address the risks 
and burdens these rules pose.  In fact, private equity funds avoid the 
direct impact of many of these rules by leapfrogging over mere 
influence and instead acquiring outright control.358  Put differently, 
the rules appear to constitute a much greater hurdle in a system 
characterized by limited shareholder voice than by one characterized 
by full-blown shareholder control.  This operates in two ways. 
First, unlike public equity funds, private equity funds have already 
chosen to sacrifice liquidity and so are not negatively impacted by 
rules that reduce their ability to exit a given investment.359  Put 
concretely, an LBO fund with a seven-year investment horizon is not 
inconvenienced by the six-month delay caused by purchasing shares 
subject to section 16(b). 
Second, many of the rules that make the acquisition and exercise 
of influence burdensome apply only to targets that are publicly 
traded.360  Private equity funds, however, generally purchase 
companies that do not list their shares on a national exchange, such 
as early stage companies and subsidiaries of public companies.361  
                                                          
preference for control acquisitions intended to take full advantage of the carried 
interest.  Supra notes 185–186 and accompanying text. 
 358. See generally Part II.A (providing an overview of private equity funds). 
 359. See generally Part II.C (detailing the typical governance structure of private 
equity funds). 
 360. See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 536–50 (cataloguing the effects on a fund’s 
monitoring ability of federal proxy and insider trading rules that apply only to 
publicly traded companies).  One example of this relates to insider trading liability 
under section 10b-5.  The risk here is that a director who is appointed by an 
institutional investor would occasionally be privy to non-public information 
regarding the portfolio company.  That information would then be imputed to the 
institution, even if the director did not in fact pass it along.  Thus, the institution 
would constantly risk violating the insider trading rules by innocently making a sale 
or purchase while the director (and the director alone) is in possession of material 
non-public information.  Id. at 547–48.  One impact of the various federal anti-fraud 
provisions is to impose a duty on insiders who are deemed to possess non-public 
information to disclose such information publicly or to abstain from trading.  SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied Kline v. SEC, 394 
U.S. 976 (1969).  For private equity funds, however, part of the purpose of acquiring 
control over a company is to obtain non-public information.  Therefore, a disconnect 
between what the fund knows and what its portfolio company managers know would 
be much less likely.  See, e.g., Roe, supra note 2, at 14 (noting that “management 
would more willingly reveal proprietary information to the large long-term 
shareholder, who has the incentive to maintain secrecy”).  Inadvertent insider 
trading would therefore not be much of a risk. 
 361. Haynes, Thompson & Wright, supra note 197, at 219 (noting that many 
buyouts occur as a result of management’s decision to refocus and narrow its 
strategy, and summarizing research regarding the causes of such a decision). 
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Alternatively, when private equity funds do acquire public companies, 
it is often in a going-private transaction that results in the company 
no longer being listed on a national securities exchange.362  Thus, by 
acquiring control, private equity funds completely negate the impact 
of many otherwise burdensome securities rules. 
The legal rules identified by Black and Roe are therefore more 
likely to deter investors who seek to exercise voice, as opposed to 
control.363  Voice contemplates a cooperative effort by large but 
fractional shareholders to exercise influence short of control.364  
Voice, in other words, impacts the margin, shifting a relatively 
impotent investor into a position of real, but limited, power. 
The goal of many proponents of voice, however, is expressly to add 
to the power of fractional shareholders to influence management.  In 
a sense, they seem to want to have it both ways—limit shareholders’ 
power by forcing them to maintain small fractional stakes, but 
increase their power by bestowing greater influence upon such 
stakes.  Undoubtedly, at some level, whether at five percent, ten 
percent or higher, shareholder influence becomes strong enough 
that rules like section 16(b) are needed to limit abuse.  Arguments to 
lessen the impact of these rules may therefore be simply delaying the 
moment of reckoning.  If section 16(b) should be changed to 
exclude certain categories of ten-percent investors, it should still 
apply to fifteen-percent investors, and so on.  The real problem, in 
other words, is that rules like section 16(b) accomplish what they 
were intended to accomplish:  they limit the liquidity of shareholders 
who attain influence short of control.365 
In fact, the problem with voice may be that it adds too little power.  
Shareholders who cross the five-percent threshold by only a small 
margin gain few of the benefits of increased influence while suffering 
a significant loss in liquidity.  The power of shareholder control, the 
investment strategy pursued by private equity funds, is that the loss of 
liquidity is coupled with a dramatic, not incremental, increase in 
influence—influence that can be converted directly into higher 
profits.  The implication, then, is that a system of institutional 
                                                          
 362. See GAUGHAN, supra note 197, at 291 (noting that a typical leveraged buyout 
“frequently involves taking a public company private”). 
 363. See Gilson, Gordon & Pound, supra note 67, at 33 (arguing that it is more 
difficult for a shareholder to elect a minority of the directors than to replace the 
entire board). 
 364. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (defining institutional voice in 
contrast to institutional control). 
 365. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1343 (noting that the “threat of a six-month 
period of illiquidity deters most institutional holders from crossing the ten percent 
threshold”). 
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investor voice may be attractive but not feasible.  Policymakers may 
therefore be forced to confront the difficult choice of accepting the 
current system of institutional investor passivity or enabling public 
equity funds to actually take control of the reins of corporate 
America.366 
None of this, however, explains the different trading strategies of 
public and private equity funds.  Rather, the discussion echoes the 
discussion of liquidity in Part III.C.367  Shareholder passivity is not 
caused by the rules.  Rather, it follows from the initial choice of 
whether to pursue a low-reward strategy that benefits from low cost, 
low risk, and high liquidity, or a high-reward strategy that must 
overcome high cost, high risk, and low liquidity.  Once that initial 
decision is made, presumably on the basis of market factors, the 
impact of the rules on either strategy is minimal.  The extremes of 
passivity and control are unaffected by these legal rules.  Rather, what 
the rules do is place burdens on the middle ground of voice.  Thus, 
the rules explain why public equity funds do not exercise voice, but 
they do not explain why they shun control. 
It should be noted, however, that while most of these rules have 
little impact on a fund’s decision to choose between passivity and 
control, they do have the impact of limiting control to friendly 
control.  As Grundfest and others have noted, truly hostile takeovers 
are largely impossible under today’s legal regime.368  Thus, if public 
equity funds were to enter the world of LBOs, they would be able to 
                                                          
 366. Interestingly, evidence of this possibility may be found in John Coffee’s 1991 
survey of the corporate governance systems that were prevalent in the United States, 
Japan, Germany, Sweden, Canada, and the United Kingdom.  See id. at 1290–1318 
(contrasting the role of investors in countries with external versus internal capital 
markets).  Coffee tentatively put these countries on a continuum, with one pole 
representing systems that privilege liquidity but inhibit institutional investor control, 
and the other pole representing systems that permit financial institutions to 
dominate industrial countries but at the expense of decreased liquidity.  Id. at 1287.  
In fact, however, his results suggested that there was very little middle ground.  
Instead, most of the countries were on one pole or the other.  Id. at 1290–1318.  
Even Sweden and Canada, the two countries he placed nearest the middle of the 
continuum, were actually just mixtures of the two poles, with some Swedish and 
Canadian entities benefiting from control but not liquidity, while other entities 
reflected the opposite approach.  Id. at 1306–09.  What was missing was the true 
middle ground of voice—a system characterized by financial institutions that exercise 
moderate influence at the expense of some liquidity. 
 367. See supra Part III.C (noting that public equity funds choose greater liquidity—
in part because investors prefer low-risk and low-reward investments—a strategy 
which inhibits effective monitoring). 
 368. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 52, at 889–91 
(examining data from 1996–2000 and noting the frequency with which staggered 
boards of directors prevented hostile bids). 
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invest only in deals where management acquiesced.369  Certainly, this 
would pose a significant limitation on the impact that such 
investments could have on the overall market for good corporate 
governance.  Presumably, the worst-run companies would be the least 
likely to agree to an acquisition as their managers would be in the 
greatest peril of losing their jobs. 
However, while this may limit the ability of public equity funds to 
change underperforming management, it does not necessarily mean 
that they cannot improve management performance.  For example, 
there are a number of empirical studies that have found that 
leveraged buyouts create strong efficiency gains, even if the buyout 
has the blessing of management.370  LBOs and other private equity 
acquisitions also invariably involve a substantial premium over the 
target’s market price.371  Presumably, the size of this premium is 
related to the purchaser’s expectations regarding its ability to reduce 
agency costs.  Thus, the management of many underperforming 
companies may be more than willing to accept such a premium.  
Certainly, that seems to be the case today, with nine of the ten largest 
LBOs in history being announced over the prior two years.372 
Although a regime of institutional investor control could never 
encompass all American companies, the more it improved 
performance at some companies, the starker the difference would be 
vis-à-vis other underperforming companies, and the greater the 
pressure that would build on the poor performers to improve.  
Indeed, a study of the impact of the shareholder activist group 
United Shareholders Association suggested that the $22.75 million it 
spent in monitoring a targeted group of underperforming companies 
contributed to a general net wealth gain of $1.3 billion.373  Thus, even 
                                                          
 369. Hostile takeover attempts, unless they are later converted into friendly bids, 
are today generally impossible given the strength and array of management’s 
defenses.  See id. (examining the effectiveness of staggered boards of directors as 
impediments to takeovers). 
 370. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 7, at 65 (arguing that post-LBO companies, with 
their close monitoring, have an incentive structure that is superior to that of public 
corporations); see also BRUNER, supra note 199, at 56 (summarizing several empirical 
studies that found increased value in transactions where managers had more at stake, 
including leveraged buyouts); Black, Empirical Evidence, supra note 10, at 924 (noting 
the existence of “substantial evidence suggesting that LBOs often led to improved 
corporate performance, at least up through about 1986”). 
 371. See John C. Coates IV, Empirical Evidence on Structural Takeover Defenses:  Where 
Do We Stand?,  54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 783, 794 (2000) (citing a study by J.P. Morgan that 
average premiums paid to companies with poison pills was fifty-one percent and 
average premiums paid to companies without poison pills was thirty-six percent). 
 372. Sorkin, supra note 219. 
 373. Strickland, Wiles & Zenner, supra note 161, at 336. 
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by monitoring only the poorest performers, public equity funds have 
the power to improve the operations of the entire marketplace. 
B. Rules Limiting Control 
Although many legal rules appear to impact both public and 
private equity funds in a similar manner, many do not.  Chief among 
those whose impact is disparate are rules that restrict mutual funds 
and pension funds from engaging in certain types of investments.  To 
the extent such investment restrictions block public equity funds (but 
not private equity funds) from acquiring control over a given 
corporation, they might explain the public equity funds’ continued 
passivity.  If such were the case, the rules would need to be relaxed—
or a safe harbor created—before mutual fund and pension fund 
managers could become active in the oversight of corporate 
managers.  Their amendment, in other words, would be a 
precondition to the ability of public equity funds to engage in active 
oversight of corporate managers.  Their removal, however, would not 
create any direct incentives to monitor. 
The following two Sections, respectively, address the impact of 
ERISA on pension funds and of the Investment Company Act and 
Investment Advisers Act on mutual funds.  Private equity funds, 
meanwhile, are generally structured so as to be exempt from these 
two regulatory schemes.374 
1. ERISA 
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act in 
1974 in response to concerns that pension funds were not being 
sufficiently regulated by the states.375  The goal of ERISA was to 
statutorily extend the common law of trusts to union- and employer-
sponsored pension plans.376  Among other things, it made the security 
of pension promises a basic goal of federal policy by regulating the 
riskiness of pension investments and by providing a government-run 
insurance program for all qualifying pensions.377 
Pension funds’ relationship with private equity investments has 
always been complicated.  Initially, for example, many observers read 
                                                          
 374. See supra Part II.B (noting that private equity funds avoid the limitations and 
regulations to which public equity funds are subject by, inter alia, limiting 
membership and clientele). 
 375. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000). 
 376. Id. 
 377. JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 3 
(2004).  For a political history of the regulation of pension funds, see generally Roe, 
Private Pensions, supra note 66, at 75. 
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ERISA as prohibiting pension funds from investing in private equity 
funds.378  In 1979, however, the Department of Labor issued a ruling 
that expressly permitted such investments, provided the pension fund 
remained sufficiently diversified.379  More recently, private equity 
funds that wished to accept investments from pension plans had to be 
structured around ERISA’s broad definition of a fund manager.380  
This meant structuring the private equity fund as a “venture capital 
operating company” or limiting the amount of capital it received 
from all pension funds to twenty-five percent or less of the total fund 
commitments.381  These rules were loosened somewhat in 2006, 
however, by exempting funds of funds and making it easier for 
private equity funds to accept subscriptions from non-ERISA pension 
plans.382 
ERISA does not contain a comprehensive list of specific rules 
relating to investment risk.  Rather, it relies upon two broad and 
relatively vague fiduciary requirements to regulate the behavior of 
ERISA fund managers.  First, it requires ERISA fund managers to act 
“with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of 
an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.”383  This fiduciary 
standard has been called “the highest known to law.”384  Second, 
ERISA fund managers are required to diversify the investments of the 
plan “so as to minimize the risk of large losses.”385  By contrast, private 
                                                          
 378. MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 73. 
 379. Rules and Regulations for Fiduciary Responsibilities, 44 Fed. Reg. 50,363 
(proposed Aug. 28, 1979); see also Frankel, supra note 295, at 944–52 (describing the 
period from 1975 to 2000 as one in which federal regulators largely cooperated with 
fund managers). 
 380. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 27–28. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. 
 383. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000).  The prudent investor standard was first 
enunciated in Harvard College v. Armory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830).  For a 
discussion by two CalPERS executives of the continuing duty of fund managers to 
monitor investments in index funds, see generally Richard H. Koppes & Maureen L. 
Reilly, An Ounce of Prevention:  Meeting the Fiduciary Duty to Monitor an Index Fund 
Through Relationship Investing, 20 J. CORP. L. 413 (1995). 
 384. Reich v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 837 F. Supp. 1259, 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(quoting Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
 385. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C).  The duty can be traced back to the common law.  
See Appeal of Dickinson, 25 N.E. 99 (Mass. 1890) (holding that trustees may not take 
the same risks as owners in search of greater profit).  ERISA fiduciaries are also 
required to act “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries” of the 
plan.  29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).  For purposes of this Article, however, the “solely in 
the interest” requirement is less significant as it is assumed that private equity 
investments are in fact made primarily for the benefit of fund investors.  Meanwhile, 
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equity fund managers, while being fiduciaries under state partnership 
law, are not required to satisfy ERISA’s prudence standard or its 
diversification requirement.386 
Neither the prudence standard nor the diversification requirement 
are likely to interfere directly with an ERISA plan manager’s desire to 
exercise voice.  As contemplated by its proponents, shareholder voice 
involves shareholders with small fractional stakes—generally under 
five percent—using the proxy process to influence management, 
either on their own or collectively with other similar shareholders.387  
Thus, unless the pension plan were quite small, acquiring a fractional 
share of a public company would seem unlikely to impact the plan’s 
diversification in any meaningful way.  Similarly, inexpensive or 
informal attempts to influence management conduct would not seem 
particularly imprudent.388 
In fact, pension plan advisers may even find it less risky to adopt a 
strategy of profit-driven monitoring than to use fund assets to pursue 
particular social goals.389  Indeed, one of the bright spots on the 
horizon of shareholder activism is the role being played by the large 
public pension plans such as CalPERS.390  Such funds have acted as 
leaders among shareholder activists and have been the catalysts for 
                                                          
the Act permits deviation from the diversification requirement only if it is clearly 
prudent.  29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2). 
 386. Because most private equity funds are organized as limited partnerships, with 
the fund corpus being the partnership itself and the fund managers serving as the 
general partner, the fund managers are generally subject to the normal fiduciary 
duties of partners.  These are generally thought to entail “[n]ot honesty alone, but 
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”  Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 
546 (N.Y. 1928).  Nonetheless, though a high standard, it is generally thought to be a 
lower standard than ERISA’s “prudent investor” standard.  See Reich, 837 F. Supp. at 
1273 (describing ERISA’s fiduciary standard as “the highest known to law” (quoting 
Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982))). 
 387. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (defining institutional voice in 
contrast to institutional control). 
 388. Indeed, the most recent Restatement of Trusts expressly approves of ERISA 
funds seeking out “individual bargains within the highly efficient markets as well as 
in the less efficient ones.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS:  PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE 
§ 227, general note to cmts. e-h (1992) (emphasis added). 
 389. See Leon E. Irish & Arthur G. Kent, The Social Investing Quandary, in ERISA 
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 319, at 237–38 (discussing the impact of ERISA’s “solely in 
the interest” requirement on social investing). 
 390. See Romano, supra note 82, at 797 (acknowledging that public pension funds 
have been “more active than other institutional investors in corporate governance 
over the past few years, offering shareholder proposals and engaging in other highly 
publicized activities to influence management actions”). 
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much change.391  It is for this reason that Coffee and others focused 
their reform efforts on public pension funds.392 
Private equity investments, on the other hand, involve quite a bit 
more than mere influence.  They involve the acquisition and exercise 
of some degree of control.  Thus, in order to uncover why public 
equity funds behave differently than private equity funds, one must 
consider the impact of ERISA’s prudence standard and diversification 
requirement on control acquisitions. 
As a technical legal matter, it is unclear whether an acquisition of 
control by a pension plan would violate ERISA.  Courts have 
consistently limited the prudence standard to a procedural test.393  
Thus, liability will not turn on the success of a particular investment, 
but on the quality of the investigation.394  Likewise, Department of 
Labor regulations state that the prudence standard requires 
consideration only of whether the particular investment strategy is 
reasonably designed to further the purposes of the plan, including 
with respect to the overall projected return.395  It does not specify 
what those purposes must be.  In fact, ERISA fund managers are 
already permitted to invest in private equity funds.396  Provided they 
maintain a proper level of diversification, it does not appear to be 
significantly less prudent to make such investments directly rather 
than through an intermediary.  It may even be less expensive. 
A similar analysis seems to apply to the diversification requirement.  
It is a tenet of modern finance theory that a well-designed portfolio 
containing as few as twenty stocks can provide ninety-five percent of 
                                                          
 391. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 846 (predicting that public pension funds will act 
as catalysts of corporate governance reform). 
 392. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 1336 (suggesting that public pension funds 
might be the “optimal corporate monitors” because they are relatively free from 
conflicts of interest, have large enough stakes in corporations, and prefer longer 
investment horizons). 
 393. See, e.g., Brock v. Robbins, 830 F.2d 640, 648 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding a 
violation of the prudence requirement where the fund managers approved a $10 
million investment in under ten minutes without any investigation); Ulico Cas. Co. v. 
Clover Capital Mgmt., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 335, 340 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (requiring 
fund managers “(1) to employ proper methods to investigate, evaluate and structure 
the investment; (2) to act in a manner as would others who have a capacity and 
familiarity with such matters; and (3) to exercise independent judgment when 
making investment decisions”). 
 394. Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Pensions, Proxies and Power:  Recent Developments in the 
Use of Proxy Voting to Influence Corporate Governance, 7 LAB. LAW. 771, 779–80 (1991) 
(citing Donovan v. Walton, 609 F. Supp. 1221, 1222–28 (S.D. Fla. 1985), aff’d, 794 
F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
 395. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (2007).  The Department of Labor, in public 
statements, has also appeared to approve of the modern portfolio approach to 
investments.  Koppes & Reilly, supra note 383, at 437. 
 396. MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 73. 
  
310 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:225 
the benefits that arise from diversification.397  Thus, provided the 
pension fund is large enough relative to the target company, it would 
seem logical that it could safely engage in a control acquisition 
without sacrificing the overall diversity of its portfolio.398 
For corporate governance purposes, however, the real impediment 
is the non-obvious reading sometimes given to the prudence standard 
and diversification requirement.  Prudence, though defined, is 
defined broadly and subject to interpretation.399  For example, Roe 
argues that a fund manager who sat on the board of a portfolio 
company would be open to lawsuits seeking to apply ERISA’s 
heightened fiduciary standard to her actions on the board.400  
Moreover, the definition expressly contemplates a comparison of the 
fund manager’s conduct to that of other fund managers “acting in a 
like capacity.”401  This creates the risk (or at least the perception) that 
the first pension fund manager to engage in an LBO or like 
transaction could be held to have violated the prudence standard for 
no other reason than because she was the first.  In other words, if no 
one else is engaging in such transactions, then there is the real 
possibility that the novelty alone would be cause for a violation.402  
                                                          
 397. See supra note 304 (referencing textbooks which state that as few as eight 
stocks can provide sufficient diversity and suggesting that this holds true when 
portfolios hold stocks whose risks are negatively correlated). 
 398. Koppes & Reilly, supra note 383, at 437 (“Thus, under ERISA, trustees may 
prudently choose to make new or non-traditional investments if certain factors are 
met.  DOL regulations specify these factors.  For one thing, expected returns must 
justify the additional risk, taking into account the overall purpose of the pension 
plan.  Also, the portfolio as a whole must be adequately diversified and sufficiently 
liquid to meet payout requirements.”); see also Roe, Private Pensions, supra note 66, at 
97 (arguing that the diversification requirement, in light of modern portfolio theory, 
is not a significant barrier to pension fund activism). 
 399. See generally Serota, in ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 319, at 4, 19–20 
(citing the standard and explaining the prudence rule). 
 400. Roe, Private Pensions, supra note 66, at 102–03. 
 401. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
 402. See ROBERT A. HAUGEN, THE NEW FINANCE:  THE CASE AGAINST EFFICIENT 
MARKETS 114–16 (1995) (noting that fund managers may seek to avoid taking actions 
that might differentiate them from other fund managers); Roe, supra note 2, at 24 
(“Commentators suggest that the rule looks to prevailing investment practices, to the 
average, but with a substantial conservative drag:  preservation of principal, even in 
the face of reduced return, is critical.” (citing B. LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT 
MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE 21, 29, 39–40 (1986))); Roe, Private 
Pensions, supra note 66, at 97–99 (arguing that ERISA creates a conservative feedback 
loop that reinforces existing practices, whatever they may be).  But see Steven L. 
Willborn, Public Pensions and the Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement 
Systems Act, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 141, 143–44 (1998) (discussing a 1997 Uniform Law 
Commissioners model act that was “designed to permit and encourage” the 
application of modern portfolio theory by pension fund managers). 
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And even if such were not truly the case, it would be reasonable for a 
risk-averse fund manager to fear that it might be.403 
The same is true of diversification.  Though a diversified portfolio 
might not be inconsistent with the occasional acquisition of control, 
the fact is that most funds are, if anything, over-diversified.404  Some 
funds, for example, appear to hold more than a thousand different 
stocks, when no more than twenty are absolutely necessary.405  
Moreover, the language of the statute makes the issue even cloudier.  
The degree of diversification that is required is that which is 
necessary “to minimize the risk of large losses.”406  Read broadly, this 
could easily be interpreted to mean that any large investment—even 
one below the five-percent threshold—would violate ERISA because 
the losses could potentially be large.407  Alternatively, it could be 
interpreted to mean that any risk of loss that is objectively large 
would be improper, even if the loss would be subjectively small 
relative to the size of the overall fund.408 
One explanation for the continued passivity of public pension 
funds may therefore lie in a risk-averse interpretation of ERISA’s 
prudence standard and diversification requirement.  Whether or not 
they would be violated by an activist monitoring strategy, such rules 
appear to impose significant risks (and hence costs) on pension fund 
managers.  Unless and until Congress and/or the Department of 
Labor clarifies their application to LBOs and similar transactions, 
these rules will continue to limit the ability of public pension fund 
managers to engage in control acquisitions. 
That being said, these requirements by themselves do not appear 
to constitute a sufficient explanation for the general passivity of most 
public pension fund managers.  For example, mutual funds, which 
are exempt from ERISA but which mimic public pension funds in 
most other ways, are nonetheless passive investors.  It is likely, in 
other words, that even if an appropriate safe harbor were designed to 
                                                          
 403. See Black, supra note 2, at 562–64 (discussing the culture of fund managers 
that makes them averse to legal risk). 
 404. See Black, supra note 11, at 834 (noting that even a relatively small portfolio 
with as few as one hundred stocks would protect institutions from most firm-specific 
risk). 
 405. See id.; see also supra note 304 (suggesting that, so long as a fund holds stocks 
whose risks are negatively correlated, a small number is sufficient for diversification 
purposes). 
 406. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2000). 
 407. See also Koppes & Reilly, supra note 383, at 436 (noting that, at common law, 
prudence is measured each transaction at a time). 
 408. See Roe, Private Pensions, supra note 66, at 99–101 (discussing the impact of 
anti-netting rules that in certain cases prohibit managers from offsetting a significant 
loss against a significant gain). 
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permit ERISA-regulated pension plans to invest in private equity-type 
transactions, public pension fund managers would continue to see 
little profit potential in active monitoring.  In other words, ERISA 
may explain why public pension fund managers believe they cannot 
invest directly in private equity-style transactions, but it does not shed 
any light on whether they would desire to do so. 
2. The 1940 Acts 
Mutual funds are governed primarily by the Investment Company 
Act of 1940,409 while mutual fund managers—also referred to as 
advisers—are governed by the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.410  
Both Acts had their roots in the original New Deal securities 
legislation of the 1930s, and both impose broad and detailed 
regulatory schemes.411  Thus, a mutual fund manager must comply 
with an extensive body of regulation, covering not merely fraud but 
everything from registration and disclosure obligations to 
recordkeeping requirements and limitations on incentive 
compensation and permissible investments.412  Private equity funds, by 
contrast, are structured so as to be largely exempt from all but the 
fraud requirements of these two statutes.413 
Although the two 1940 Acts, like ERISA, subject mutual funds to a 
system of broad and onerous regulation, their impact on corporate 
monitoring is likely to be less significant.  In the first place, it is 
doubtful that mutual fund managers owe fiduciary duties to their 
investors that are significantly higher than the duties owed by private 
equity fund managers.414  In the second place, the Investment 
Company Act’s diversification requirement is fairly easily 
circumvented. 
                                                          
 409. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2000). 
 410. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2000). 
 411. For a political history of the Acts, see generally Roe, Mutual Funds, supra note 
66, at 1469.  For a description of the history and development of the mutual fund 
industry, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, STEVEN M. GOLDFELD, LILLI A. GORDON & MICHAEL F. 
KOEHN, THE ECONOMICS OF MUTUAL FUND MARKETS:  COMPETITION VERSUS 
REGULATION ch. 1 (1990). 
 412. See generally Clifford E. Kirsch, An Introduction to Mutual Funds, in MUTUAL 
FUND REGULATION §§ 1:4.1, at 1-13, 1:4.2, at 1-13 to -16 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 2d ed. 
2007) (describing the regulatory framework to which fund advisers must submit). 
 413. See supra Part II.B (noting that private equity funds avoid the limitations and 
regulations to which public equity funds are subject by, inter alia, limiting 
membership to a selected clientele). 
 414. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 
180, 194 (1963) (imposing “an affirmative duty of ‘utmost good faith, and full and 
fair disclosure of all material facts’” on a mutual fund adviser (quoting WILLIAM L. 
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 534–35 (1955))). 
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Currently, most mutual funds prefer to be categorized as 
“diversified” because investors generally consider such funds to be 
less risky.415  To qualify as such, a fund is required to devote seventy-
five percent of its assets to diversified investments.  It is then 
prohibited from using these monies to acquire more than ten 
percent of any one company or to acquire an interest in a single 
company that would exceed five percent of the fund’s total assets.416 
However, a diversified mutual fund is permitted to invest the 
unregulated twenty-five percent of its assets in any manner it chooses, 
including in a single, non-diversified security.417  Given the near-
gargantuan size of many mutual fund complexes, even this twenty-five 
percent would be enough to make a number of significant control 
acquisitions.  Moreover, if a fund were to choose to adopt a strategy 
of seeking to control a limited portfolio of target companies, it would 
want to advertise that fact.  Thus, it would probably desire to buck 
tradition and adopt the non-diversified label.  Doing so would 
therefore exempt such fund from any limitations on the 
concentration of its investments.418 
Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code, which applies to 
mutual funds, presents much the same story.  Generally speaking, 
mutual funds seek to be treated as “regulated investment companies” 
under section 851 of the Code so as to be eligible for pass-through 
tax treatment.419  Without such treatment, dividends earned by the 
mutual fund would be taxed three times:  once at the company level, 
again at the level of the mutual fund, and a third time when 
distributed to the mutual funds’ investors.420  A mutual fund that 
satisfies the Code’s diversification requirement is taxed only twice.421 
Like the Investment Company Act, the Code divides the assets of a 
regulated investment company into two pools.  The first pool must be 
invested in a diversified portfolio, such that not more than five 
                                                          
 415. See Roe, supra note 2, at 20 (“Mutual funds are designed for unsophisticated 
investors who cannot assemble a diversified portfolio or evaluate the mutual fund’s 
portfolio.”). 
 416. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(1) (2000). 
 417. Id. § 80b-5(b)(2). 
 418. See Audrey C. Talley & James L. Love, Restrictions on Investments, in MUTUAL 
FUND REGULATION, supra note 412, § 8:2.2, at 8-9 to -10 (explaining the requirements 
for a diversified classification and further noting that non-diversified funds may 
invest more than five percent of their total assets in any one issuer). 
 419. I.R.C. § 851(b)(3) (2007); Talley & Love, in MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra 
note 412, at § 8:2.2, 8-9 to -10; see Roe, Mutual Funds, supra note 66, at 1478–80 
(examining subchapter M of the Code and noting that only diversified mutual funds 
are eligible for pass-through tax treatment). 
 420. Roe, supra note 2, at 20–21. 
 421. I.R.C. § 851(b)(3) (2007). 
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percent of the fund’s total assets are invested in any one company 
and such that the fund does not own more than ten percent of the 
equity of any one company.422  Obviously, this presents a real 
limitation on the ability of such a fund to adopt a strategy of control 
acquisitions.  However, the other pool is unregulated, except that the 
fund is generally prohibited from investing more than twenty-five 
percent of its total assets in any one company.423  Thus, although most 
mutual funds, for tax purposes, elect to keep at least half of their 
assets diversified, there is nothing to stop them from investing the 
other half in a few highly concentrated investments.424  Again, given 
that some mutual fund complexes have enormous sums at their 
disposal, this would not seem to be an overly tight restriction on their 
ability to engage in active oversight strategies.  Moreover, as taxes on 
capital gains approach zero, it is possible that an aggressive mutual 
fund might be willing to forego pass-through treatment and devote a 
greater portion of its assets to active corporate monitoring.425 
Slightly more significant for corporate governance purposes are 
the Investment Company Act’s prohibitions against certain 
transactions.  These apparently represent a policy choice to limit the 
risk to which mutual fund investors are exposed.  In particular, 
section 12(a) of the Investment Company Act generally prohibits 
registered investment companies—i.e., mutual funds but not private 
equity funds—from effecting short sales of securities and from 
purchasing securities on margin.426  However, because the SEC has 
thus far failed to adopt the necessary implementing rules, mutual 
funds are currently free to participate in these practices.427  In fact, 
many mutual funds have been formed for the express purpose of 
selling securities short or for hedging their investments by means of a 
long-short strategy.428 
Even if such rules were actively enforced, however, the inability of 
public equity funds to make such investments would not adequately 
                                                          
 422. Id. § 851(b)(3)(A). 
 423. Id. § 851(b)(3)(B). 
 424. Roe, supra note 2, at 20. 
 425. See id. at 20–21 (demonstrating that the marginal tax burden applicable to 
non-exempt mutual funds is relatively small). 
 426. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a)(1)-(2) (2000).  Exceptions exist for short sales “in 
connection with an underwriting in which such registered company is a participant” 
and for purchases on margin where “such short-term credits as are necessary for the 
clearance of transactions.”  Id. 
 427. Talley & Love, in MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 418, § 8:3.1, at 8-11 
to -13. 
 428. Adam Shell, Investors Add a Bit of Hedge Fund to Portfolio Mix, USA TODAY, Dec. 
8, 2006, at 1B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/funds/2006-12-
08-hedge-fund-strategy_x.htm. 
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explain their passivity.  In fact, although private equity funds may 
make such investments, they typically do not.429  Rather, when 
acquiring a company, they generally invest in its common stock in 
order to take control, or in preferred stock that is convertible into 
common.430  Additionally, venture capital funds also frequently 
acquire debentures or other debt securities.431  Each of these 
securities is, of course, a permissible form of investment under the 
Investment Company Act.  Thus, while the rules regarding 
permissible investments may appear to point to a potential distinction 
between public and private equity funds, in practice any such 
distinction is probably quite minor. 
C. Governance Rules 
The third category of legal rules that could explain the different 
investment strategies of public and private equity funds is the set of 
rules applicable to fund governance.  Rules regarding disclosure, for 
example, as well as rules relating to who is eligible to invest in a fund, 
differ markedly between public and private equity funds.  More 
importantly, rules regarding the permissibility of incentive fee 
arrangements differ, providing what appears to be the most likely 
explanation for the activist monitoring undertaken by private equity 
funds and the passivity that is prevalent among public equity funds.  
Each of these sets of rules is discussed separately below. 
1. Disclosure rules 
Private equity funds are typically structured so as to be exempt 
from all but the most basic of disclosure requirements.432  Mutual 
funds, on the other hand, must register with the SEC and make 
ongoing and extensive disclosures regarding their structure and 
                                                          
 429. Hedge funds that routinely invest in short sales and other derivative securities 
are expressly not categorized as private equity funds for purposes of this Article.  See 
supra notes 203–204 and accompanying text. 
 430. See LEVIN, supra note 187, ¶ 202, at 2-9 to -25 (outlining a venture capital 
fund’s preferred investment structure with respect to a hypothetical start-up 
transaction). 
 431. See id. (describing certain tax advantages that arise from holding debt rather 
than equity). 
 432. Private equity funds generally seek exemptions from the disclosure 
requirements of the Investment Company Act, the Investment Advisers Act, the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  SCHELL, supra note 
182, §§ 8.01-.04, at 8-3 to -45.  Admittedly, some funds do pursue strategies that 
require them to register under the Investment Advisers Act.  Id. § 8.02[3], at 8-23 to -
35.  However, under most circumstances, these disclosures require little substantive 
information from such advisers and no information regarding investment strategies 
or techniques or other similarly sensitive information.  Id. 
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operation.433  Pension funds have similarly extensive disclosure 
requirements.434  Despite these differences, however, disclosure rules 
appear largely unconnected to monitoring ability. 
Admittedly, the behavior of different fund managers might differ if 
they were required to disclose sensitive investment policies.  Thus, for 
example, secrecy may be very important for hedge funds that engage 
in proprietary trading strategies that could easily be copied by others 
with the same information.  In fact, such funds frequently decline to 
disclose their trading positions even to their own investors.435 
For most public and private equity funds, however, a requirement 
to disclose the types of transactions in which a fund seeks to invest 
would not seem particularly onerous given that the strategy itself is 
fairly obvious.  The value lies in the execution.  Thus, the risk of 
disclosure would seem unlikely to be significant.  Moreover, to the 
extent a public or private equity fund were to seek to acquire control 
of a public company, section 13(d) of the Securities Act would 
require prompt disclosure of its intention.436  Thus, again, the rules 
do not appear to operate in a manner that would privilege corporate 
monitoring activities by private equity funds over public equity funds.  
Their impact is instead mostly neutral. 
2. Eligible investor rules 
From a securities law standpoint, anyone can invest in a mutual 
fund or pension fund, regardless of their wealth or sophistication.437  
Private equity funds, on the other hand, in order to remain exempt 
from various regulations, generally limit their investors to those who 
                                                          
 433. See generally Michael Glazer, Prospectus Disclosure and Delivery Requirements, 
Shareholder Reports, in MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 412, at chs. 4–5 
(detailing the federal registration and prospectus disclosure requirements for mutual 
funds under the 1933 and 1934 Acts and discussing the requirements mutual funds 
must meet in providing reports to their shareholders). 
 434. See generally Peter O. Shinevar, W. Fulton Broemer & Jayne Zanglein, Reporting 
and Disclosure, in 1 ERISA BASICS D-1 to -57 (American Bar Association 2000) 
(outlining the reporting and disclosure requirements imposed on pension funds by 
ERISA and highlighting the requirements of the annual report provisions). 
 435. See SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 5, at 49–50 (noting that hedge fund 
managers frequently choose not to share securities positions and holdings with their 
own investors because such information does not benefit the investors and may 
compromise the hedge fund’s competitive advantage in the market). 
 436. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2000). 
 437. The one proviso to this is that the investor must be eligible to participate in 
the particular pension fund or mutual fund.  Thus, for example, if a pension fund is 
sponsored by General Motors, it is likely to be limited to employees of General 
Motors.  However, among those employees, there is no requirement that they be 
wealthy or sophisticated in order to participate. 
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are “qualified purchasers” (or at least “accredited investors”).438  
Participation in a private equity fund is therefore limited in practice 
to wealthy investors and fund insiders.  Most retail investors are 
ineligible.  In fact, many funds actually require their investors to 
satisfy wealth requirements that exceed the statutory minimums.439 
How this distinction impacts monitoring ability, however, is 
unclear.  One possibility is that private equity funds can take on 
greater risk because their more wealthy investors are likely to be 
better diversified and thus are better able to suffer a complete loss of 
their private equity investment.440  As this Article has demonstrated, 
however, a large public equity fund that devoted a portion of its assets 
to an active monitoring strategy could nevertheless remain 
completely diversified, thus diminishing the risk of a total loss.441  
Moreover, it would still be possible for a retail investor to allocate her 
assets partly to activist funds and partly to other asset categories.442 
Another possibility is that the smaller number and greater 
sophistication of private equity fund investors means that they will be 
superior monitors of the fund managers.  As a result, the fund 
managers can be trusted to take greater risks with the knowledge that 
their investors will not tolerate shirking.  However, this again appears 
to be more a function of market forces than an explanation for the 
variance in investment strategies.  If the alignment of interests 
between the fund managers and the fund investors is sufficiently 
great, the number of investors and their level of sophistication should 
be irrelevant.  Certainly, private equity funds have fewer and 
wealthier investors, but such difference on its own is insufficient to 
explain their aggressive oversight strategies nor the continued 
passivity of public equity funds. 
                                                          
 438. By limiting their investors to only “qualified purchasers,” private equity funds 
can qualify for an exemption pursuant to section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company 
Act.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2000).  Funds that prefer to take advantage of a 
different exemption from the Investment Company Act generally still require their 
investors to be “accredited” in order to be exempt from the Securities Act of 1933 
pursuant to rule 506 of Regulation D.  17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501, 230.506 (2007). 
 439. Others, however, are seeking to increase their size by reducing eligible 
investor requirements to the statutory minimum.  E.g., Eleanor Laise, Private Equity 
Targets Littler Guy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2006, at D1. 
 440. Indeed, most private equity funds require their investors, in order to be 
eligible, to represent that they are capable of suffering a complete loss of their 
investment. 
 441. See supra note 304 (recognizing the benefits of a diverse portfolio and 
realizing that holding shares in as few as eight companies may be sufficient to reap 
those benefits). 
 442. See id. (providing an example of how portfolios can be diverse and still find a 
balance between risky and more predictable investments). 
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3. Limits on incentive compensation 
Managers of mutual funds and pension funds face severe 
limitations on the types of fees they are permitted to charge.  These 
are imposed, respectively, by the Investment Advisers Act and ERISA.  
The goal of this policy is to minimize incentives for fund managers to 
take overly speculative risks with client savings.443  Private equity fund 
managers, by contrast, are subject to no such restrictions. 
Section 205(a)(1) of the Investment Advisers Act prohibits a 
registered investment adviser from receiving compensation “on the 
basis of a share of capital gains upon or capital appreciation of the 
funds or any portion of the funds of the client.”444  In general, this 
means that a manager of a mutual fund may not charge a fee based 
on the fund’s performance.445  Also prohibited by section 205(a)(1) 
are contingency fees.446  Instead, the manager would be limited to 
transaction fees and/or management fees that are based on the value 
of the assets being managed.  Although the SEC chose not to require 
that the fees be “reasonable,” as was once proposed, it did impose a 
fiduciary standard on fund managers when establishing the fees.447  As 
a result, mutual fund fees cannot be excessive. 
At the same time, although ERISA does not specifically prohibit 
performance fees, the Department of Labor has interpreted the Act 
as banning most incentive compensation arrangements that do not 
meet each of eight specified criteria.448  Most importantly for 
                                                          
 443. 2 FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 242, § 12.03[A], at 12-59.  Interestingly, 
prior to 1970, performance fees were common among advisers to institutional 
investors.  INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 92-64, pt. 2, at 254 (1971).  It was not until 1970 that 
Congress applied the Investment Advisers Act to advisers of mutual funds.  2 FRANKEL 
& SCHWING, supra note 242, § 12.03[F], at 12-106.6 to -109. 
 444. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1) (2000).  Note, however, that fees based on a 
percentage of the assets under management are not deemed to be “on the basis of a 
share of . . . capital appreciation,” even though the fees would necessarily increase as 
the account appreciates.  Id.; KIRSCH, supra note 230, § 9:4.3[A], at 9-16. 
 445. Note, however, that this section does not prohibit fees based on other 
measures of performance.  KIRSCH, supra note 230, § 9:4, at 9-6. 
 446. See Contingent Advisory Compensation Arrangements, 45 Fed. Reg. 34,876 
(May 23, 1980) (interpreting the Investment Advisers Act as not allowing managers 
to collect commissions); see also Trainer, Wortham & Co., Froley, Revy Inv. Co., 
Starbuck, Tisdale & Assoc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 3127379, at *1, 2004 SEC 
No-Act. LEXIS 925, at *8 (Dec. 6, 2004). 
 447. See generally 2 FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 242, § 12.03[D], at 12-76 to -97 
(explaining that the fiduciary duty standard is one of common-law reasonableness 
and discussing factors that must be considered to determine if fees comply with this 
standard). 
 448. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., Dep’t. of Labor Op. 89-31A, 1989 ERISA LEXIS 
29, 1989 WL 224560 (Oct. 11, 1989); BDN Advisers Inc., Dept. of Labor Op. 86-20A, 
1986 ERISA LEXIS 9, 1986 WL 38857 (Aug. 29, 1986); Batterymarch Financial 
Management, Dept. of Labor Op. 86-21A, 1986 ERISA LEXIS 8, 1986 WL 38858 
(Aug. 29, 1986). 
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corporate governance purposes, the compensation must be based on 
the net appreciation of plan assets during a pre-established valuation 
period.449  In other words, pension fund managers, like the managers 
of mutual funds, are generally prohibited from charging 
performance-based fees. 
There are two exceptions to the general prohibition against 
performance fees that apply in the mutual fund context.  The first is 
for funds that limit their membership to “qualified clients.”450  These 
include individuals and companies (not including other mutual 
funds) with a net worth in excess of $1.5 million or at least $750,000 
under the management of the investment adviser.451  For purposes of 
this exception, each investor in a mutual fund would need to satisfy 
the wealth requirements in order for the manager to charge a 
performance fee.452  The second is for so-called “fulcrum fee” 
arrangements, which permit the manager of a mutual fund to adjust 
the base advisory fee depending on how the fund performs relative to 
a stipulated market index.453  The key to the fulcrum fee is that the 
percentage charged cannot merely increase when performance 
exceeds expectations—it must also decrease proportionately when 
performance lags.454 
These exceptions have relatively little impact on the ability of 
public equity funds to engage in a strategy of active corporate 
governance, however.  In the first place, in order to qualify for the 
wealth exception, a mutual fund would have to refuse subscriptions 
from all but highly wealthy investors.  Given that the primary purpose 
(and value) of most mutual funds is to invest retail dollars, this 
                                                          
 449. See KIRSCH, supra note 230, § 9:5, at 9-21 to -22 (listing the other criteria set 
forth by the Department of Labor as:  (1) the plan assets must be large; 
(2) investment should be in securities with available market quotations; (3) when 
market quotations for securities are not available, valuation must be done by a third 
party; (4) arrangement must comply with Advisers Act rule 205-3; (5) a sophisticated 
fiduciary must approve the compensation agreement; (6) the agreement must be 
reasonable; and (7) compensation payments must be predetermined). 
 450. 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(a) (2007).  This rule was amended in 1998 to remove 
several additional requirements for advisers to qualified clients, including the 
requirement that the advisory contract be negotiated at arm’s length, and to increase 
the dollar thresholds.  KIRSCH, supra note 230, § 9:4.3[C], at 9-19 to -20. 
 451. 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(d)(1) (2007).  It also includes individuals and entities 
that qualify as “qualified purchasers” under the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-2(a)(51)(A) (2000), as well as individuals who are officers or directors of the 
mutual fund.  17 C.F.R. §§ 275.205-3(d)(ii)(B), 275.205-3(d)(1)(iii) (2007). 
 452. 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(b) (2007). 
 453. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(2) (2000).  This exception was created in 1970, at the 
same time that the general prohibition against incentive compensation was extended 
to mutual fund advisers.  DIV. OF INV. MGMT., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PROTECTING 
INVESTORS:  A HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 238 (1992). 
 454. KIRSCH, supra note 230, § 9:4.3[B], at 9-16 to -17. 
  
320 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:225 
prospect appears neither practical nor desirable.  In fact, such a 
requirement would effectively convert a mutual fund into a private 
equity fund.  In the second place, fulcrum fees are in practice 
generally limited to much smaller percentages than a typical carried 
interest.455  In addition, the SEC has promulgated extensive 
regulations regarding when such fees may be considered fair.456  As a 
result, their impact on monitoring ability is severely muted.457 
Mutual funds generally charge their shareholders two types of 
fees.458  Sales loads are a type of brokerage fee intended to 
compensate financial advisers for a particular transaction.459  They are 
paid either at the time of purchase (front loads) or occasionally when 
the shares are redeemed (back loads).  However, as more and more 
investors have purchased mutual funds through employer-sponsored 
savings plans, sales loads have decreased in frequency and amount; 
hence, their significance has generally waned.460  More common are 
fees for ongoing expenses.  These are paid from fund assets, rather 
than directly by the shareholders, and tend to decrease as the fund 
achieves economies of scale.461  Total mutual fund fees—ongoing 
expenses plus an annualized portion of any sales loads—decreased 
from an average of 2.32% of fund assets in 1980 to 1.07% of fund 
assets in 2006.462 
Pension fund managers are generally limited to fees for ongoing 
expenses.  This is because transaction fees of the kind charged by 
mutual funds would likely violate ERISA’s strict prohibition against 
                                                          
 455. 2 FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 242, § 12.03[A], at 12-59. 
 456. See generally id. § 12.03[F][5], at 12-118 to -122 (expanding upon the factors 
the SEC considers to determine the fairness of fees, including, generally, the fairness 
of the fulcrum fee, the index used to determine performance for the fulcrum fee, 
and the time period over which performance is calculated). 
 457. See Eisinger, supra note 13, at C1 (noting that, as of 2005, only three percent 
of mutual funds charged a performance fee and that such funds accounted for less 
than eight percent of all mutual fund assets). 
 458. See 2 FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 242, § 12.03[A], at 12-58 to -61 
(discussing the development of “wrap fee” arrangements and other advisory fees).  
See generally James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures:  A 
Behavioral Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907 (2005) (providing a recent analysis of 
mutual fund fees). 
 459. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 22, 47. 
 460. See id. at 48 (finding the growth of no-load funds and increased competition 
in the mutual fund industry as additional causes of the decline in the use of sales 
loads). 
 461. Id. at 47–48, 52.  Fees for ongoing expenses typically include an advisory fee, 
an administrative fee, and so-called 12b-1 fees designed to offset the costs of 
marketing and distribution of fund shares.  John Howat & Linda Reid, Compensation 
Practices for Retail Sale of Mutual Funds:  The Need for Transparency and Disclosure, 12 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 685, 693–96 (2007). 
 462. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 47. 
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related party transactions.463  Thus, most pension fund managers 
receive a salary or other compensation based on a percentage of the 
assets under management.464 
Both of these structures are in sharp contrast to the compensation 
paid to private equity fund managers.  As was discussed in greater 
detail above, private equity funds typically charge their investors a 
carried interest that represents a twenty-percent equity stake in any 
profits that result from the fund’s investments.465  Although in many 
cases the twenty-percent fee applies to all of the fund’s profits, many 
larger and more successful funds apply the carried interest only to 
the extent fund profits exceed a specified benchmark rate.466  In fact, 
this appears increasingly to be the trend in private equity fund 
formation.  Either way, if the fund does not yield profits (or profits 
above the level of the benchmark), then the fund’s managers receive 
no compensation.467  On the other hand, to the extent the fund is 
successful, the carried interest can create significant wealth for the 
managers.468  Thus, there are strong and direct incentives for 
managers to enhance fund performance. 
                                                          
 463. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000); Donald J. Myers & Michael B. Richman, Class 
Exemptions from Prohibited Transactions, in ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 319, at 
267–68, 283–94.  This restriction would also apply to transaction, consulting and 
other fees that many private equity fund managers charge their target companies as 
compensation for brokering a leveraged buyout.  Supra notes 276–280 and 
accompanying text.  Thus, a pension fund that engaged in a leveraged buyout would 
not have access to such fees, thereby decreasing its overall profit from the deal.  On 
the other hand, the same underlying economics could probably be achieved by 
simply adjusting the parties’ allocation of profits.  Moreover, investors have 
increasingly demanded that most or all of such fees be paid to the investors rather 
than retained by the fund managers.  MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 19–24. 
 464. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 862–66 (discussing the compensation of external 
fund managers); John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees:  
The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 627–32 (2001) (finding that mutual 
fund managers receive fees double the amount of those received by pension fund 
managers). 
 465. See supra Part II.D (expanding upon the use of carried interest to compensate 
managers and explaining how such a system aligns manager’s interests with those of 
investors and provides incentive for high-yield investments). 
 466. See supra notes 269–271 and accompanying text (explaining that the use of 
such benchmarks ensures that private equity fund managers do not benefit from 
general market movements and will only receive their share of profit after the 
“hurdle rate” is met). 
 467. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.  However, private equity funds 
also typically charge a management fee intended to cover the fund’s expenses.  See 
supra notes 273–275 and accompanying text (noting that private equity fund 
managers usually charge a management fee of two to three percent).  Thus, although 
fund managers are unlikely to profit from an underperforming fund, they are also 
unlikely to suffer a loss. 
 468. See Taub, supra note 9, at 42 (reporting that the highest paid hedge fund 
manager received $1.7 billion in annual compensation in 2006); see also Jenny 
Anderson, Blackstone Founders Due Billions, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2007, at C1 (reporting 
that the two founders of the private equity fund are due to receive approximately $8 
  
322 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:225 
The ability to charge incentive compensation goes straight to the 
issue of incentives—as opposed to barriers—and so appears to be the 
key difference that explains why private equity funds pursue an 
activist investment strategy while public equity funds shun most such 
monitoring activities.469  Much like the stock options granted to 
corporate management, a carried interest generates significant 
incentives to improve performance.470  It therefore appears that 
private equity fund managers monitor and discipline corporate 
managers because they are paid by their investors to do so.471  Public 
equity fund managers receive no such compensation and so have no 
such incentive. 
If public equity fund managers are not incentivized by their 
compensation structure to engage in monitoring, the question 
remains what are their incentives.  Part V explores the incentives 
created by a system of flat fees. 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNANCE REFORM 
In Parts III and IV, I drew the preliminary conclusion that the key 
distinction that explains the different approaches that public and 
private equity funds take to monitoring is the general prohibition 
against incentive compensation for the managers of mutual funds 
and pension funds.  This finding would have important implications 
for corporate governance.  In particular, it suggests that if 
policymakers were to deregulate fund manager fees—while at the 
same time adjusting any regulations that might limit the exercise of 
institutional investor control—the behavior of public equity funds 
might change.472  Indeed, were their managers incentivized to pursue 
                                                          
billion and $2 billion, respectively, as a result of the fund’s IPO); Henny Sender, How 
Blackstone Will Divvy Up Its IPO Riches, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2007, at C1 (noting that 
the two founders will receive over $9 billion in stock in connection with their firm’s 
IPO); Henny Sender & Monica Langley, How Blackstone’s Chief Became $7 Billion Man, 
WALL ST. J., June 13, 2007, at A1 (same).  To put these amounts in perspective, 
consider by comparison that the highest paid corporate CEO in 2006, Apple 
Computer’s Steve Jobs, received a mere $650 million.  Big Paychecks, FORBES, May 21, 
2007, at 112. 
 469. See LEVIN, supra note 187, ¶ 103, at 1-3 to -6 (characterizing incentive 
compensation as a primary distinguishing factor of private equity investing). 
 470. Unlike corporate stock options, however, a carried interest is more difficult 
to manipulate and is more closely tied to actual firm performance.  See supra note 272 
(noting that a lack of similar restrictions on stock options presents a greater 
opportunity for fraud). 
 471. See SCHELL, supra note 182, § 1.02[3], at 1-12 to -14 (noting that private equity 
funds are structured to maximize the alignment of interest between a fund’s 
managers and its equity investors). 
 472. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1362–63 (recommending that pension fund fees 
be deregulated in order to encourage more activist investment strategies). 
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control acquisitions of underperforming companies, they might 
evolve into the active corporate monitors that many have hoped they 
would become.473  Even better, they might help to foster a deeper 
market for good corporate governance. 
Part V.A therefore explores the incentives that the legal 
prohibition against incentive compensation creates for public equity 
fund managers.  In it, I conclude that the legal framework plays a 
significant role in shaping their incentives and that efforts to alter the 
framework could in fact help to foster a deeper and more active 
market for corporate control.  Indeed, from a corporate governance 
standpoint, the current regulatory regime creates exactly the wrong 
incentives for public equity fund managers, encouraging them to 
shun monitoring rather than to embrace it. 
Finally, Part V.B reviews the corporate governance implications of 
the existing incentives.  In it, I conclude that one impact of 
regulatory efforts aimed at deregulating public equity fund 
compensation would be to deepen and intensify the market for 
corporate monitoring. 
A. Existing Incentives for Fund Managers 
Like corporations, mutual funds and pension funds are themselves 
fictional legal entities that suffer from their own internal agency 
costs.  The interests of a fund’s managers, in other words, may differ 
from the interests of a fund’s investors, often substantially.474  Thus, in 
order to understand the monitoring and investment behavior of 
public equity funds, one must first consider the incentives facing the 
individuals who manage such funds.  Presumably, such individuals 
will seek to maximize their level of compensation, even if their 
conduct is partially at odds with the best interests of the fund.475  
Simply removing barriers to the exercise of influence is therefore 
unlikely to change fund behavior, as some have suggested, unless 
there are adequate incentives for managers to expend the time and 
resources necessary to discipline corporate managers.476  It is not 
                                                          
 473. See id. at 1366–67 (concluding that pension funds could be an  optimal 
corporate monitor if given the proper incentive through deregulation); Black, supra 
note 11, at 815–16 (arguing that with the proper reforms and deregulation, public 
equity funds could cooperate to act as institutional monitors). 
 474. Rock, supra note 1, at 469–72. 
 475. See id. (noting that public fund managers face many competing interests—
including pressure from corporate managers and/or state and local governments—
and fund managers often choose to advance their own interests rather than acting 
for the collective good). 
 476. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 173, at 234–38 (discussing the incentives of 
pension fund managers).  But see Black, supra note 11, at 873 (“Money managers will 
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enough that funds be capable of monitoring.  The fund managers 
must also desire to monitor. 
The general subject of money manager incentives is not a new one 
and much ground has previously been covered.477  My goal in Part V.A 
is therefore not to revisit all of the overlapping incentives facing fund 
managers, but to focus on those related to the structure of their 
compensation.  To the extent their fees create disincentives for 
monitoring, this would bolster my tentative conclusion in Parts III 
and IV that deregulating such fees would encourage fund managers 
to reshape mutual funds and public pension funds into active 
corporate monitors. 
The managers of mutual funds and pension funds, as was 
previously noted, generally charge their clients a fee based on the 
assets that they manage.478  Thus, regardless of the manager’s 
performance, a larger fund means a larger fee.479  In other words, 
mutual funds are primarily aggregators of capital.  For purposes of 
corporate governance, then, fund managers will be incentivized to 
engage in oversight activities only to the extent they believe that their 
efforts will lead to a larger pool of assets and, thus, a larger 
management fee.  Monitoring is expensive, burdensome, and at times 
risky.480  Unless they believe that they can profit personally from an 
active investment strategy, fund managers will continue to pursue 
passive diversification. 
There are two basic methods for public equity funds to achieve 
asset growth, neither of which hold much promise for improved 
corporate governance.  First, they can realize growth by generating 
increased profits, provided those profits are reinvested in the fund.481  
Second, they can realize growth by attracting new investors (or 
                                                          
surely do more monitoring if legal reform facilitates institutional voice.  The only 
question is how much more.”). 
 477. See, e.g., BAUMOL, GOLDFELD, GORDON & KOEHN, supra note 411, at ch. 5 
(contemplating whether the competitive nature of the market is enough to drive 
managers to act in accordance with investor interests or if regulation is needed to 
monitor manager behavior); Black, supra note 11, at 873–82 (asserting that public 
equity fund money managers have some incentives to monitor, including the desire 
to perform well, to receive peer recognition, and to gain positive publicity for high 
returns); Coffee, supra note 2, at 1362–66 (arguing in favor of incentive 
compensation for pension fund managers). 
 478. See generally supra Part IV.C.3 (explaining that public fund managers are 
severely restricted by the Investment Advisers Act and ERISA from charging fees 
based on performance). 
 479. Due to scale economies, however, the relative size of the fee decreases as the 
size of the fund increases.  Coffee, supra note 2, at 1362–63. 
 480. Black, supra note 2, at 523. 
 481. Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Competition and Change in the Mutual Fund 
Industry, in FINANCIAL SERVICES:  PERSPECTIVES AND CHALLENGES 181, 182 (Samuel L. 
Hayes III ed., 1993). 
  
2007] WHAT HEDGE FUNDS CAN TEACH CORPORATE AMERICA 325 
additional dollars from existing investors).482  In fact, given that the 
true role played by public equity funds in financial markets is simply 
to aggregate investments at a low cost and so efficiently provide the 
benefits of diversification to retail investors, the real incentive for 
public equity fund managers may be to focus on cost-cutting.483  These 
issues are discussed in turn below. 
Note, however, that the subject is made somewhat cloudier by the 
fact that many funds effectively subcontract many of their investment 
decisions to numerous outside managers.484  Thus, the incentives of 
these sub-managers may differ at times from those of the managers 
ultimately charged with a fund’s administration.  Still, for corporate 
governance purposes, it is the incentives of those ultimately in 
control that count.485  If the senior managers see value in monitoring, 
they will direct the behavior of their sub-managers accordingly.  
Likewise, if they view monitoring as a distraction or unnecessary cost, 
their instructions to their sub-managers will reflect this attitude as 
well. 
1. Profit growth 
Profits, of course, will lead to a larger fund and yield a larger fee.  
Thus, for example, if a $1 billion fund were to grow by five percent 
due to the investment decisions of its managers, the fund would 
thenceforth have assets totaling $1.05 billion and the management 
fee would increase proportionately.  Note, however, that such growth 
only occurs if the profits are reinvested in the fund.  Were the 
additional monies to be withdrawn from the fund in the form of a 
dividend or other distribution, then the managers’ successful 
investment would have no impact on the size of the fund (and hence 
on the size of their annual management fee). 
A strategy of profit growth, however, is unlikely to lead to any 
significant amount of monitoring.  If one assumes an annual 
management fee in the range of one percent, the addition of $50 
million in the example above would thenceforth increase the annual 
                                                          
 482. Alan Rosenblat & Martin E. Lybecker, Some Thoughts on the Federal Securities 
Laws Regulating External Investment Management Arrangements and the ALI Federal 
Securities Code Project, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 587, 594 (1976). 
 483. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 10–11, 143; see also supra 
note 34 and accompanying text. 
 484. See generally Rock, supra note 1, at 464–78 (examining the agency costs 
associated with intermediaries and questioning whether agents’ interests are aligned 
with their principals’ interests). 
 485. But see Coffee, supra note 12, at 845, 862–66 (arguing that the important 
agency problem is not at the corporate manager level, but at the financial 
intermediary level). 
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management fee payable to the fund’s managers by only $500,000.  A 
change in investment strategy that produces a five percent return—
such as a decision to become an active monitor of the fund’s 
investment portfolio—is therefore profitable only to the extent it 
costs the fund managers less than $500,000 to produce.486  Given that 
mutual funds may hold as many as a thousand different stocks at any 
given time, $500,000 would be likely to purchase only the most 
general level of oversight for any one company.487  It is uncertain, 
however, whether such minimal monitoring could produce enough 
of a boost to performance to justify the expense. 
In fact, the likelihood that fund managers will provide oversight 
over any one company becomes even smaller when one considers 
that the fund is unlikely to own more than five percent of any such 
company.488  Thus, if a mutual fund tried to discipline a $1 billion 
manufacturing company of which it held four percent, and if such 
efforts doubled the value of the company—an unlikely scenario to be 
sure—the mutual fund would only garner four percent of the extra 
$1 billion, or $40 million.  Thus, the result of this incredible 
achievement would be to add $400,000 to the annual management 
fee.  If, however, such efforts yielded a more realistic ten percent 
increase in the value of the manufacturing company, the fund would 
receive only $4 million for its efforts and the management fee would 
increase by a mere $40,000.  Considering that a contentious proxy 
contest can easily cost upwards of seven figures,489 such numbers 
suggest that there is little incentive for fund managers to engage in 
costly—not to mention uncertain—monitoring when they personally 
have so little to gain.490  Rather, they are likely to see greater value in a 
                                                          
 486. Of course, if the gain accrues on an annual basis, the effort to monitor would 
be worthwhile to the extent the current expense is less than the present value of the 
future stream of profits.  Thus, permanent improvements gained through 
monitoring can justify a much higher expenditure on oversight than temporary or 
one-time improvements. 
 487. This may account for the scholarly interest in promoting institutional 
investor voice, as opposed to control, and in utilizing economies of scale to achieve 
greater monitoring. 
 488. See Black, supra note 2, at 530 (“Owning 5% is easy if you’re passive; hard if 
you’re active.  Owning 10% is hard even if you’re passive, but much harder if you’re 
active.”). 
 489. The average contest is estimated to range between $250,000 and $1 million.  
Bratton, supra note 10, at 1403.  Meanwhile, the recent proxy fight over the merger 
of Hewlett-Packard and Compaq is estimated to have cost over $100 million.  Lohr, 
supra note 351, at 31. 
 490. In contrast, a private equity fund manager earning a twenty-percent fee 
would have received an $8 million fee in the first example and an $800,000 fee in the 
second. 
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more passive investment strategy, selling—rather than reforming—
investments that turn sour. 
Of course, one might object to these examples by suggesting that 
many mutual fund complexes are much larger, thereby increasing 
the magnitude of even minor fluctuations in value.  A $1 trillion 
mutual fund complex, for example, might be able to absorb the cost 
of a little monitoring, even if a $1 billion fund might not be.  
Moreover, as Black and others have suggested, certain types of 
oversight—such as monitoring board composition and structure—
might lend themselves to economies of scale.491 
The point of these observations, however, is not to suggest that 
there are no incentives to increase profits.  Surely, such incentives do 
exist.  Rather, the point is that such incentives are unlikely to be large 
or transparent, even to sophisticated fund managers.  The results of 
monitoring will be both uncertain and uneven, but their costs 
immediate and concrete.  Therefore, in a world of flat fees, even 
those fund managers who are inclined to take a more active role in 
oversight must conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether 
such efforts are likely to be rewarded. 
2. Growth through advertising 
Public equity fund managers can also achieve growth by 
substituting advertising for profits.  This is because the size of the 
fund will increase as it attracts new investors or additional capital 
contributions from existing investors.  For example, if the average 
mutual fund investor maintains a balance of $48,000, then the 
addition of ten new investors through advertising would contribute 
$480,000 to the fund’s assets, thereby adding an additional $4,800 to 
its annual management fee.492  New capital, in other words, leads to 
increased fees for the fund managers just as surely as do increased 
profits.  The only question is the relative cost and impact of 
advertising, something knowable only on a case-by-case basis. 
Certainly, fund performance—achieved in some cases through 
better monitoring—matters for advertising.  This is especially true for 
those investors who compare data on results when selecting an 
investment fund.493  In this way, a fund’s profits might be used to 
                                                          
 491. Black, supra note 2, at 580–84, 589–91. 
 492. See INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 57 (reporting that the 
median amount households with mutual funds invest in them is $48,000). 
 493. For a discussion of this relationship, see generally Rock, supra note 1, at 445.  
See also Prem C. Jian & Joanna Shuang Wu, Truth in Mutual Fund Advertising:  Evidence 
of Future Performance and Fund Flows, 55 J. FIN. 937, 938 (2000) (noting that 
  
328 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:225 
signal the quality of its managers and thus retain current investors or 
attract new ones.494  It would be difficult, therefore, for a fund to 
completely ignore performance. 
An advertising campaign, however, does not need to be linked 
entirely to performance data in order to be successful in attracting 
additional capital.  Instead, a fund may attempt to attract new 
investors based on its perceived reputation for integrity, its particular 
investment strategy, or some other unusual or defining 
characteristic.495  It is also possible for investors to be swayed by the 
same type of advertising techniques that are used by Madison Avenue 
to sell other products.  Were this not the case, we would see fewer 
television commercials featuring famous spokespeople from the 
1960s as well as graphics and music that are so obviously intended to 
appeal to the crucial Baby Boom generation.496  In fact, there is 
                                                          
advertisements can provide investors with information as they decide where to place 
their money). 
 494. Several empirical studies suggest that mutual funds increase their advertising 
following a year with strong performance.  Cf. id. at 937 (finding funds that advertise 
perform better than those that do not advertise). 
 495. TD Waterhouse, for example, which recently merged with Ameritrade, has 
used several actors from the TV drama Law & Order as spokesmen in order to sell a 
reputation for fair and honest dealing.  The first, Steven Hill, played the role of 
Manhattan District Attorney (“DA”).  More recently, Sam Waterston, who portrayed 
the DA’s chief prosecutor, has taken over the role.  See Gothamist.com, Sam 
Waterston TV Commercial, http://gothamist.com/2003/11/18/sam_waterston_tv_c 
ommercial.php (Nov. 18, 2003) (last visited Oct. 26, 2007). 
 496. Appeals to the Baby Boom generation through references to the pop culture 
of the 1960s and 1970s have become de rigueur in mutual fund advertising.  For 
example, one television commercial currently airing for Ameriprise Financial 
features an aging Dennis Hopper—an actor best known for his role as Billy in the 
1969 counter-cultural road film “Easy Rider”—standing in a field of yellow flowers 
while music from The Spencer Davis Group’s 1967 hit “Gimme Some Lovin’” plays 
loudly in the background.  Its tag line:  “Flower power was then.  Your dreams are 
now.”  See Ameriprise Financial, Commercial:  Wildflower, http://www.ameriprise.co 
m/amp/global/about-ameriprise/commercials.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).  
Another television commercial—this one for Fidelity Investments—plays The 
Zombies’ 1968 single “Time of the Season” while various slogans and tag lines float 
by on the bubbles of what turns out to be a lava lamp.  See YouTube.com, Fidelity 
Investments “Time of the Season” Ad (2005), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3jjV 
kuTZBrA (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).  Still another Fidelity commercial shows rate and 
fee information on a background of psychedelic flowers while Iron Butterfly plays 
their 1968 rock anthem—the first ever to be awarded a Platinum album—In-A-
Gadda-Da-Vita.  Its tag line:  “Need a little flower power?  Our retirement specialists 
can help.”  See YouTube.com, Animated Flowers,  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
chIgcMqdK_k (last visited Oct. 1, 2007); see also Michael Stetz, Iron Butterfly’s in an 
IRA Ad?  Bummer, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 2, 2006, at B1, available at 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060402/news_1m2iron.html 
(quoting the band’s drummer, Ron Bushy, now 64, as saying “I guess the method to 
their madness is that all the baby boomers who got stoned listening to that song are 
now all grown up and have money”). 
For a parody of this trend, see Diane Rohde, There’s No More Reassuring Voice in 
Retirement Planning than Dennis Hopper, THE ONION, May 30, 2007, http://www.th 
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empirical evidence to suggest that the size of investments in mutual 
funds is largely unrelated to their level of performance.497  The one 
main exception to this observation is for the best-performing funds, 
exactly the ones most likely to attract capital from investors who 
closely track the data.498 
More importantly, as an advertising device, profits matter only on a 
relative basis, not an absolute one.  How well a fund performed in a 
given period is irrelevant.  What matters is whether the fund 
outperformed its competitors.499  Or, to be more exact, what matters 
is that mutual fund and pension fund investors be unaware of 
differences in performance.  So long as a fund’s results are roughly 
equivalent to those of its competitors, performance ceases to be a 
distinguishing characteristic.500  In fact, a cynic might interpret the 
fragmentation of most large mutual fund complexes into 
multitudinous sub-funds and share classes as a means for impeding 
easy comparisons of returns.501  So many data points, each fluctuating 
constantly, remove the transparency that might otherwise be present 
in mutual fund returns.502 
What this ascendancy of advertising over performance means for 
corporate governance is that public equity fund managers are 
unlikely to see much value in attempts to compete based on their 
ability to bring discipline to corporate managers.  Why expend the 
                                                          
eonion.com/content/opinion/theres_no_more_reassuring_voice. (last visited Oct. 
1, 2007) (“Dennis Hopper’s television spots for Ameriprise Financial are so 
reassuring . . . . When I hear him in those commercials, it’s the familiar voice of a 
coke-dealing, LSD-fueled hippie cowboy biker putting me at ease.”). 
 497. Sirri & Tufano, supra note 481, at 190. 
 498. See id. (noting that consumers tend to react to very high performance but not 
very low performance). 
 499. See Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN. 
1589, 1620 (1998) (finding that consumer reaction to fund performance is stronger 
for funds which spend more on marketing). 
 500. See Sirri & Tufano, supra note 481, at 190–98 (identifying new products, 
distribution methods and low fees as differentiation strategies). 
 501. At the end of 2006, for example, there were 8,120 U.S. mutual funds offering 
investors 21,260 share classes, or an average of 2.6 share classes per fund.  
INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 93.  Moreover, the average fund 
complex sponsors many sub-funds.  Vanguard, for example, offers its investors no 
fewer than three hundred investment choices.  Vanguard.com, Find Similar 
Vanguard Funds, https://personal.vanguard.com/VGApp/hnw/funds/tools/findsi 
milarfund (last visited Oct. 1, 2007). 
 502. Indeed, empirical studies suggest that investors are very slow to redeem their 
shares after periods of substandard performance.  See, e.g., Richard A. Ippolito, 
Consumer Reaction to Measures of Poor Quality:  Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry, 35 
J.L. & ECON. 45, 61 (1992) (reporting a 0.35% decrease in growth rate following poor 
fund performance compared to a 0.90% increase in growth rate following high 
positive performance); Sirri & Tufano, supra note 499  (explaining that gathering 
and analyzing data about mutual funds requires consumer time and effort and 
analyzing the consumer costs associated with investment decision making). 
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resources on risky and uncertain monitoring when the results may 
have no more of an effect on the managers’ compensation than does 
their spokesperson’s particular karma with Baby Boomers?503  
Admittedly, the best funds are probably those that privilege 
performance above all else.  However, at a minimum, this ability to 
hide lackluster results in a slick advertising campaign mutes the 
incentives to engage in active oversight. 
3. Incentives to cut costs 
The ability to attract new capital through advertising may also tend 
to shift the focus of fund managers away from performance and onto 
cost.  This is because comparing performance is difficult, while 
comparing fees is not.  For one thing, profits fluctuate from period to 
period, as do general economic conditions.  Even personnel may 
change.504  Keeping up with such changes may be an enjoyable 
diversion for some, and may seem like second nature to finance 
professionals, but is likely to be beyond the capacity and interest of 
most public equity fund investors.505  Moreover, each of these factors 
is exacerbated by the plethora of options now available to investors, 
even within the same family of funds.  An informal review of the 
Vanguard website, for example, shows hundreds of sub-funds, each of 
which can be combined at various percentage levels with other sub-
funds, and most of which have multiple asset classes.506  Choice, in 
other words, can become bewildering.  Even those investors who are 
sophisticated enough to slog their way through the performance data 
face a significant challenge.  As we lawyers are fond of reminding 
people, past performance is not a guarantee of future profits.507 
                                                          
 503. Fidelity Investments took 1960s nostalgia to its logical extreme when it hired 
former Beatles singer and songwriter Sir Paul McCartney to be its chief spokesperson 
in 2005.  Jenn Abelson, Brand on the Run, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 8, 2005, at F1; see 
YouTube.com, [Ads] – Superbowl 2006 – Fidelity Investments – This is Paul, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oyJ_w15D8kk (last visited Oct. 1, 2007). 
 504. See Jennifer Levitz, When a Fund Manager Leaves Investors Fret—For Good Reason, 
WALL ST. J., June 4, 2007, at R1 (reporting that “manager musical chairs,” in the 
words of one investor, is a common concern among mutual fund investors). 
 505. This may be one reason for the growth of funds of funds:  investment funds 
that diversify not by acquiring a portfolio of securities but by acquiring a portfolio of 
other investment funds.  See INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 26 
(noting that U.S.-registered funds of funds have increased from 45 in 1996 to 604 in 
2006, while their assets have increased over the same period from $13 billion to $471 
billion). 
 506. Vanguard.com, Find Similar Vanguard Funds, https://personal.vanguard.co 
m/VGApp/hnw/funds/tools/findsimilarfund (last visited Oct. 1, 2007). 
 507. It is, of course, common practice in the securities industry to print such 
warnings in boldface or other large-type on the cover of offering documents. 
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Indeed, this focus on cost appears to be bolstered by the revolution 
in corporate finance that has taken place over the past few decades.  
According to the efficient capital markets hypothesis, markets for 
many corporate securities are sufficiently liquid as to be efficient.508  
The implication of this finding is that for large, widely followed 
stocks, the price incorporates all of the available information and 
thus its future direction will be random.509  The price, in other words, 
is a consensus price that cannot be consistently bested by an investor 
unless that investor has access to information that the market lacks.510 
The underlying lesson for retail investors is therefore roughly as 
follows:  You cannot consistently beat the market, and neither can 
your financial adviser.511  Thus, you should avoid paying a high fee for 
investment advisory services that cannot be rendered.  Instead, you 
should seek out a reputable firm and invest your savings in a safe, low-
cost, diversified public equity fund.512 
The focus of mutual fund advertising on the size of fees rather than 
on the quality of returns thus appears to have some basis in sound 
economic theory.  Proof that investors have learned this lesson can be 
found not only in the nature of fund advertising but also in the 
explosion of index funds and ETFs, which expressly shun active 
management.513  Rather than seek to achieve profit growth through 
stock picking acumen, they embrace the lessons of the efficient 
capital markets hypothesis and reject any efforts to actively follow 
                                                          
 508. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 309, at 324 (noting that the article in which 
the theory first appeared was Maurice G. Kendall, The Analysis of Economic Time-Series, 
Part I:  Prices, 96 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 11 (1953)).  Harry Roberts has identified three 
forms of the efficient capital markets hypothesis:  weak, semistrong, and strong.  Id. 
§ 13-2, at 329.  See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic 
Crashes:  The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 546, 551–70 (1994) (tracing the history and development of the efficient capital 
market theory). 
 509. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 309, at 328 (explaining that since prices are 
based on all relevant information, they change when new information is available 
and the unpredictability of this new information’s arrival makes the changes 
unpredictable). 
 510. Id. at 336 (noting that, although there is disagreement at the margins, “we 
believe that there is now widespread agreement that capital markets function well 
and that opportunities for easy profits are rare”). 
 511. See id. at 337 (“In an efficient market you can trust prices, for they impound 
all available information about the value of each security.  This means that in an 
efficient market there is no way for most investors to achieve consistently superior 
rates of return.  To do so, you not only need to know more than anyone else; you 
need to know more than everyone else.”). 
 512. See id. at 344 (“In an efficient market investors will not pay others for what 
they can do equally well themselves.”). 
 513. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 34–35. 
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their investments.514  Instead, they purchase a portfolio of stocks 
intended to mimic the results of some market index or category, such 
as the S&P 500 or the Nasdaq.  Their chief value is not in exceeding 
the returns of actively managed funds, but in mirroring them at a 
lower cost.515  Currently, it is estimated that over ten percent of equity 
fund assets—more than $1 trillion—are held by index funds.516 
Cost cutting, of course, is anathema to monitoring.  Even if 
corporate oversight were to become less costly and burdensome as a 
result of proxy reform, some risk and expense would always remain.  
Thus, even those public equity fund managers who might be inclined 
to discipline errant corporate managers would be faced with the 
question of whether the lower cost route of exit would be preferable.  
In fact, for an index fund, any effort to actively manage investments is 
counter to its stated goal of mimicking the market.  Thus, 
monitoring, however cheap and easy it may become as a result of 
proposed legal reforms,517 is unlikely to coexist comfortably with a 
regime characterized by competition over low fees. 
B. The Promise of Public Equity Fund Oversight 
As demonstrated by Part V.A, public equity fund managers are not 
paid to monitor their investments.  They are paid to attract new 
capital through a combination of advertising and cost-cutting.  So 
long as a fund’s profits are in the vicinity of those of its competitors, 
performance—and hence monitoring—matters to public equity fund 
managers only to the extent it provides fodder for further advertising. 
Indeed, there is a sort of symbiosis among profits, advertising and 
cost-cutting.  Low costs and high profits are both worthy ends in their 
own right, but both also provide fuel for advertising campaigns.  
Advertising, for its part, can be used to signal the high quality of a 
fund’s investments or to obscure less-than-inspiring results.  By 
restricting public equity fund managers to a percentage of the assets 
they manage, legal rules distort the market’s incentives and shift the 
focus of fund managers away from the quality of their investment 
decisions.  Profits become a means rather than an end. 
Moreover, the quality of public equity fund governance has itself 
been seriously questioned.  For example, scholars have for many 
                                                          
 514. Id.; see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 20, at 865 (noting the impact of the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis on institutional investors). 
 515. See Diya Gullapalli, ETF Price War Looms as Vanguard Looks to Catch Up, WALL 
ST. J., July 7–8, 2007, at B1 (reporting on Vanguard’s plan to market an ETF similar 
to a Barclay Global Investors ETF but at lower cost). 
 516. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 35. 
 517. See generally supra Part I.D. 
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years doubted whether the fiduciary duties applicable to mutual fund 
managers are adequate.518  As a result, many have advocated an 
increased monitoring role for disinterested directors.519  Meanwhile, 
Joel Seligman has pointed out that SEC oversight of the mutual fund 
industry has often proved lax.520  In fact, peaking around 2003 but 
continuing to the present, the mutual fund industry has been rocked 
by a series of scandals related to late trading, market timing, and the 
selective disclosure of information to investors.521  The result has been 
a flurry of hearings, litigation and rulemaking.522 
                                                          
 518. See Langevoort, supra note 11, at 1017 (noting that the abuses of 2003 
reignited long-standing concerns about enforcing fiduciary obligations in mutual 
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companies and their affiliates); Joel Seligman, Should Investment Companies be Subject to 
a New Statutory Self-Regulatory Organization?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1115, 1126 (2005) 
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mutual fund industry).  But see Langevoort, supra note 11, at 1019 (questioning the 
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 520. See Seligman, supra note 519, at 1115 (citing a report by the General 
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and the resulting settlements); Mahoney, supra note 13, at 176–80 (detailing legal 
and regulatory strategies to address improper mutual fund trading by fund 
managers, brokers and traders).  Other problems have arisen as well, including issues 
of variable products, director independence, soft dollars, volume discounts, portfolio 
manager conflicts, and revenue sharing with broker-dealers.  Seligman, supra note 
519, at 1116–17. 
 522. E.g., Review of Current Investigations and Regulatory Actions Regarding the Mutual 
Fund Industry:  Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 108th 
Cong. (2004); see also Heather Timmons, 2 Fund Groups Agree to Pay $450 Million to 
End Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2004, at C1 (reporting a settlement with regulators 
after two of Amvescap’s companies were accused of improperly allowing market 
timing); Janus Settlement Complete, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at C6 (announcing that 
the Janus Capital Group had reached a $226.2 million settlement with state and 
federal regulators after allegations of improper trading).  For a description and 
assessment of the SEC’s rulemaking efforts in response to the mutual fund scandals, 
see generally Christopher S. Petito & Audrey L. Cheng, The Regulatory Response to 
Mutual Fund Scandals, in MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 412, ch. 28 
(providing an overview of mutual fund abuses, regulatory responses and legislative 
proposals); Edward Sherwin, The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation:  Lessons 
from the SEC’s Stalled Mutual Fund Reform Effort, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 19–53 
(2006). 
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The point of this is not to prove, or even argue, that there are 
substantial agency costs in mutual funds and public pension funds.  
This is obvious and generally well understood.523  The point is to 
suggest that the incentives facing fund managers are at best opaque, 
even to the managers themselves.  At worst, the incentives are exactly 
the opposite of what advocates of institutional investor monitoring 
would hope for.  Public equity fund managers remain passive in their 
investment philosophy because they are paid not to monitor but to 
cut costs. 
Compare this to an incentive fee world such as exists for private 
equity funds.  There, growing the fund is largely irrelevant, except to 
the extent that it allows fund managers to work with more money.  
Neither cutting costs nor advertising improve the managers’ bottom 
line.  However, they receive a twenty-percent share of any increases in 
performance.  Whereas a public equity fund manager would just as 
soon exit an underperforming investment, a private equity fund 
manager earns her living by improving such performance. 
The most likely result of deregulating public equity fund 
compensation would therefore be the expansion of the market for 
good corporate governance.  Public equity funds, like their private 
brethren, would be empowered to compete based on their ability to 
identify and reform underperforming companies.  To the extent a 
given company suffered from significant agency costs, it could expect 
to receive offers from a variety of potential suitors, each promising its 
own set of cures for the company’s perceived ills.  Those public equity 
funds that were best able to bring about positive change in the 
performance of their portfolios would produce the highest returns 
and attract the most capital.  Thus, retail dollars could be expected to 
join the assets of the more well-heeled in the fight to bring discipline 
to corporate managers. 
Indeed, public equity funds that charged a fee based on 
performance would be doubly incentivized to take an active role in 
corporate monitoring.  First, they would have greater reason to 
improve their funds’ performance because they would personally and 
directly benefit from such improvements.524  Second, and perhaps 
                                                          
 523. Some of these costs may be political.  See supra note 170 (providing examples 
of how politics may influence investment decisions).  But see Camara, supra note 4, at 
236–39 (describing “investors [who] are insulated from market and political forces 
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more importantly, they would need to achieve greater returns in 
order to justify their higher fees and avoid a flight of capital.525 
A fee structure that rewards success is both more equitable and 
better able to align the interests of fund managers and fund investors 
than is one which is uncoupled from performance.  Thus, regulatory 
efforts intended to deregulate public equity fund compensation are 
likely to expand and intensify the oversight of corporate America.526  
Investors in mutual funds and public pension funds could therefore 
benefit twice, as both fund managers and corporate managers 
compete to improve their results. 
As an ancillary matter, however, it is worth noting that even if all of 
the hurdles to the exercise of shareholder voice were removed, and 
even if public equity fund managers were permitted to share in the 
benefits from monitoring, there simply may not be a market for 
increased corporate governance.  It may well be that most retail 
investors would prefer the existing low-risk, low-reward strategy of 
public equity funds and would reject any offering of high-risk, high-
monitoring strategies.  In this regard, efforts to deregulate 
shareholder activism have little downside risk.  If there is no market 
for monitoring, nothing will change if the rules are altered.  On the 
other hand, if there is an untapped potential to reduce agency costs 
through improved corporate governance—whether at the level of 
voice or control—it would presumably be fostered by efforts to 
enable that market.  The beauty of any proposal to deregulate fund 
compensation is therefore that its primary function would not be to 
dictate any particular conduct but merely to create the preconditions 
for a deeper market for good corporate governance.  Currently, 
public equity funds have only one viable model—low-cost 
diversification with little or no monitoring.  Were they permitted to 
experiment with a high-cost, high-return model, we would soon 
discover whether additional active monitoring is indeed economically 
efficient. 
 
                                                          
 525. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 309, at 181 (“Wise investors don’t take risks 
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CONCLUSION 
Policymakers should permit mutual fund and public pension fund 
managers to charge incentive-based compensation similar to that 
currently charged by private equity fund managers.  By doing so, they 
would create direct incentives for public equity fund managers to 
adopt a strategy of active oversight.  Monitoring would cease to be a 
distraction and an obstacle to cost-cutting and would instead become 
a primary means of competition.  By bringing the vast resources of 
retail investors into the market for corporate governance, incentive 
pay would fundamentally alter the relationship of corporate 
managers and their shareholders.  The pendulum would swing.  
Managers would become more accountable. 
Admittedly, private equity funds are not without their critics.  For 
example, both their growing wealth527 and newfound political clout528 
have come under attack of late.  In presidential politics, Republican 
hopeful Mitt Romney has been both extolled and criticized for his 
role as a founder of Bain Capital.529  Like corporations, investment 
funds have also had their share of scandal.530  And with a Democratic 
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 530. See Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Bear Stearns Staves Off Collapse of 2 Hedge Funds, 
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Congress and the widely publicized IPO of Blackstone Group, federal 
policymakers have begun rethinking their laissez-faire approach to 
the regulation of private equity funds.531  Even Hollywood has joined 
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the act, casting Matt Damon as a morally dubious hedge fund 
manager in the Oscar-nominated movie Syriana.532 
And yet, despite their growing influence and the interest of 
Hollywood and the press, legal scholars have thus far paid scant 
attention to the role private equity funds play in America’s system of 
corporate governance.533  This is a mistake, however, as private equity 
funds have embraced corporate oversight as their primary investment 
objective.  Not only do their actions benefit overall corporate 
governance by improving the performance of underperforming 
firms, but they also provide an important model for broader 
governance reform.534  Hostile takeovers failed as a monitoring device 
and institutional investor voice remains an unfulfilled promise.  
Public equity fund control, by contrast, has not even been 
considered. 
In fact, institutional investor control may already be on the march.  
Acquisitions by private equity funds are rising as a percentage of total 
deal flow, such that fully twenty percent of global M&A activity, as 
measured by value, is now undertaken by private equity funds.535  
Additionally, several prominent private equity advisers, most notably 
Blackstone Group and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, have either sold 
subscriptions to the general public or announced that they will soon 
do so.536  This will enable such funds to partially tap the retail dollars 
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currently available only to public equity funds and to use them as an 
important additional source for the financing of corporate 
monitoring.  Their aim—like that of the reforms considered in this 
Article—is convergence:  joining retail dollars to the fight for 
improved corporate discipline. 
There can be no guarantee of what would happen if public equity 
fund compensation were to be deregulated.  However, there is reason 
to believe that the result would be increased corporate oversight by 
mutual funds and public pension funds.  Risk and reward would be 
left to mediate between themselves, with different funds offering 
their investors different choices with respect to their preferred level 
of monitoring.  Were that to occur, one might even imagine that 
some public equity funds might join private equity funds in 
competition to squeeze agency costs out of inefficient companies.  
The result would be a deeper and more active market for good 
corporate governance.  Their fees deregulated, public equity funds 
might yet be capable of fulfilling their promise as the ideal corporate 
monitor. 
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